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Abstract
Samuelson, Heidi A. PhD. The University of Memphis. August/2012. Out of
Joint: The Nexus of Madness and Time-Consciousness. Major Professor: Mary Beth
Mader.
According to Edmund Husserl, time is one of the most difficult phenomenological
problems, and difficulties arise as soon as we attempt to reach an understanding of how
temporal objectivity can become constituted in the subjective consciousness of time. I am
focusing on one aspect of time-consciousness – the role it plays in studies of mental illness – in order to expose the difficulties, and ultimately the social problems, that arise
when Husserlian structures of time-consciousness are taken as a medically normal foundation. In the first part of this project, I argue that Husserlian structures of timeconsciousness are uncritically reliant upon a linear flow of time itself and a linear flow of
consciousness. In addition, the structures of time-consciousness must implicitly belong to
a psychologically normal consciousness, because Husserl expressly excludes “the insane”
from empathetic activities like world-time constitution due to the insane's lack of rational
capacity. To support my claims, I turn to phenomenological psychiatry and cognitive science that study mental illness. Husserlian structures of time-consciousness have been
used to explain the way abnormal experiences of time occur in certain patients diagnosed
with mental illness. Historically speaking, this justifies my claim that Husserlian structures of time-consciousness can be taken as normal. In the second part of this project, I
frame my critique of these difficulties in terms of Michel Foucault's historical epistemic
conditions and in terms of power relations. Using the epistemic conditions Foucault
claims frame the modern era (starting from the end of the 18th century), I construct an
explanation for the employment of Husserlian phenomenology in the psychiatric field,
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based on a reliance upon the linear flow of time and linear flow of consciousness. Nevertheless, I argue that we must be cautious about viewing time-consciousness as a normal
feature of human consciousness. This type of application is used in the service of what
Foucault calls “demonstrative truth” that has dominated thought for centuries. This ultimately leads me to a critique of both truth and the social effects of using Husserlian timeconsciousness as a tool in normalization practices, specifically medicalization, that can
marginalize individuals unfairly.
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Introduction
Broadly speaking, the purpose of this project is two-fold, to critique both the
universal claims and the implicit normative claims found in Husserlian phenomenology
of time-consciousness. The structures of Husserlian time-consciousness are taken by
Husserl and those who apply his work in psychiatric disciplines to be universal and
normal, and I deny both of these assertions on historical grounds. In order to make this
argument, I begin with an explanation of the features of Husserlian time-consciousness
that appear regularly in Husserl's work. Then, I examine the way features of Husserlian
time-consciousness appear in studies of mental illness in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Specifically, I look at the structures of Husserlian time-consciousness as they are
empirically employed in both psychiatric and cognitive science research to study (and in
some cases treat) cases of mental illness. Although I justify the use of phenomenology in
psychiatric disciplines from a historical standpoint, I also argue that this employment of
phenomenology corroborates the implicit normality at work in Husserl's phenomenology
of time-consciousness.
One common sign or symptom of mental illness as it appears in 20th and 21st
century discourse is the mentally ill patient's abnormal experience of time. For a patient
who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia or who has suffered trauma, for example,
their experience of the present does not always relate to the past or the future in the same
way it does in a psychologically normal person's conscious experience. To explain these
types of occurrences, some researchers in psychiatric disciplines have turned to
conceptual resources found in Husserlian phenomenology of time-consciousness. I argue
that both phenomenology and the psychiatric disciplines that apply phenomenology

1

utilize conceptual conditions that are assumed to be both ahistorical and descriptive in
explaining time-consciousness. The two conditions I pick out are the linear flow of
consciousness and the linear flow of time. That is, in order to study time-consciousness at
all, for the phenomenologist or the psychiatrist, both a consciousness that flows in a
linear manner and a linear flow of time must be assumed. By linear flow, I mean the
common, everyday way we think of the passage of time and our on-going conscious
awareness as always in motion; where future becomes present and present becomes past,
and we are always in the present.
It is my task in this dissertation to show that the reliance on both of these
assumptions emerges out of a particular historical situation. I highlight two consequences
of situating time-consciousness historically. First, I show how time-consciousness was
able to emerge as an object of study in the first place, and second, I expose the
contingency of the conditions from which time-consciousness emerges. Ultimately, I
argue that the supposed universal features of time-consciousness are historically
conditioned, implicitly normative, and that the conceptual conditions employed to explain
time-consciousness occur in a particular, but contingent, epistemic framework. In other
words, the identification and prioritization of Husserlian structures of time-consciousness
are conditioned upon a particular historical situation. The argument I am making is
Foucaultian. The fact that we talk about the structures of time-consciousness conditioning
conscious experience is indicative of a historical epistemic framework (that we are still in
today), so we can question whether or not they can be applied to all people at all times.
Using Michel Foucault's archaeological work, it becomes evident that Husserlian timeconsciousness and its application in the study of mental illness contributes to the
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discourse and practices, like psychiatric treatment and neurological research, that create
normalized subjects in our modern era. In performing this analysis, I focus on timeconsciousness because it is considered a fundamental and basic experience that underlies
any conscious act. Ultimately, I conclude that having an abnormal time-consciousness
has a marginalizing effect on the subject, and this exemplifies a broad regularization and
normalization indicative of other social institutions in the modern era.
In Foucault's work on madness and psychiatric power, we see that over the course
of history, at least since the Renaissance, there have been social mechanisms to
distinguish people's behavior as atypical or abnormal. The criteria used to make these
determinations are different depending on the time frame, and the way these individuals
have been treated has changed. For instance, people who today we would not deem mad
or mentally ill were assigned the label of madness and treated accordingly – isolated from
society or thrown into confinement, like the Salpêtrière hospital, which served as a prison
for prostitutes and a holding pen for the mad in 17th and 18th century France. Today we
talk about madness in terms of mental illness; although the shift toward viewing madness
as mental illness has changed some of these social responses, those deemed mentally ill
are still in many cases pushed into the margins of society. I will argue that Husserlian
structures of time-consciousness contribute to this marginalization when they are taken
up as regulating norms. This is indicative of what Foucault calls disciplinary power, the
type of power that becomes politically dominant after egalitarian principles take over
from having one sovereign individual in power.1

Foucault explains this in great detail in Discipline and Punish. He writes, “Historically, the
process by which the bourgeoisie became in the course of the eighteenth century the politically
dominant class was masked by the establishment of an explicit, coded and formally egalitarian
juridical framework, made possible by the organization of a parliamentary, representative regime.
1

3

Using Foucault's work on psychiatric and disciplinary power, I argue that the
normalization that takes place in the medicalization of madness as mental illness is a
product not only of certain power structures but also of epistemological commitments to
demonstrative truth. In the modern era, the demonstrative truth of science has dominated
how we view the limits of knowledge. That is, the dominant view of truth is that
whatever can be proved with scientific experimentation in accordance with accepted
physical and mathematical laws. My claim is that the assumptions of the linearity of time
and the linear flow of consciousness are among the conditions that shape scientific
knowledge used in the psychiatric practices that diagnose and treat mental illness. I
conclude this project with the claim that historicizing these conditions and practices that
shape truth reveal the contingency of truth. Ultimately, when truth is contingent and can
change over time, this allows us to call into question the social practices, like society's
treatment of the mentally ill, that rely on it.
Challenges to this Project
I must acknowledge the difficulties in working with two thinkers, Edmund
Husserl and Michel Foucault, whose bodies of work are extensive and whose earlier
works are often considered incompatible with their later works. Husserl published texts
from 1887 up until his death in 1938, and numerous posthumous works have come out
since then (to date there are 39 volumes of Husserliana), including lectures and working
notes. Foucault published texts from 1954 until his death in 1984, and since his death, 14
lecture courses he gave between 1970 and 1984 have also been published (to date four of
But the development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the other, dark
side of these processes. The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were
egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those
systems of micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the
disciplines.” See: Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 222.
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these volumes are forthcoming). Foucault's written work and lecture courses are also
supplemented with interviews and collaborative works. Given the sheer volume of work
these two philosophers accomplished, I have to qualify that I am covering only a small
portion of this material. Before I address the challenges peculiar to each thinker
separately, as well as the challenge of working with psychiatric literature, the scope of my
project must be put clearly.
I am concerned only with Husserlian time-consciousness and how it has been
used in psychiatric work, including clinical psychiatry and particular cognitive science
research that studies cases of mental illness. Although I acknowledge that the application
of Husserlian phenomenology to the field of cognitive science goes beyond the service of
psychiatric research, I am limiting my discussion specifically to time-consciousness and
mental illness. It is a question beyond the scope of this project to enter the contemporary
debate about the employment of phenomenology in cognitive science. I do think the
overlap in the case of time-consciousness applied to mental illness is legitimate and the
use of phenomenology is necessary in these cases, but I am not making claims about the
broader application of phenomenology. Both cognitive science and phenomenology are
vast fields and cover multiple methodologies; it is far beyond the scope of any one
project to cover them all. Merleau-Ponty's work, for instance, has been employed in
contemporary research on embodied cognition, but again, I am limiting myself to discuss
only the use of Husserlian time-consciousness.
Philosophically speaking, my work could perhaps be placed in a debate between
the transcendental and the empirical. Although I acknowledge the contrasts and the ways
in which psychiatrists, particularly those claiming to be doing phenomenological
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psychology, reject aspects of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, I am not putting
these two approaches to philosophy at odds with one another. I am doing a historical
analysis, not a methodological one. What is important to my project is that both
phenomenology and psychiatry arose as disciplines in modernity, and the same epistemic
conditions enabled them both to emerge in this era. I am interested in the similarities
under which time-consciousness emerges as an object of study for both phenomenology
and psychiatry.
Working with Husserl's Corpus
As I mentioned above, the breadth of Husserl's work must be acknowledged as a
potential difficulty to be overcome, particularly on the issue of time-consciousness.
Husserl's work is often seen as divided into three distinct periods, marking when he
worked at Halle (1886-1901), Göttingen (1901-1915), and Freiburg (1916-1928),
respectively. Husserl's earliest works were aimed at providing a foundation for
mathematics using psychology, philosophy, and mathematics, and it is true that his
particular transcendental phenomenology does change and develop over the course of his
work. For my project, I will leave the development of Husserl's thought aside, because
my work does not hinge particularly on any of the supposed divisions of his work. I will
note that my arguments which appeal to Husserl's work that is not specifically on timeconsciousness are based on texts published from Ideas (1913) onward which focus on his
transcendental idealism and his conception of intersubjectivity.
Husserl's study of time-consciousness started at the turn of the century as a
response to the works of Brentano and Meinong. In 1928, Edith Stein published Husserl's
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, which consisted of a series of
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lectures and notes mostly given between the years 1905 and 1911 (and is referred to as
the 1905 Lectures). Time-consciousness remained a central feature throughout the course
of Husserl's work from 1905 on. I am primarily using the 1905 Lectures, as these are the
texts most commonly cited in psychiatric literature. I also mention two other fairly
extensive analyses on time-consciousness that are referred to in Husserl scholarship as
the Bernau Manuscripts (written between 1917 and 1918) and the C-Manuscripts (likely
written between 1929 and 1937). The vocabulary Husserl used to talk about timeconsciousness changed from manuscript to manuscript, but some of the basic concepts of
the levels of time-constitution remain consistent. Furthermore, he remained haunted by
the problem of the relationship between the levels he draws of time-constituting
consciousness. There are different scholarly interpretations of Husserl's understanding of
time-consciousness, and these differences are heavily dependent upon which of Husserl's
texts are used (or excluded) to determine the account. My intent is to explain Husserlian
time-consciousness in a way that lends itself most readily to the way it is taken up in
psychiatric disciplines and not get caught up in the interpretive nuances that mark
contemporary Husserl scholarship.
In order to make my argument that Husserlian time-consciousness is implicitly
normal, I draw on Husserl's work that goes beyond the particular study of timeconsciousness. In order to establish an account of normality that can be applied to timeconsciousness, I look at Husserl's conception of intersubjectivity, drawing on some of
Husserl's later works, including Ideas II (1912)2, Cartesian Meditations (1931), The
Crisis of the European Sciences (1936), and Experience and Judgment (1939). In his
early work, it is well-known that Husserl was highly critical of psychologism, and he
2

Ideas II was not published until 1952, but the majority of it was written in 1912.
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attempted to distance phenomenology from it. Nevertheless, in the 1930s, Husserl was
less critical of psychology, maintaining that psychology is tenable if it is grounded in
phenomenology.
Working with Foucault's Corpus
As with studying Husserl, there are unique challenges that come with employing
the work of Michel Foucault. As I mentioned above, his work comes not only in the form
of his written texts, but in transcribed lecture courses and interviews given primarily in
the 1970s and 1980s up until his death in 1984. Foucault was careful about publishing
interviews during his life, in some cases they were edited and rewritten by Foucault
himself. Much like the way Husserl's work is often divided historically, Foucault's work
is also frequently classified as occurring in three different periods. First, in the 1960s,
Foucault employed what he called an archaeological method, in which he examined
specific historical institutions, like clinical medicine and madness, and how they
developed over time. He frames his analysis in terms of the rules that keep systems of
thought and knowledge within certain boundaries that condition all thinking within a
particular historical time period. Second, in the 1970s, Foucault's work is generally
considered to be focused on analyses of power. Though he does not abandon his
archaeological work, he begins to analyze more particularly that changes in historical era
occur based on contingent events. One of the ways he does so is to examine the way
certain institutions and practices came together to create modern disciplinary power. This
is important to my project because I draw on what Foucault refers to as “psychiatric
power” that also emerges in modernity. Third, Foucault's work in the early 1980s moved
toward an ethics of care of the self, in which he examined ancient notions of the ethical
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self. I do not think the work done in these different time periods of Foucault's work are
incompatible with each other. Much like with Husserl's work, I see Foucault's thought as
developing over time, and I will draw from all three eras, though mostly his work in the
1960s and 1970s. The texts I focus most on are The History of Madness (1961), The
Order of Things (1966), and The History of Sexuality (1976). I also use one lecture course
in particular, the 1973 course on Psychiatric Power to generate much of my criticism as
well as the 1971 public debate Foucault had with Noam Chomsky on human nature.
One more potential problem of note for my project involves my reliance on
Foucault's historicization. Foucault uses three historical divisions throughout his work:
the Renaissance (from the 16th century to the beginning of the 17th), the Classical Era
(from the 17th century to the end of the 18th), and the modern era (which began at the end
of the 18th century). The divisions are approximate and marked by epistemic shifts that
Foucault most clearly presents in The Order of Things, and importantly, the modern era is
the time period we are still in. One of the challenges in doing a historical analysis of this
type is the problem of perspective. Foucault's archaeological claims depend on the idea
that there is a historically situated epistemic framework that structures discourses,
practices, and the way we organize knowledge. It is difficult to criticize one's own era
using the epistemological framework that is being called into question. I will discuss this
problem in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, in spite of this challenge, being aware of historical
changes that have happened at least allows us to question particular regions of knowledge
or truth we may take to be absolute or demonstrative (relating to time-consciousness and
mental illness, for example), and that is what is most important to my project.
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A final challenge I must acknowledge about this project is the problem of using
psychiatric research to make my argument, particularly in Chapter 2. I am not a trained
psychiatrist, nor have I performed any psychiatric or neurological studies on timeconsciousness or on mental illness. I am relying on data collected and interpreted by
researchers and clinicians in these fields. The purpose of my project is not to analyze
their research or critique their methods of data collection and interpretation, and I do not
need this type of analysis to make my argument. What I am using this research for is to
show that Husserlian phenomenology of time-consciousness has been employed in these
empirical disciplines. I am pointing out the types of studies in which Husserlian timeconsciousness has been invoked, not performing or evaluating the studies themselves.
Where a study cites Husserl, what I am doing is interpretive work to explain the findings
in terms of the structures of consciousness I have outlined as Husserlian. I am also
arguing that these studies necessarily use the same assumptions that Husserl implicitly
used, namely the linear flow of time and the linear flow of consciousness.
The Argument
My argument proceeds in the following way. In Chapter 1, I begin with the
emergence of time-consciousness as an object of study in the work of Edmund Husserl.
My goal is first to establish an account of the structures of Husserlian timeconsciousness.3 I show that these structures rely upon a tripartite structure of retention,
primal impression, and protention in order to demonstrate how we are conscious of
objects that change over time. I also show how Husserl analyzed the conscious and
intentional temporal acts conditioned on this tripartite structure (acts like remembering
Throughout this work I use the phrase “Husserlian time-consciousness” to mean the principle
aspects of Husserl's phenomenological account of internal time-consciousness.
3

10

and anticipating), and how these acts and structures are unified in a single consciousness.
According to Husserl, all these structures are universal and rely upon an absolute flow of
time-consciousness that underlies all experience. Against the backdrop of this exegesis, I
argue that Husserl's account of time-consciousness uncritically depends on consciousness
unfolding linearly and uninterrupted within a continuous flow of linear time. This makes
Husserl's argument reliant on the flow of consciousness and the flow of time as
transcendental conditions he takes as intuitively given and, thus, ahistorical. I also argue
that Husserl's account of time-consciousness has an implicit assumption of a
psychologically normal consciousness, and that this must be the case given that Husserl
thinks an objective, shared sense of world-time is intersubjectively constituted.
In Chapter 2, I provide examples of Husserlian time-consciousness being used in
certain psychiatric and cognitive studies of mental illness, and this corroborates my claim
from Chapter 1, that Husserl's time-consciousness is implicitly normal. I demonstrate that
Husserl's account of time-consciousness has been explicitly employed in psychiatric
practices since the early 20th century in order to evaluate abnormal consciousnesses, and
in particular, deviant experiences of time. Husserlian structures of time-consciousness
have also been used in cognitive science and neuroscience (in the service of psychiatric
research), where it has been shown that Husserl's tripartite structure of timeconsciousness describes a set of cognitive operations in the brain. Phenomenology has
been useful in these fields to explain abnormal conscious experiences in certain cases of
mental illness. I look particularly at the case of schizophrenia, in which time-disturbance
is most commonly noted. By examining these cases, I argue that Husserlian
phenomenology of time-consciousness has been brought into the psychiatric discourse of
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normal and abnormal, and this supports my claim that Husserl's account of timeconsciousness is implicitly an account of a normal time-consciousness.
In Chapter 3, I call the universality of Husserlian time-consciousness into
question on historical grounds. In order to do so, I introduce Foucault's archaeological
method developed in the 1960s. To reiterate, the idea behind Foucault's archaeological
method is that systems of thought and knowledge are governed by paradigmatic rules that
operate to order thought on a subconscious level. These paradigmatic rules in the modern
era are centered on the emergence of man as both an object of scientific study and as the
subject performing such studies. With this in mind, I argue that the transcendental
conditions used by Husserl and related psychiatric research in studies of timeconsciousness are not context neutral, but rely upon a modern epistemic framework in
which man is at the center. I apply Foucault's analysis to the particular case of timeconsciousness and show that the way we in the 21st century think about the fundamental
structures of consciousness has occurred as the result of historical, epistemic changes,
and this is further evidenced by the way madness has been viewed as mental illness in the
modern era.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I examine one outcome of the analysis I gave in Chapter 3,
particularly the effects the normalization of time-consciousness has on subjectivity in a
contemporary social context. I begin with a critique of the normalization and
medicalization that occurs in the modern world on the basis of the transcendental
conditions employed in Husserlian time-consciousness and in psychiatric research. I
argue that the normality or abnormality of one's time-consciousness has a direct impact
on what it is to be a subject in the modern era. Under the reign of disciplinary power,
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psychiatry makes use of the Husserlian model of time-consciousness in order to
normalize and control the temporality experienced by the subject. This fits with what
Foucault refers to as biopolitical model of power that focus on making the life of
individuals and populations flourish via regulatory and disciplinary practices.
Nevertheless, the experiences of the mad (the unregulated and undisciplined) still exist,
and I argue that their experiences provide important counter-narratives and counter-truths
that the non-mad must heed in order to question this regularizing power of the status quo.
This allows us (the non-mad) to recognize and bring into question our own normal
subjectivity as it appears in the discourse of both madness and time-consciousness.
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Chapter 1
"Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past."
-T.S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton”
Time and the experience of time is a foundational concept in nearly any thorough
account of human experience, which is why it commonly gets taken up in
phenomenology. In the course of this project, I am specifically concerned with the
phenomenon of internal time-consciousness, that is, the way that time is experienced by
the human consciousness. Coming out of the Kantian tradition, time is seen as a condition
for all rational experience, and more specifically in Husserl's case, all conscious
experience. In one of his letters to Ingarden, Husserl claims that the phenomenology of
time cannot be treated purely for itself, that is, it is inseparable from the constitution of
the individual.1 There is some type of temporal givenness that accompanies the being of
all individual, empirical objects. Furthermore, our conscious life is only understood in
temporal terms, as a flow of successive and coexistent experiences. There is something
about time that we cannot understand outside of our experience of it.
This study of the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness is a topic that
Edmund Husserl grappled with and continued to work on throughout his life, as he
attempted to explain how objective time can be constituted in the subjective
consciousness of time (Hua 10/3).2 It is difficult to simply give a straightforward account
of Husserl's conception of internal time-consciousness, primarily because he never had
In the April 5th letter, Husserl writes that the phenomenology of time “cannot be be treated
separately and purely for itself [sich nicht rein für sich ablösen lässt].” See Husserl, Briefwechsel
III, 182.
1

2

Page numbers for Husserliana 10 will refer to the English translation: Husserl, Edmund. On
the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917).

14

one single and definitive account. Rather, his view developed over a series of lecture
notes and lectures given during the early decades of the 20th century. Because of its
frequent appearance in Husserl's work, it is not a stretch to say that the problem of timeconsciousness is one of the most important problems to phenomenology that Husserl
grappled with. This also explains why there is much secondary literature on Husserl's
time-consciousness. This scholarship starts with Husserl's own student Eugen Fink and
continues with contemporary research on the topic. There are continuing debates about
the consistency of Husserl's account across his corpus as well as the famous problem (and
unsatisfactory solution) of the infinite regress of time-constituting consciousness. I will
draw on different Husserlian texts as well as scholarly interpretations of Husserl's text in
this chapter, but I will not enter these particular debates in Husserlian scholarship. While
I make note of some of the nuanced differences that arise while working across different
Husserlian texts, I intend to come up with a cohesive and general account of the
structures of time-consciousness and a particular vocabulary in this chapter that will be
the reference point for the course of this project.
In this chapter, I will offer a fairly general account of Husserl's conception of the
phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, synthesized from his major works on the
topic. I will focus on what Husserl refers to as the “universal form” of timeconsciousness, highlighting what seem to be the consistent features of Husserl's account
throughout all of his works and drawing a picture of how I think Husserl is describing the
conscious experience of time for the experiencer and the experiencing consciousness.
What I am not concerned with in this project is the problem common to Husserl
scholarship of time-constitution at the primal level at the inner sphere of consciousness.
Nor am I concerned with the questions that arise about the particular nuances of passive
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and active synthesis or the status of the intentionality of the acts of retention or protention.
In the overall course of this project, I am concerned with the kind of time-consciousness
that is taken up in both cognitive science and psychiatry in the context of studying mental
disorders that are marked by the anomalous way in which patients diagnosed with these
mental disorders experience time. The account I draw of Husserl's phenomenology of
internal time-consciousness is a common and general interpretation (and hopefully a clear
one) that corroborates those interpretations employed by these other fields of study.
After drawing the general account, I will argue that Husserl's account of timeconsciousness is an account of a normal time-consciousness based not only on its
supposed universality, but also on the way Husserl conceives of normality. Husserl's
accounts of normality and abnormality are generally reserved for constituting acts like
perceiving and knowing, that is, for the normality of an experience, and do not extend to
the structures of consciousness. Nevertheless, it is possible to employ Husserl's account
of time-consciousness to explain different pathological cases where consciousness of
time is disturbed, and I discuss that in more detail in Chapter 2. Husserl has a tendency to
speak of consciousness generally and its structure universally, and Husserlian structures
are implicitly taken up as those of a normal, default consciousness when psychiatrists like
Binswanger and Minkowski and some research in the cognitive sciences have applied
Husserl's work to studies of pathology. This chapter focuses mostly on an interpretation
of Husserl's account of the structures of time-consciousness. I will argue that there are
cases that call this supposedly universal structure into question, and because of this,
Husserl's account of time-consciousness can enter normal/abnormal discourse.
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Introduction to Time-consciousness in Husserl's Corpus
Husserl's account of time and time-consciousness is interspersed throughout many
of his works. There are three works in particularly that provide the most sustained
accounts of time-consciousness. Husserl's work on time-consciousness began at the turn
of the century, and his most famous 1905 lectures (the only lectures on the subject
published in his lifetime) are published as “The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of
Internal Time” in Husserliana Vol. X.3 Husserl continued to work on time-consciousness,
and gave additional and supplementary lectures between 1905 and 1910, which are also
published in Vol. X. In 1917-18, Husserl worked on what have come to be called the
Bernau Manuscripts, which mark a second stage in his development, building upon his
first accounts and addressing certain problems that arose from them. Eugen Fink
remained in possession of these manuscripts and planned to develop them, but they were
not published until 2001 in Vol. XXXIII of Husserliana. The final phase of Husserl's
work on time-consciousness continued into the 1920s and early 1930s and was published
as the C-Manuscripts in 2006. Husserl's discussion of time-consciousness is not limited to
these texts, which shows the importance of time-consciousness to Husserl as well as his
continued grappling with the issue. I will focus primarily on the 1905 lectures and the
Bernau Manuscripts, because these are the works most frequently cited in the application
of Husserl's work.
Husserl's conception of time-consciousness in the 1905 lectures is in part a
criticism of Brentano, who claimed that time was constituted by the imagination.
According to Brentano, perception is situated only in the present, and our imagination
3

Though labeled the 1905 Lectures, they were not originally published until 1928, by Martin
Heidegger. Husserl's student, Edith Stein put the lecture notes together, and she incorporated
some of his later developments into it.
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completes perception by reproduction and anticipation.4 Husserl claims that this is
impossible. Not only do we sense duration, succession and alteration, the unity of
consciousness encompasses the present and the past. Husserl's innovation in response to
Brentano is the idea of an “extended present” or a “thick present,” that is, we need a
present experience of the past other than simple recollection of a memory. In order to
grasp a succession of representations, Husserl concludes that our conscious content is
temporally extended. That is, our apprehension of experiences extends over time and is
not simply a succession of “now” moments. We would not be able, for example, to
apprehend a melody if our consciousness was unable to form a successive unity. Instead,
as we listen to a song, we retain previous notes and anticipate future ones (particularly if
it is a song we have heard before) in an extended present. This is what enables us to hear
a melody as one unified object and not simply as a collection of unrelated notes. This
innovative notion of the extended present must be explained in order to understand
Husserlian time-consciousness.
The starting point for an account of the extended present, and any discussion of
time-consciousness, must begin with two things required of Husserl's phenomenological
method: 1) the suspension of objective time and 2) the assumption that there is a
streaming or flow of consciousness to which time appears. Husserl introduces both of
these notions at the beginning of the 1905 lectures:
...it may indeed seem as if we were already assuming the flow of objective
time and then at bottom studying only the subjective conditions of the
possibility of an intuition of time and of a proper cognition of time. What
we accept, however, is not the existence of a world time, the existence of a
physical duration, and the like, but appearing time, appearing duration, as
appearing. These are absolute data that it would be meaningless to doubt.
4

This is on Husserl's account, and presumably, these ideas come from transcripts of Brentano's
lecture courses. See: Hua 10/11-20.
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To be sure, we do assume an existing time in this case, but the time we
assume is the immanent time of the flow of consciousness, not the time of
the experienced world. (Hua 10/5)
First, there is a difference between the objective time of the world, or world-time, and the
immanent time of the flow of consciousness. This immanent time is time that appears
[erscheinende Zeit] to us in our conscious experience, while objective time is measurable
and belongs to the “nexus of nature governed by empirical laws” (Hua 10/8). Objective
time is the time of the world and of objects. This is the time that is measured, that allows
us to make and set appointments, and to measure velocity and acceleration. We use
objective time often when we are in what Husserl calls the “natural attitude.” According
to Husserl, the natural attitude is the attitude we are in over the course of our everyday
life and when we do work in the natural sciences.5 We can bracket this attitude, and the
naïve assumptions about objects we form in it, in order to do phenomenological analysis,
whereby we consider only the conscious experience we have of objects.
Our sensed temporal data, which is the immanent time that appears to our
consciousness, cannot be equated with objective time. Objectivity is not constituted
through the primary content of our conscious experience; rather, it must be established.
That is, the starting point for Husserlian phenomenology6 is one's conscious experiences,
and from there we look at objects based on the ways we are intentionally oriented to them.
In his later works, Husserl will add that we do this intersubjectively as well. We do not
have directed access to another's consciousness, so the objective time that we use in our
intersubjective interactions must be constituted subjectively. The building blocks of
5

The natural attitude was first presented in Ideas I, §27-32.

6

At least from Ideas on. I briefly discussed this in the Introduction, but the centrality of
consciousness to Husserl's phenomenological method came about most obviously in Ideas I. See
§33-36.
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objectivity come from data that is given to the subject in conscious experience. Thus,
temporal apprehensions are phenomenologically given to our consciousness; temporal
data is not simply an objective feature of the world outside us. One of Husserl's aims is to
explain how our consciousness conditions our understanding of the objective world of
appearances we constitute and this includes time.
It should also be noted that the immanent time that appears in consciousness
should not be confused with what we might commonly call “subjective time” or the
reflective experience of objective time. That is, even though the duration of a minute or
an hour is always objectively the same, minutes can seem to drag by when you are
waiting in line at the post office or stuck in a traffic jam. By contrast, time seems to fly
when you are caught up in a good film or a tantalizing novel. The subjective experience
of “time flying” when you are having fun is a psychological experience, the analysis of
which still occurs in the natural attitude for Husserl. This is an interesting analysis in the
natural attitude, but it is one we put aside when trying to achieve the phenomenological
description of inner time-consciousness. If we take a phenomenological perspective on
subjective time, as Husserl does, then we suspend the psychological effects on our
perceived passage of time, like boredom, instead, we look at the conscious acts that
constitute time, like perceiving, remembering, anticipating and imagining. It is not a
simple task to pin down all the ways in which Husserl employs the notion of constitution7,
in general, and the way I will use it here, a constituting act is what the consciousness does
when it creates a “state of affairs” [Sachlage] or an object of consciousness. That is, I am

7

For a very comprehensive analysis of constitution, see Sokolowski, The Formation of
Husserl's Concept of Constitution. There are epistemological commitments involved with
constitution (i.e. the constitution of meaning), but I am concerned with time-constitution.
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concerned that these constituting acts of consciousness create a sense of time for our
consciousness.
To unpack this separation of objective time and immanent time of consciousness
further, in the introduction to the 1905 lectures, Husserl claims that he is interested in
“experiences of time” without originally accepting the existence of an empirical world
time. Husserl is explicitly concerned with how time appears to our consciousness. He
explains: “We seek to bring the a priori of time to clarity by exploring the consciousness
of time, by bringing its essential constitution to light, and by exhibiting the apprehensioncontents and act-characters that pertain – perhaps specifically – to time and to which the
a priori temporal laws essentially belong” (Hua 10/10). That is, Husserl is not out and out
rejecting that time is a feature that can be found in the world nor is he claiming that time
occurs only in the mind, in fact, he claims that it is impossible to imagine that we could
not have an experience of time. He is attempting to understand time via the conscious
experience of it. Husserl thinks that by studying consciousness of time, one can get to the
essence of time and how it is that we constitute the a priori laws: “that the fixed temporal
order is a two-dimensional infinite series, that two different times can never be
simultaneous, that their relation is a nonreciprocal one, that transitivity obtains, that to
every time an earlier and a later time belong, and so on” (Hua 10/10). It is important to
note that he is not denying that time is a two-dimensional infinite series in a fixed order,
he is simply attempting to explain our conscious experience of the appearance of
temporal phenomena. He thinks that starting from the conscious experience of time, we
can understand how we come to an objective account of time itself as a linear, infinite
series.
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The second requirement for Husserl's project to get off the ground is the
assumption that there is an experiencing consciousness.8 In Husserl's early work, Logical
Investigations and developed further in Ideas I, he advances the view that the main
characteristic of consciousness is that it is intentional. Intentionality means that every
mental phenomenon has a content, or is directed at an object. In other words,
consciousness is always consciousness of something. This includes our perceptions,
beliefs, desires, etc. From Ideas I and on, Husserl's focus was on the structures of
consciousness, which are distinguishable from acts of consciousness – perceiving,
believing, remembering, and the objects of consciousness – the perception, the belief, the
memory. In Husserl's later works, the Cartesian Meditations and the unfinished Crisis of
the European Sciences, Husserl focuses more on the problems of intersubjectivity and
how a science of mind must be established as a foundation for the natural sciences. That
is, Husserl's earlier work was very subjective, including the 1905 Lectures, his
investigations start from the transcendental ego as that which the world and all
appearances come to. Later, he will attempt to explain how intersubjectivity is crucial to
the way we constitute experience via empathy, as well as how others play a role in the
background of our pregiven “lifeworld” [Lebenswelt].9 Both intersubjectivity and the
lifeworld affect the way we think about temporality not only because the objective time
we constitute is ultimately a shared time, but also, I will argue, because it is by
8

This may seem like an obvious assumption, but Heidegger criticizes Husserl for not instead
starting at the fundamental level of Being.
9

Another difficult concept in Husserl's work, the lifeworld can be thought of both in terms of
the rational structure that underlies our natural attitude and the underlying beliefs we hold or as
the socially or culturally constructed meanings by which we justify our selves, the world and
others. If we look at a community of subjects (which can be related in a variety of ways) then
Husserl calls their common lifeworld the “homeworld” in which meanings are established within
a shared language. Subjects who belong to different communities still have a common framework
of “a priori structures” that can be translated from one language to another.
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comparing experiences of time that we can speak of normal and abnormal
consciousnesses.
Even when Husserl's work focuses more on intersubjectivity, time-consciousness
remains a central issue throughout his work. Though many of Husserl's ideas develop and
are refined over the course of his work, consciousness is always intentional and always
described as a flow. If consciousness is a moving flow, then we experience it as changing
over time, and this means time-consciousness is integral to it. Consciousness, for Husserl,
is absolute, meaning it underlies all constitution. One of the ways we examine
consciousness is to consider the way objects constituted in our stream of consciousness
endure and have continuous existence. For example, we try to define objects, like the
notes of a melody we hear, as existing in time-points with each note being a point in time.
Even though each time-point is fixed in relation to other time-points, as we experience it,
the melody “flies into the distance for consciousness” (Hua 10/27). That is, the melody is
an object of our consciousness, and it passes through our conscious awareness one note at
a time. When the melody finishes, a new or different object enters our awareness. Even
though we can separate time objects, like melodies, out of our conscious awareness, the
objects appear to us in one streaming conscious flow. This is why Husserl claims that “if
anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of
a process” (Hua 10/76).
To put this another way, consciousness is always a continuous flow. You cannot
turn it off and on, and though you have mechanisms to remember and recollect, you
cannot rewind or replay your experiences in the same type of intentional act as perceiving
them for the first time. When we look at the phenomena of objects appearing to us, “we
necessarily find a flow of continuous 'change'; and this change has the absurd character
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that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither 'faster' or 'slower'” (Hua 10/76).
Consciousness is a flow of objects that appear in a linear order at an unchanging rate.
Even when we reflect on our experience of objects that appear to our consciousness, our
reflections still appear in this flow despite the fact that we are performing a different kind
of conscious act than simply perceiving, say, a melody. This is why Husserl refers to the
time-constituting continuum as “a flow of continuous production of modifications of
modifications” (Hua 10/106). Reflecting on a perception is one such modification that
can occur within the flow. Even though our consciousness is a complex of different
conscious acts, it is unified and these acts work together. Consciousness also has a sense
of ownness to it, that is, I have a sense that my conscious activity is peculiar to me and
not accessible to anyone else.10 This ownness corroborates the absolute and independent
nature of consciousness.11 Husserl's project was to understand the structures of
consciousness from this starting point, and we can see how crucial understanding its
temporal nature will be to that task.
To explain this more precisely, throughout his corpus, Husserl maintains three
different levels of temporality that we can investigate from a phenomenological
perspective. Through phenomenology, we can get to the structures of consciousness that
condition our experience of time. There is a difference between 1) the time of appearing
objects, 2) the immanent time of acts of consciousness, and 3) the absolute flow of timeconsciousness, and it is important to understand this distinction. All three levels of
10

See: Cartesian Meditations, §44.

11

Consciousness is the basic starting point for Husserlian phenomenology, and (I will return to
this later in the project) Husserl is Cartesian in his acceptance of it as something that exists
independently of the world. In Ideas I, Husserl claims that “no real being … is necessary to the
being of consciousness itself” and that “the whole spatio-temporal world … is, according to its
sense, a merely intentional being.” See §49.
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temporality are different levels of the appearing time of consciousness. I will now explore
Husserl's conception of the phenomenology of time-consciousness thematically in terms
of these three levels of temporality. First, I will offer an explanation of the protentionprimal impression-retention structure that enables us to perceive temporal objects, the
subjective time-constituting acts of consciousness and the unity of these acts, and the
absolute flow of consciousness. Then, I will describe a universal form of timeconsciousness using those three aspects of time-consciousness. Once this is explained, I
will begin my critique of the underlying assumptions of normality made by Husserl in his
project.
The Structures of Time-Consciousness
Protention – Primal Impression – Retention Structure
Husserl centers his analysis of time-consciousness in the 1905 lectures on an
explanation of how we experience certain time objects,12 or objects that contain temporal
extension, like the example of the melody I mentioned briefly above.13 Consciousness is
intentional for Husserl, and so consciousness will always relate to some object and its
way of appearing. The melody is a special type of object for Husserl, because it contains
temporal extension in itself, unlike something like a table, which exists in time but only
as a unity of atemporal properties that endure over time. Ultimately his goal is to explain
the structures of consciousness that condition the appearance of the time object, and using

12

There is a difference between a temporal object [zietliche Objekte], which refers to the unity
of properties at a time, and a time object [Zeitobjekte], which refers to an object containing
temporal extension in itself. A melody or a spoken sentence are obvious examples of time objects,
as one cannot conceive of either occurring at a single moment.
13

The melody is really Husserl's only example, and it is employed frequently in his work.
Though the melody explains this phenomenon well, we could give a similar analysis on a spoken
sentence, for instance.
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the time object as an example, we can understand this fundamental structure of our timeconsciousness.
The example of the melody can be used to clearly show what is meant by a time
object being constituted over a duration. Each tone in a melody has its own temporal
extension, that is, it has a duration. When the tone starts, I hear it 'now' and as it continues
to sound, it has a new 'now.' The original 'now' changes into the past. The tone has a
“duration-unity,” which is the unity of the whole process in which it begins and ends. Just
as the individual tones fall back into the past, the unity also “recedes into the ever more
distant past” (Hua 10/25). The tones of a melody, or the elapsed durations constantly
“sink back,” but they are still retained in consciousness, because the melody has the unity
described above. Every time-point is fixed in the melody. I am conscious of notes and
succession, but more importantly, I am conscious of a continuity.
As we have seen above, Husserl presupposes a continuous flow of consciousness,
although he does not claim this specifically, the temporal nature of this flow is
conditioned on the appearance of a continuous flow of time itself. He assumes a
succession of points, where past comes prior to future. In the 1905 lectures, Husserl
explains the appearing phenomenon in consciousness as a continuity of constant changes
that form a unity as a running-off (Hua 10/29). There is a starting point where a time
object [Zeitobjekte] begins to exist by appearing in our consciousness. This is a 'now.'
What was now becomes past. The running-off changes continuously, since a new 'now'
always enters consciousness. What was 'now' becomes past, and preceding points move
uniformly into the past. This continuity is immutable, and Husserl claims this is
immutable with regard to its form (Hua 10/29). This means that the notes we hear, for
instance, sink back into the past in a particular temporal order. It seems that for Husserl,
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there is something like a history of our consciousness that stretches like a linear time line.
If we had a perfect memory we could recall the order of all of our perceived events, and
thus we could recall the order notes in a melody.14 Husserl refers to these impressions that
sink back as “primary memories” because they are memories that remain in our
awareness even after they pass. He claims that the extension of primary memory is in
principle infinite. We can single out points in the continuity, focus on these points, and
separate them into phases, but this is always an abstraction on our part. We perform this
type of objectifying analysis on reflection.
Time-consciousness is in a state of constant change, but the constitution of the
time object does have a beginning in what Husserl calls a 'primal impression'
[Urimpression]. The primal impression is best described as the presentation of the 'now'
described above. Each note of the melody is first experienced as a primal impression
before it sinks back into the past, so there is a continuous series of retentions that are
modifications of the primal impression. When an immanent time object has elapsed, like
when a melody has finished playing, the consciousness of the now-past does not stop
when the object stops being presented. It is simply no longer part of perceptual, or
immediate impressional, consciousness. Husserl explains: “the impressional
consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new retentional consciousness”
(Hua 10/31). A retention is weaker in intensity than the genuine tone-sensation, and the
retentional tone is only “primarily remembered” (Hua 10/33). Yet, this is still different
from recalling a melody heard in the past, which would be the recollection of a secondary
14

In recent years, there have been widely publicized cases of people who do claim to have
“perfect memories.” That is, they can remember what happened on every single day of their life.
Though, given the research, it is unclear whether these patients remember with clarity all their
conscious activity, thoughts, imaginings, even if they remember remembering, as well. See:
Parker E. S., Cahill L., McGaugh J. L., p. 35-49.
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memory or an act of time-constitution. An intuition of the past (a secondary memory) is
different from consciousness of what has just been, which is only a primary memory of a
time object held in the retentional consciousness.
Of course, there is not some definitive line where a retention stops being a
retention and starts being a memory. This is simply the way we categorize memories
upon reflection. If perception of the time object no longer occurs, then the perception is
not followed by a new phase of the perception, but by a fresh memory. Husserl explains
that “a pushing back into the past continually occurs” and so the time object we just
perceived can now be recollected as a secondary memory, albeit a very recent one (Hua
10/32). This continuous process of sinking back is modified until it disappears and ends
in imperceptibility.15 So, retention is not simply the recollection of a memory that
happens in the present. Rather, retention is structural part of the “extended present,”
making the present “thicker” than the fraction of clock time it takes to have a perception.
This is Husserl's initial account of the form of time-consciousness, but he expands
on it in the Bernau Manuscripts. Some of Husserl's language changes between the 1905
Lectures and the Bernau manuscripts. Instead of a “primal impression” [Urimpression],
Husserl refers to the same phenomenon as the “primal presentation” [Urpräsentation]. He
also refers to “immanent time objects” as “events” [Ereignisse]. These changes and the
reasons for them have been discussed by other Husserl scholars,16 but for my purposes,
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An interesting issue arises in the relationship between retentions and recollections that
Rodemeyer has written about at length. That is, there are some retentions that seem to be a part of
our conscious awareness all the time. For instance, if I am fluent in a second language, it is held
in the background of my consciousness where I can access it even without thinking about it,
unlike a memory, which requires an act of remembering. Rodemeyer has explained this apparent
tension with the idea of near retentions and far retentions. See: Rodemeyer, 2006.
Notably, John Brough. See: “Notes on the Absolute Time-Constituting Flow of
Consciousness.” See also: Brough, “The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s
16
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this change in language is simply an indication that Husserl made more than one attempt
to explain the form of time-consciousness. The basic retention structure outlined above
does not change, so I will maintain Husserl's original terminology for these phenomena.
What the Bernau Manuscripts add to the retention-primal impression structure
explained above is a more explicit inclusion of the act of anticipation, what Husserl calls
a protention. Though the Bernau Manuscripts are most noted for Husserl's expansion of
the theme of the constitution of objective time, he also goes further with his explanation
of the protention-primal impression-retention structure. There is an interweaving of
protentions and retentions that cannot be taken apart from the process of time-constitution.
Husserl says explicitly that protention and retention rely on each other (Hua 33/31-33).17
That is, there is a retention of protentions and a protention of retentions, and they meet at
a point (what Husserl referred to as “the now” or “primal impression” in the 1905
lectures) where the anticipated protention is fulfilled before receding as a retention.
Simply put, there is an expectation (a protention) that is fulfilled (a primary impression),
and then it sinks back into the past (a retention). Without being able to protend, our
momentary experiences would have very little meaning or coherence. Protention is
consciousness's openness to what is beyond it, and what we retain can affect our
expectations. Thus, protention and retention influence the meaning and direction of the
other's content, and we understand the experienced present as having this structure.
This is Husserl's account of the conditions for the way we experience our flow of
consciousness as temporal. To summarize in less technical language, when we perceive

Early Writings on Time-Consciousness,” p. 308–309.
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Page numbers for Volume 33 refer to: Husserl, Edmund, Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das
Zeitbewusstsein (1917-1918). (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001).
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an object, like a spoken sentence, we have an initial impression of it that is registered to
our consciousness. As we listen to the sentence, the initial impression sinks back into the
past and we retain that perception as we hear new words being spoken. There is also an
anticipatory character to this experience, the protention, and even though we do not know
the content of the sentence, we can anticipate its duration and its end. The initial
impression is pushed back further into the past until it is no longer perceptible. If we can
recollect the sentence later, then it is a different act than the original experiencing. The
protention-primal impression-retention structure is not the same as the past-present-future
phases of the object or the stream of consciousness of lived experience.18 It is the
structure of time-consciousness in the invariant form described above that constitutes the
temporal flow of our consciousness and conditions our experiences. This is the universal
form that time-consciousness takes on, and it is universal because it holds the same for all
the experience of time a consciousness has, and presumably, for all consciousnesses.
Time-Constituting Acts and the Unity of Consciousness
The difference between retention and memory mentioned above leads us to the
second aspect of Husserl's time-consciousness that must be addressed. The
phenomenology of time-consciousness is not limited to time objects. Husserl's example
of the melody explains the basis structure of time-consciousness when perceiving a time
object, but our consciousness is more complex than just perceiving time objects. We can
also think about time-consciousness at the level of the acts of consciousness that intend
time objects. For instance, one can remember one's childhood pet while reading a memo

“Lived experience” is a technical term for Husserl. We are conscious of our lifeworld as a
horizon of experience, but it is not a static background. We are active and live together with the
world.
18
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in the present and anticipating a drink after work all “at the same time.”19 What it means
to live as a conscious human being includes other experiences like memory, anticipation
and phantasy. These, as well as perception, are all time-constituting acts where our
consciousness presents objects, re-presents objects, and expects the re-presentation of
objects. These acts are temporal, but they are different from the basic protention-primal
impression-retention structure described above. Namely, the protention-primal
impression-retention structure conditions the different intentional, temporalizing acts that
our consciousness can perform.
Husserl maintains the idea of the protention-primal impression-retention structure
even as late as Experience and Judgment, but he continues to analyze the issue of how
different conscious, temporal acts fit together in the unity of consciousness. We have an
awareness of our acts of consciousness, that is, I am aware that my memory is different
from my perceiving something or that an act of remembering is different from an act of
phantasy. This awareness is temporal, that is, I know my learning how to ride a bike
occurred before the events I am perceiving now, and that I am simply having a memory
of it. When I recollect that memory, I am bringing it forth to my current awareness, but I
still know it is a past-experience being recalled in the present by my intentional act of
remembering. Furthermore, suppose I have this recollection when I see a group of
children riding bikes; the memory does not make the perception of the children disappear.
Even though what is remembered “lies far behind” my current perception, “the memory
as a lived experience is contemporaneous with the lived experience of perception” (EJ
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Of course, this is just a turn of phrase. Remembering, reading, and anticipating do not
actually happen at the same time objectively speaking. They are separate primal impressions, but
to human awareness sometimes this temporal difference is negligible.
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176). I am not always remembering or expecting, but I do have an abiding awareness of
my life as an on-going flow of successive experiences.
To use the metaphor Husserl employs in the C-Manuscripts, these acts of
consciousness are like waves in the flow of consciousness, they are distinct from one
another, but all a part of the flow, which is a form of consciousness that is always filled
(Hua Mat VIII 362–363). That is, consciousness is a single flow. It is only in reflection
that “we find a single flow that breaks down into many flows” but this multitude of flows
still “has a kind of unity that permits and requires us to speak of one flow” (Hua 10/81).
Our stream of consciousness is very complex when we try to offer an explanation of it.
Yet, “there rather exists something like a common form of the now, a universal and
perfect likeness in the mode of flowing” (Hua 10/81). Our consciousness is unified and
there is a transcendental subject which is aware of the flow of consciousness, but how
does this unity work?
The explanation as to how and why there are different levels of timeconsciousness at work simultaneously is very difficult, and Husserl himself does not
seem satisfied with his own explanation. In the 1905 lectures, Husserl explains that the
unity of the flow of consciousness (the acts of remembering, perceiving, etc.) and the
unity of a time object (via the protention-primal impression-retention structure) are
constituted “at once.” He continues: “As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it
may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless
the case that it does. And this can be made intelligible on the basis of the flow's essential
constitution” (Hua 10/84). Our consciousnesses are complex, but it is not difficult to
listen to a melody, or have a memory, or imagine something. We do all of these things
automatically, and we just have a sense that it is one consciousness that is “doing” all of
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this. Furthermore, there is a sense that this is our own consciousness that is having these
experiences and performing these intentional acts.
Transcendental subjectivity explains what underlies this awareness and unification,
but when we try to bring temporality into this discussion, the explanation becomes more
complicated. As I will describe in the next section, our consciousness has an underlying,
absolute temporal flow that makes time-constitution possible, but this underlying flow is
primordial and pre-reflective, that is, we have no awareness of it. When we do reflect on
our consciousness, we can have gaps in our memory, for example. We have a lot of lines
of the past that appear side-by-side in our memories (EJ 176). It takes a synthetic step on
our part to unify them. It seems that there are different strands of time being woven by
our consciousness automatically - the primary memory constantly fading back into the
past, the recollection of secondary memories long since past, the anticipation of a future
event, etc.
Just like all of these things are tied to one consciousness, it seems as though there
must be some form of time itself that makes all of these connections possible.
Theoretically, we could piece our conscious experiences together chronologically on a
time line. That is, not only can we tell the difference between a memory and what is not a
memory, we can put them together in an order. Like the way retentions sink back
infinitely into the past in a particular order, our consciousness is held up against some
infinite line of time where past, present, and future are always related in a universal
invariant form. This requires that time be a linear flowing object that it is constantly
changing but maintains the same form and speed, and Husserl seems to accept time
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itself20 in this way without question. The unity of consciousness is dependent on the prereflective level of the absolute flow of consciousness, but also on the invariant form of
time.
The Absolute Flow of Time-Constituting Consciousness
From the account given in the 1905 lectures to his later work, Husserl maintains
the idea that there is some sort of absolute or primal level of time-consciousness
underneath the level of time-constituting acts such as memory, anticipation, etc. But
having a primal, pre-reflective level carries the problem of how it relates to the other two
levels of temporality described above, that is, constituting time-objects and timeconstituting acts. Though the terminology Husserl uses to describe these levels of
consciousness changes, the levels themselves are maintained throughout his work. In the
1905 lectures, Husserl uses the terminology I employ, that is, “the absolute timeconstituting flow of consciousness” (Hua 10/73). In the Bernau manuscripts, he replaces
his terminology of the “absolute flow” with “primal process,” [Urprozess] but the
division of the levels of constitution remains the same. John Brough has explained in
detail the terminological differences Husserl employs to explain these three levels, and
that discussion does not affect my project. I only note that I will use the language of
“absolute flow” from the 1905 Lectures, but it may be helpful to think of the division
with Husserl's later terminology.21 The important point is that there is a base level, which

It is important to know that “time itself” is not the same thing as “objective time” for Husserl.
Objective time is often taken up in a way that makes it seem like an absolute phenomenon, but in
phenomenology there is a clear distinction. According to Husserl, time itself is a linear flowing
object that is essential to consciousness, and we know this because our consciousness is
structured temporally and we can extract the essence of time from our temporal experiences like
that of the melody.
20
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John Brough has simplified these three levels as internal experiencing, the experience
[Erlebnisse], and the intentional object of experience, and this is a helpful clarification. See:

34

is the flow of consciousness that underlies all experiences the subject has. On the second
level are the time-constituting acts we perform as conscious subjects, like perception,
memory, and phantasy.22 There is also a level on which we are aware of our acts of
consciousness, and this is also the level where we constitute time-objects and world time.
Much scholarship rests on the relationship between these levels of timeconstitution, because of the problem of the infinite regress of constitution.23 Husserl
explains that we have an awareness of the absolute flow (even though the flow is prereflective and primal) in addition to our awareness of acts of consciousness and our
objects of consciousness. In the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl explains the flow and the
experiences it constitutes are inseparable.24 But the question that appears again and again
for Husserl is how the flow can be conscious of itself? This relationship between levels of
consciousness can be readily seen between temporal acts and objects. That is, we have
temporal objects (and time objects) and our acts of consciousness are the intentional acts
aimed at these objects. Supposedly these conscious acts are constituted by the absolute
flow of consciousness. So, if the absolute flow of time-consciousness constitutes these
acts, then is another level necessary below the level of the absolute flow in order to

“Notes on the Absolute Time-Constituting Flow of Time-Consciousness.”
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We also experience phantasy at this level, where we constitute fictional time. See:
Husserliana XXIII. Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory. Trans by John B. Brough.
(2005).
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There is another way that the problem of the infinite regress works in Husserl. Not only do
we experience temporal objects like melodies, we distinguish the enduring object from its way of
appearing before us. The object we perceive has a duration and this is explained by the
protention-primal impression-retention structure that makes this possible. The act of perceiving
can be taken as an object, when we reflect on a past perception, for instance, that act also has a
duration. So, if perception has a duration, then something must make its temporal phases possible
and so on.
24

See Hua XXXIII, §44-48.
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constitute it? If not, then that means the absolute flow constitutes itself in some way. As
Zahavi puts this problem very simply, the succession of consciousness does not give us
the consciousness of succession.25 Husserl attempts to explain this without positing
another temporally extended consciousness whose task it is to unify the first-order
consciousness, and so on. We can either continue positing more layers of consciousness
or we can solve the problem in some other way. Husserl does not want to posit layers in
an infinite regress, but his other attempts to solve the problem remain unsatisfactory, even
for himself.
I do not aim to solve the problem of the infinite regress here, nor will I give a
sustained account of this debate here. This problem deserves mention, however, because
there has been so much scholarly debate regarding it, and the structures of timeconsciousness I am investigating do still rely on the absolute flow for Husserl. This
debate is beyond the scope of this project; it is enough for my project to acknowledge that
Husserl accepts that there is an absolute flow of time-consciousness and that some
relationship exists between these levels. My analysis focuses on the intentional acts of
perceiving, imagining and the protention-primal impression-retention structure. Husserl
claims that time-consciousness starts with some “transcendental event” that is related in
some way to the acts of consciousness that constitute objects, but the questions of how
the acts themselves are constituted and whether or not this constitution goes on ad
infinitum is not necessary to answer. My interest is more in the universal applicability of
Husserlian time-consciousness on the level of the structures on which we can reflect.
Remember that Husserl's goal as stated in the 1905 Lectures is to constitute objective
time from subjective experience. That is the question that remains central to my project.
25

See Zahavi (2007): 72-73.

36

Summarizing the Universal Form of Time-Consciousness
Above, I have explained the major aspects of Husserl's phenomenology of internal
time-consciousness. First, there is the protention-primal impression-retention structure
that conditions our experience of time objects. Second, there are the time-constituting
acts of consciousness like remembering, perceiving, and imagining. These acts are timeconstituting because they intend objects (memories, phantasies, melodies, etc.) that have
temporality and/or are in time. Third, there is an absolute flow of time-consciousness that
underlies the acts of consciousness. The absolute flow of time-consciousness is prereflective and unchangeable, and on this level we cannot distinguish between different
moments of the streaming flow. Any act of distinguishing would occur at the level of the
time-constituting acts of consciousness. There is continuous change, but it always
maintains the same form and the same intervals. Husserl does not argue for this, it is
simply his description of how time seems to appear to us. Husserl confirms in all of his
major works on time that time itself is a universal and invariant form. The content of a
sensation changes depending on the individual (and within one individual as well), but
the form of time is always the same. This means that the protention-primal impressionretention structure is fixed. This also means that even though our subjective timeconstituting acts, like perceiving, remembering, imagining, etc. function in fixed ways
relative to the protention-primal impression-retention structure.
The story does not end here. Husserl maintains this general form of timeconsciousness even as late as Experience and Judgment. In this work, he relates the unity
of consciousness back to objective time, or world-time, which is the time used by the
natural attitude (but is constituted by the subject based on the appearance of time to our
consciousness) and the time we use in order to interact with others. If two people can
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experience the same event, then their experiences must relate back to some shared,
objective world and a world time. It seems then that not only do we have the problem of
how to go from the subjective to the objective, we can also ask how we go from the
subjective to the intersubjective.
Questions of intersubjectivity become more important to Husserl in his later
writings. Up until then, his focus was mostly on the transcendental subject and structures
of consciousness. In works like The Crisis the concepts like the “lifeworld” come into
play while Husserl attempts to explain our intersubjective nature. The lifeworld is the
structure that underlies our socially and culturally constructed meanings that come from
living with others. Husserl writes:
In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon,
as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each “I-the-man” and all of
us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world;
and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing
precisely through this ‘living together.’ We, as living in wakeful worldconsciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of
the world... Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego;
rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together,
belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning... The
we-subjectivity... [is] constantly functioning. (CES 108-109)
Though we can talk about an individual's consciousness, and it seems that we only have
direct access to our own consciousness, for Husserl, we are always intersubjective. To put
this very simply, it seems that for Husserl, although no one else has access to my
consciousness, the objects of my consciousness and the meaning I give them come from a
shared world that I conceive as objective reality. Although I am born into a certain
cultural and historical situation, I help constitute the world as I continue to live and
interact with others. In order to explain how my consciousness interacts with others, we
seem to have a shared time we take to be objective, and it seems that a complete account
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of time-consciousness must include an explanation of intersubjective time. Remember
that Husserl, from the outset of the 1905 Lectures, is ultimately trying to explain how we
have objective time, and to get there, this requires intersubjectivity.
It is my contention that the use of a notion of normality, specifically of a normal
consciousness enables Husserl to make the transition from an account of internal timeconsciousness to intersubjective time (which ultimately leads to objective time). To make
the move from the appearing time I experience to an intersubjective time (and objective
when employed in the natural attitude) I assume that others have similar structural timeconsciousness as mine. This characterization is a simplistic account of the notion of
empathy Husserl develops in the Cartesian Meditations, but the general idea is that
intersubjective experience is empathetic. That is, we attribute intentionality to the acts of
others by putting ourselves in the other's place. We have a fundamental belief that a being
that looks and acts like me perceives things from a perspective similar to my own. That is,
if I were in the other's place, I would perceive things in approximately the same way. This
belief is a part of the pregiven background of my lifeworld.
What results from this is that because we are intersubjective, in a world with
others who are also time-constituting creatures, we can start to compare ourselves to
others. One way to do this is on the cultural level, as Husserl does with his idea of the
homeworld, but we can also compare our conscious life. It is a pre-given belief that
others are like us in terms of our intentional acts, but on occasion we see someone who is
not like us and not acting in a way that we can empathize with. It seems that with this
type of empathy, there is often an implicit presumption of normality at work that extends
from the subject. That is, in assuming that others are like me, I am assuming that I am
normal or typical. I often make this assumption automatically and un-reflectively until I
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encounter someone who is different from me.26 I am not constantly confronted with
behavior that I cannot explain as intentional so I assume that there are normal ways of
acting, perceiving, etc.
For instance, I assume that most people see colors the way I do. Suppose I am
touring Graceland and I tell my companion to meet me by the pink Cadillac, I am
assuming they can pick out the color pink. It is not just assuming that others are like me.
Norms obviously function on the cultural and social levels, and Husserl would not deny
this. Statistical norms and social norms often corroborate my own norms, for instance,
most people are not colorblind. Nevertheless, empathy is not a consideration of cultural
norms, but works on the level of intentional acts of consciousness, so it seems to me that
there is also some assumption of a normal consciousness at work. If there was not, then
we would never be able to attribute intentionality to multiple others in a coherent way.
Usually we understand the behavior of others on a very basic level, I assume people
perceive, remember, etc. and in doing so, I am assuming their consciousness is structured
like mine. Because I expect similar behavior from all human beings unless experience
proves otherwise, I am implicitly employing some norm or standard of typical behavior.
When I tell my companion to meet me by the pink Cadillac, I am assuming that the
ability to pick out the color pink is normal.
I must emphasize that Husserl does not make any explicit reference to a normal
consciousness in this way, but I contend that his account of time-consciousness is
dependent upon an implicit notion of a normal consciousness. This implicit assumption is
best seen in cases that stick out as anomalous, which we can explain by comparing them
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For example, it took me going to school and being around other children my age for me to
realize that my writing with my left hand was not “normal.”
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to Husserl's universal form of time-consciousness. Furthermore, it is this implicit
assumption that enables cognitive scientists and psychologists to evaluate disordered
consciousnesses as I will show in Chapter 2. In what follows, I will look at cases that
seem to be abnormal or anomalous as compared to the universal form of timeconsciousness I have described in this chapter. Then I will look at Husserl's account of
norms to support this contention. I will also consider why Husserl did not make these
claims about a normal time-consciousness himself.
Threats to the Universal Form of Time-Consciousness
In this project, I am interested in the way an experiencing subject “lives” their
conscious experience of time and how normality fits into this conscious experience. What
I have provided above is an account of the structures of time-consciousness, and this is a
general account, gleaned from texts that span Husserl's career. Now that the structure is
established, the crux of my project is to apply these structures to cases of actual human
experience. Do the structures outlined above provide a descriptive account of the
temporal nature of conscious experiences for all human beings? What happens when we,
the experiencer, do not know that a piece of conscious data is a retention? What happens
if we are mistaken and we think we are having a memory that is actually a phantasy?
More specific to this project, what happens when one has a condition like schizophrenia
or insomnia that affects all of one's conscious experiences and perhaps their very
structures of consciousness? How does this affect these individuals' sense of
intersubjectivity and their ability to contribute to constituting objective time?
For Husserl, time-consciousness is explained by certain structures. There is an
invariant relationship between protention, retention and primal impression, and this is the
structure that conditions our experience of temporal objects. There is also a unity to
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consciousness that recognizes all the time-constituting acts as part of one consciousness,
and this unity is conditioned upon the absolute flow of internal time-consciousness. The
subjective features enable us to constitute an objective and intersubjective time. It is my
contention that within Husserl's phenomenology, these structures of time-consciousness
are best explained as “normal.” That is, it is only via an implicit normal consciousness
which has universal structures that we can empathize with others. Insofar as we are
intersubjective, we do regularly empathize with others, so we rely on structures implicitly
considered normal. I will argue that this is how normality operates within Husserl's
phenomenology of time-consciousness. Nevertheless, I am not endorsing this notion of
normality. If there are cases that do not fit Husserl's implicitly normal descriptions of
these structures, then we can call the absoluteness of the structures of time-consciousness
into question.
Before I go further, I want to clearly define the structural features that will appear
in this project as features of time-consciousness that can potentially be disrupted or can
be judged as occurring in an abnormal way. First, there is a continuous flow of timeconsciousness; this continuity means that supposedly there are not breaks in our
conscious experience. Second, there is linearity to this flow of consciousness,27 whereby
linearity I mean the protention-primal impression-retention structure occurs in a fixed
order. We anticipate, have a primal impression, and then retend that impression in a thick
present. Third, we have time-constituting acts like perceiving and remembering. These
are not structural in the same way protention-primal impression-retention provides the
building blocks for the constitution of time objects, but these are intentional acts that are
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There is also linearity to time itself, and though this is not a structure of consciousness, this
assumption of linearity will also be a point where I call Husserl's account into question.
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conditions by that underlying structure. Fourth, the unity of consciousness refers to the
way the structures and acts of consciousness work together to form a cohesive unit.
Finally, the ownness of consciousness is the abiding awareness of that I am the only one
who has access to my consciousness. Keeping these features in mind will help navigate
the cases I point to throughout this project where abnormalities or anomalous cases seem
to occur.
I am not the first person to attempt to critique Husserl's phenomenology of timeconsciousness on the basis of some type of anomalous condition that affects the
conscious experience of time.28 In looking at cases of melancholia, for example, Ludwig
Binswanger shows that in a melancholic state, the patient experiences a transformation of
time-consciousness. He uses the case of Cécile Münch, a patient who had an
overwhelming sense of guilt about a decision made in the past. Based on her self-reported
experiences, Binswanger goes on to claim: “The self-reproach of the melancholic is often
expressed linguistically in conditional form, such as 'If I had not proposed the trip,' or 'If I
would have not only suggested.'”29 The melancholic person is focused on finding open
possibilities in the past (which is impossible), so her protentions are exclusively oriented
on the past instead of the present. According to Binswanger, the primal impression
disappears with the protentions oriented this way, because the protentions are empty
intentions that do not get fulfilled in the present, primal impression. The protention is
meant to be something anticipated that is fulfilled in the present and then sinks back into
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Another example of this is Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological analysis of insomnia. In a
state of insomnia, he claims, the unity of consciousness dissolves as the primal impression as the
moment of the creation of the new is out of play. See: Levinas, Otherwise than Being (or Beyond
Essence). pp. 153-62. See also: Levinas, Time and the Other.
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Binswanger (1960), 27. Translation mine.
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retentional consciousness. If the primal impression does not precede the retention and
instead the protention is oriented toward retention, then the structure of the intentional
time-consciousness is amiss. In my terms, this is a disruption of the linearity of the flow
of time-consciousness. According to Husserl, the flow of retentions that sink back must
always sink back in a chronological linear order, from anticipated primal impressions. In
this case, it seems like the patient is futilely trying to relive a retention as a primal
impression in order to change how she acted in response to it. The patient is doing more
than performing the time-constituting act of remembering. Remembering is an intentional
act, but this patient has no intentional object because she no longer experiences the
primal impressions that come with all the intentional acts the consciousness performs.
Importantly, too, this patient cannot constitute time as a linear flow. Not only does she not
experience the past as a continuous sinking back from the present, she does not maintain
the past-present-future relationship of time.
Stefano Micali questions this type of analysis, criticizing the idea that the primal
impression must signify something new, as Binswanger seems to insist. Micali's
argument, more generally, is to critique the universal necessity of a primal impression
preceding the retention in terms of “limit-phenomena,” or in my terms, anomalous cases.
His goal is to question the idea that the flow of time-constituting consciousness and the
protention-primal impression-retention structure must be absolute and unchanging for
Husserl. Micali argues that there is no clear determination of an absolute timeconstituting consciousness. He writes: "If one stresses only the invariable form of the
modification of the primal impression into the retentional continuum, then one risks to
miss an essential point: Husserl attempted to find different modalities for doing justice to
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the ambiguous phenomenon of absolute time-constituting consciousness."30 He claims
that we can see a case of this attempt if we look at the difference between the 1905
Lectures and the Bernau Manuscripts. In the Beilage to the 1905 Lectures, Husserl
claimed that the primal impression is the starting point of time-constitution. Whereas, in
the Bernau Manuscripts, the “now-phase” does not signify the appearance of something
new; rather, the moment of creation does not emerge from nowhere, it is fulfillment of a
previous protention. This would respond to Binswanger's reliance on the primal
impression as a new event. The primal impression need not be the creation of something
new, it is the simply the intertwining of protention and retention. According to Micali, is
does not matter if the protended object is a retention.
Micali is concerned primarily with disturbances to the absolute flow of
consciousness, so it is important to note the difference between the temporal order of a
temporal object and the order of the absolute flow. The phases of a temporal object we
experience are sequential, that is, we can divide the absolute flow into past-present-future,
whereas the protention-primal impression-retention continuum is a structure. These are
two different levels of time-consciousness that occur in a unified consciousness.
According to Micali, the absolute flow is more like the linear flow of time itself in that it
unfolds chronologically. Furthermore, Micali claims that according to Husserl, in the
order of the absolute flow of time-consciousness, one's protentions and retentions are not
in a temporal relation with the primal impressions in the empirical sense.31 That is, as we
have explained in a previous section, retentions, protentions and the primal impression
Micali, Stefano. “The Temporalizations of the Absolute Flow of Time-consciousness.” p.176.
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What Micali means by this is that the primal impression is together with the protentions and
retentions in a continuum that is a pre-empirical structure of absolute consciousness. See Micali,
176-179.
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condition our ability to perceive temporal objects. It is a mechanism by which we
experience, so the disrupted order of retentions, protentions, and primal impressions
presented in Binswanger's patient is not a disruption of the order of time. That is, the
absolute flow of consciousness is not necessarily disrupted even if the protention-primal
impression-retention structure were disturbed in some way. So, for Micali, Binswanger's
case is not enough to call Husserl's time-consciousness into question.
Does this explanation save Husserl from all the criticism Binswanger's case brings
forth? It seems incorrect to claim that protentions, primal impressions, and retentions do
not unfold chronologically, particularly given the way Husserl describes the continuous
sinking back into the past of retentions. Furthermore, it must be the case that the time
objects experienced with this structure are linear objects with a starting point, a
succession, and an end. The notes of a melody cannot be heard out of the order in which
they appear. Micali would have to explain how a retention could occur without having
been a primal impression. Husserl would surely not think this is possible, because it
would create a gap between protention and retention. Nevertheless, I do agree with
Micali that the primal impression need not be a new event, but Binswanger's patient is
not simply having an impression of a memory. You can imagine a person who is so
fixated on the past that they are no longer aware of the present passing around them.
Imagine that they are so affected by their condition that they fixate on hypothetical
responses to past experiences to the point where it prevents them from having other
intentional conscious acts or experiencing other intentional objects. They are protending
their memory as a future event and then phantasizing responses to it as if it could be an
event to which they can respond.
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Husserl is concerned with strands of time that seem to flow side-by-side, that is,
we can have a phantasy and a memory “at the same time,” but in his account, even of the
unity of consciousness is always linear. We recall a memory, it sinks back into the
retentional consciousness, and then we perform some other time-constituting act. We can
have a memory in one primal impression and a phantasy in the very next. He does not
consider cases where the person lives through loops of consciousness instead of steady
streaming flow and seems to believe that their past act can be relived differently. This
does not mean Husserl's account is wrong, but it does mean that this case is anomalous,
allowing us to further question whether Husserl's account of time-consciousness is
absolute and universal.
Even though Husserl aims at a phenomenological description of the universal
form of absolute time-consciousness, which functions anonymously in all temporal
phenomena, Micali argues that in order to do so, Husserl approaches the flow from
different perspectives. The absolute flow always carries out a passive unification of the
experience on the pre-reflective level, but the absolute flow articulates itself in different
experiences in different ways.32 Husserl does show concern with disturbances to timeconsciousness and acts of consciousness that may be disruptive to it. Husserl goes into an
in-depth discussion of the temporality of imagination or phantasy in Experience and
Judgment.
The imagination creates a peculiar problem because every conscious act of
imagination corresponds not to an objective world, but to a world of the imagination.
Husserl explains that we must have “for every individual object of imagination (as quasi-
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Though Micali does not address the problem of what could happen if the absolute flow is, in
fact, disrupted, he seems to argue that it cannot be. p.178.
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actuality), an “individual” singularization [Vereinzelung] for every temporal point and
every duration” (EJ 172). Instead of the temporal positions that link to an actual world,
everything is carried out in quasi-actuality. Husserl is committed to temporal unity, and
there is unity even in the fantasy. Within the story of Harry Potter, for example, we can
ask if Harry bought his wand at Ollivander's before or after he went to Gringotts bank, so
there are still some temporal limitations even in an imagined world. It would be a
different imagined world if the order of events was different. The unity of imagination is
not a unity of objectivities in some kind of absolute world-time, so it can only be a “unity
of the lived experiences constituting objectivities” (EJ 175). Acts of phantasy are lived
experiences and are still constituted in the absolute flow of internal time-consciousness,
and they still have absolute position and sink back into retention. It is just not the case
that the imaginary objectivities intended in the acts of imagination have an absolute,
identifiable temporal position in objective time.
The imagination works to further complicate the explanation of timeconsciousness because it is an experience additional to the way subjects constitute an
objective world. Though Husserl provides an explanation that accounts for temporal
phenomena like imaginings or something like a hallucination, there is still a problem
when presented with cases of mental illness where the experiencer is not aware they are
hallucinating. Husserl works from the assumption that we know when we are imagining,
or that we realize we are hallucinating (or do so right after the hallucination), because he
claims we correct for it in the sense that we do not try to put the intended objects of our
imaginings into an objective time, where for Husserl, an objective time is a shared time.33
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Yet, Husserl cannot be correct about this. Not all cases of imagining are corrected
for. For example, schizophrenia is marked by the inability to tell the difference between
what is real and what is illusory. Another example is Binswanger's melancholic patient
mentioned above, who kept running through hypothetical ways to react to a problem that
could not occur again. According to Binswanger, and based on the patient's reporting of
her experience, she was stuck in a loop of remembering and imagining.34 It is not clear
how Husserl would explain individuals with these disorders in his broader attempt to
reach an objective time, though I will explore this at the end of this chapter. I am not
claiming that Husserl could not account for the experience of the melancholic patient or
other anomalous cases. Rather, I am claiming that there is an understood normality in the
way time-consciousness is described, that is, Husserl's account of time-consciousness
implicitly describes a normal consciousness.
These particular individual cases of different time-consciousness are important,
because they may be a threat to the relationship between subjective life and our
intersubjective world. Remember that Husserl is attempting to reach objective time
through subjective experience. If the world is a shared world, then we have to be able to
account for differences in the way others inhabit this world, and Husserl's
phenomenology, particularly his phenomenology of time-consciousness, has been used in
the normal/abnormal discourse that has come to be popular in the sciences of the 20th and
21st century. Husserl's account of time-consciousness may still be able to explain that
anomalous experiences of time-consciousness exist, though Husserl himself never
mentioned them, and I will come back to this question. My concern at this point is to
34

In contemporary terms, we would explain this as being caused by an underlying condition,
likely depression, but this explanation does not alter the fact that the woman experiences her
thoughts as if in a loop.
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establish that the account of Husserlian time-consciousness I have provided in the
previous sections refers to a normal consciousness.
The Normal Consciousness
Husserl is aware of varieties of conscious experiences that may at first appear
troubling to his account of time-consciousness, including hallucination and phantasy, and
with the phenomenological method, he offers accounts of these experiences.35 These
examples show how complex human time-consciousness is. There are many cases,
however, that Husserl does not take into account that may be more difficult to fit into his
rubric. Again, my claim is not that Husserl's account cannot describe anomalous cases, in
fact, phenomenology is helpful in explaining anomalous experiences. My claim is that
these cases can be compared to Husserl's general account of the universal form of timeconsciousness and that general account is implicitly a normal time-consciousness. That is,
Husserl's account implicitly refers to a psychologically normal subject, so the structures
of time-consciousness that I have outlined in this chapter provide a descriptive account of
a normal time-consciousness.
In this final section of the chapter, I will look at Husserl's accounts of normality in
order to legitimate my claim that it can apply to time-consciousness. Of course, Husserl
never claims that his account of time-consciousness is normal, in any of the ways he
refers to normality. He does claim that the form of time-consciousness he describes is
universal, and this makes it trivially normal, because every rational person allegedly has
it. Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases that do not seem to match Husserl's form of
time-consciousness. Husserl does talk about normality in terms of our subjective
35

Things like hallucination and illusion, as well as experiences like doubt and disappointment,
which have less of an obvious temporal component, are what Husserl calls “modalizations” of
perception. He does not consider them abnormal. See: Hua XI, 25-64.
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experiences and in terms of constituting a shared world, so it remains a question why he
does not use the term “normal” when referring to the structures of consciousness or, more
specifically, time-consciousness. I want to show the ways in which Husserl's account of
time-consciousness is an account of a normal time-consciousness in a stronger sense than
normal because it is universal. I contend that normality can apply to time-consciousness
on two levels based on Husserl's account of normality. First, because normality is internal,
it can apply to the structures of time-consciousness. Second, it is normal consciousnesses
that constitute the world at the exclusion of the insane or abnormal.
Normality of the Structures of Consciousness
Husserl does not systematically develop an overarching conception of normality
and abnormality in any of his works. Generally speaking we can say that “the normal” for
Husserl works as a guide for our experience, and this seems to occur in two ways. First,
we anticipate experiences according to normal and typical patterns of experience that we
have sedimented in our minds. This happens within the subject (Hua XI/186). Second, we
experience the normal in an intersubjective way, where cultural and historical norms and
traditions guide our experiences and behaviors and meanings. For my purposes, I must
note again that the claims Husserl does make about normality do not explicitly extend to
the fundamental structures of consciousness or to time-consciousness in particular.
It also must be noted that an attempt to draw an account of normality in Husserl is
made more difficult by the fact that Husserl's approach to phenomenology changes over
the span of his work. In Home and Beyond, Steinbock offers a comprehensive account of
Husserl's employment of normality, as a part of a larger project to explore the different
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phenomenological methods – static, genetic, generative36 – employed by Husserl as his
work developed. Steinbock divides Husserl's accounts of normality into three different
approaches that more or less map onto the static, genetic and generative
phenomenological methods. Though a lot of Husserl scholarship rests on these
methodological distinctions, it is beyond the scope of this project to delve into these
nuances. Whether or not Husserl's approach to phenomenology changes, he does not
abandon the general structures of internal time-consciousness even in his later work, and
that remains my focus. My goal is to show that Husserl's developed account of timeconsciousness contains within it implicitly a normal time-consciousness. A normal timeconsciousness seems to be an issue Husserl never explicitly considered at any point in his
work, although it seems that there are examples of anomalous experiences in which an
anomaly occurs on the level of the structures of time-consciousness. Husserl does talk
about norms in his work in a variety of contexts, and in this section I will look at the
ways norms work on the subjective level.
According to Steinbock, in the course of Husserl's work, he refers to normality in
at least these three ways: 1) normality as concordance in the constitution of sense unity; 2)
the normal as optimal, or the preferred perspective for experiencing a situation; and 3) the
normal as typical.37 I am borrowing these divisions from Steinbock uncritically as a
starting point, because they are helpful in navigating where time-consciousness could fit
into a Husserlian account of normality. These senses of normality appear internally to the
experiencing subject. In the next section, I will look at another way Husserl discusses the
36

These divisions are common in Husserlian scholarship, but they are given considerable
attention in Steinbock, Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl. See also:
Welton, 2002.
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Steinbock, Home and Beyond. p.123-169.
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“normal” in his later work, which is more like normal as conventional on an
intersubjective level. In this section, I am most interested in the first type of normal
mentioned here, normality as concordance, because as I will show, this is most closely
relates to what I am calling the normal time-consciousness.
One way Husserl approaches the normal and abnormal is in terms of a coherence
of a sense experience and regarding how an experience takes on sense or meaning in
relation to the subject's perceiving or knowing. That is, the perceiving or knowing subject
constitutes normality. This does not always occur with respect to some kind of external
circumstances, as an abnormality can occur phenomenologically within the structure of
perception itself. A perception would be considered normal when a sensation is similar to
the appearance presented in consciousness. An abnormal, or anomalous,38 perception
would occur, for instance, if a stick appeared to be split underwater, but when you
reached in the water for it, you found it was actually in one piece. Husserl also uses the
example of a wax figure. Suppose you see a person in the distance but upon closer
inspection you realize the person is actually a wax figure, making your perceptions in
discordance. What happens here is that, “Two perceptual interpretations, or two
appearances of a thing, interpenetrate, coinciding as it were in part of their perceptual
content.”39 There is a discordance in what we saw and what we think we saw. This need
not be a discordance in interpretation; normality also occurs in the way sense unities fit
together. Steinbock puts this succinctly: “we have an anomaly when we have discordance
with sense unity, when there is a 'break' in the temporal unfolding of appearances, a
Husserl almost exclusively uses the word “Anomalität” and not “Abnormalität.” The latter
has strong normative connotations, while the former still maintains both descriptive and
normative connotations in German.
38
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Logical Investigations, Investigation V, §27. p. 610.
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'rupture' in the constitution of sense.”40 Suppose a bright flash blinds us temporarily, then
our flow of consciousness as perceiving is disrupted in that time. We can see already that
this relates at least tangentially to our time-consciousness, because it interrupts our
conscious flow and our act of perception by our experience of a primal impression that
we had not been anticipating.
This is an account of normality within the perceiving subject's experience and
their own understanding of what is concordant and discordant.41 That is, we generally do
not expect to have a bright flash temporarily blind us, so when it happens it is an
anomalous experience. This is not a case of comparing an individual to other individuals,
or taking the individual as an object compared to some set of standards. It is the natural
and social sciences,42 not phenomenology, that do those types of quantitative
comparisons. According to Husserl, those disciplines “advanc[e] the idea of normal
phenomena that would be the same for all subjects independently of their sensuous
makeup.”43 Put differently, for the natural sciences, the body is treated as an object of
normal experience that can be measured and compared to other bodies. This would also
40

Steinbock, 132. See also: Hua XIII/364.
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We could also look at an example of the second type of normality: normalizing as optimizing.
Take, for instance, a case of someone getting their vision corrected. The point of vision correction
is not to restore one's vision to a previous state, but to achieve the optimal vision for that person.
According to Husserl, to make vision normal as optimal is to enhance my vision such that “the
content of the world... has more determinations than I knew before.” (Hua XIV/121). Furthermore,
for Husserl the normal lived-body is optimalizing, in that it creates norms and optimal
experiences. Concordance can become optimal, but the optimal can also become typical, and if a
norm is regularly instituted, it can function as an ideal type, and then normality would be “a
certain typical constancy in the comportment of lived-corporeality (Hua XIV/121). (See also:
Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World.) We can also transcend norms and change them,
and according to Steinbock, this take on norms is Husserl's innovation. We can reset norms if our
atypical experiences start to become typical, for instance. (Steinbock, 145).
42

Husserl does not include the social sciences in his explanation, but I think contemporary
social sciences certainly fit here.
43

Steinbock, 131. See Husserl, Ms. D 13 I, 213a.

54

apply to much of contemporary psychiatry, which relies on a set of standards, reached
using bodily and neurological factors, to diagnose and treat psychiatric conditions.44
Although Husserl does claim that sometimes the anomalous can become normal,
normality is still a type of standard; with the example of normal as concordant, it appears
to be a self-set standard. In other words, it seems that for Husserl, the experiencer needs
to be aware that something abnormal, or anomalous, is occurring. Husserl attempts to
distance phenomenology from psychology, particularly in his early work, and he is not
discussing the normal in a way that opposes it to the pathological. Nevertheless, we can
still see why phenomenology could be helpful in consort with psychology and psychiatric
disciplines. It seems that the phenomenological approach lends itself to explanations of
abnormal experiences. In contrast to the phenomenologist, natural scientists do not study
the lived body as the thing that constitutes normal experience. For the phenomenologist,
the abnormal or anomalous is a rupture or sudden change within one's normal experience.
It is a qualitative variation and not measurable or quantitative. Normality concerns lived
experience, not statistics, or average characteristics decided beforehand and imposed
from the outside.
For the reasons stated above, this is why phenomenology is helpful to particular
strands of psychology and psychiatric practices where diagnosis often relies on the selfreported experiences of individual subjects. In fact, in his later work, Husserl seems less
critical of psychology so long as phenomenology provides its foundation. Ultimately,
Husserl's goal is for phenomenology to ground all the natural and human sciences, and
this theme is taken on in Ideas II and in The Crisis. In the second “Abhandlung” to the
German edition of The Crisis, Husserl states: “the universal personal science itself seems
In its own words, the DSM uses a “multiaxial” classification system for assessment.
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to transform itself into the all-encompassing science, to resolve itself into a universal
philosophy, and eidetically into a universal ontology.”45 Of course, he is referring to
phenomenology here as the “universal personal science.” To see how Husserl might relate
phenomenology specifically to psychology and not to the sciences in general, turn to
Eugen Fink's outline for the continuation of The Crisis. He notes that psychology could
not remain psychology and must explore the transcendental dimension.46
We can see how the interplay of phenomenology and psychology could work in
the following example: take a patient who describes a fractured experience, such as
Minkowski's case where a patient sees a bird singing and hears a bird singing, but thinks
they are not the same bird.47 Using Husserl's version of normality as concordance, we see
that this experience is not abnormal because other people would put the bird and the
chirping together; rather, the abnormality occurs because the lived-body is not working
together, or it is working non syn-aesthetically. It seems that this account of normality as
concordance can extend to time-constituting acts other than mere perception as well,
because other intentional time-constituting acts are either reliant on perception or
function similarly to perception. The experience of déjà vu, for example, seems like a
rupture in our remembering that we would mark as anomalous. If something goes wrong
with my experience of time, I can say that it is abnormal for me, and insofar as timeconsciousness relates to the constitution of sense experience, Husserl says as much.
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This appears in Appendix III to the English translation of The Crisis of the European
Sciences, p. 333.
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Fink does not go into much more detail how this would work, but Husserl did approve Fink's
outline. See: The Crisis of the European Sciences, p. 397-400.
47

Lived Time, 285.
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Thus far, even in the case of Minkowski's patient, the normal as concordance
requires the ability to recognize and constitute when something is not normal for us in
our time-constituting experiences. So, how can the psychiatrist diagnose abnormality in
someone else without some standard that extends beyond the subject? How can we tell if
another's experiences are abnormal or anomalous? What happens when a subject has
something like an enduring anomalous condition that affects their consciousness such
that they cannot recognize a discordance? That is, what if the discordance occurs at such
a fundamental level that the subject cannot be aware of it? Husserl still gives us a way to
account for the way a third party, like a psychiatrist, can recognize abnormal experiences.
Although Husserl does not talk about the normal in terms of pathology, presumably he
leaves that for the psychologist or physician, he does account for abnormal perception
like hallucinations and the subject's interpretation of their perceptions. These cases
tangentially relate to time-consciousness because perception is a time-constituting act.
This also suggests that we have a normal experience of time that would allow us to spot
an abnormality. What Husserl does not do is consider the fact that an underlying
condition, like a mental illness, could cause a subject to have a disrupted experience. Yet,
he does have something to say about the insane, which I will discuss in the next section.
Normal Consciousness as World-Constituting
With the sense of normal described above, Husserl assumes that the experiencing
subject will be able to recognize their own “ruptures” in experience. When expectations
are not met, then they know something abnormal has occurred. This is not the only way
Husserl discusses normality. There is also the experience of normality on the social level.
Alfred Schutz has explained this as follows: although the building blocks of my world are
the things that appear to me in my consciousness, I find myself in relation to objects for
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“use and enjoyment, foodstuffs, clothes, arms, tools, works of art and literature, means
for legal or religious ends.”48 Husserl calls these objects upon which a new intentional
meaning has been bestowed “founded objects.” We also find other persons and apprehend
them as subjects in a common environment. We are dependent on other people, we
understand other people, and we share a common world. We are able to do this via the
constitution of intersubjectivity. One of the keys to constituting intersubjectivity for
Husserl is empathy, where we consciously attribute intentional acts to other conscious
subjects.
I mentioned this idea before when I discussed the constitution of objective time.
Not only do subjects constitute objective time, they also constitute the world in which
they live. Each transcendental subject must constitute the world as a human being so that
they can relate to other human beings. In order to do so, one constitutes norms, and this is
a different sense of normality than the internalized norms described in the previous
section. Here, the normal is what is historically and culturally conventional, and this
would also include statistical norms. In order to share a world with others, we need to
constitute certain norms that are shared. What happens when we encounter individuals
with whom we cannot empathize? What can we say about individuals who do not engage
in normal behavior? How do we determine when abnormal behavior is enough to be
considered pathological?
Although as I mentioned above, Husserl is not attempting to play the role of
psychiatrist, he makes comments in his work about “the insane” presumably that refer to
a group of people who have received pathological diagnoses.49 There must be some sense
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of normality at work for Husserl to use this term. This sense of normality is different
from the account of normality based on self-set standards, and it also seems to go beyond
mere cultural norms and conventions that are required to constitute a shared world. It
seems that in addition to understanding cultural norms, we need to also be able to
understand the behaviors of others. Abnormal behavior must be something that can be
recognized in others, because psychiatrists are able to diagnose others with mental illness
and Husserl is able to use “insane” as a classification. For Husserl, psychiatric diagnosis
happens in the natural attitude, but the foundation for the natural attitude, as well as for
psychology, should be in phenomenology. That is, objectivity in the sciences is ultimately
grounded in transcendental intersubjectivity.
In The Crisis of the European Sciences, Husserl looks at the following paradox:
How can humanity exist as world-constituting subjectivity and yet be incorporated in the
world itself? I do not want to get too far into Husserl's discussion of world in terms of the
lifeworld and homeworld,50 because these notions stray from time-consciousness and go
beyond the scope of this project. Nevertheless, I am interested in how the mad or the
mentally ill fit into this picture based on some other claims made by Husserl in The Crisis.
He poses the following question: “are the insane also objectifications of the subjects
being discussed in connection with the accomplishment of world-constitution?” (CES
187). He asks the same of children and goes onto say “After all, it is only from the mature
and normal human beings who bring them up that they first become acquainted with the
world in the full sense of the world-for-all, that is, the world of culture” (CES 187,
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What Steinbock calls the normal as typical is what is familiar to me in my lifeworld. The
homeworld is the term Husserl uses to describe the cultural, intersubjective, co-constituted world
that is generated through cultural practices, rituals and narratives. The homeworld is constituted
as normal in contrast to an alienworld that is not normal for us. See: Hua XV/431.
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emphasis added). These statements seem to give “the insane” the same status as objects,
denying them subjectivity at the level that enables them to participate in worldconstituting intersubjectivity. Husserl excludes children, animals, and the insane from the
list of world-constituting subjects, so “the insane” are in some sense worldless.51 In
Chapter 3, I will provide a critique of Husserl's exclusion of the insane, but for now,
given what Husserl says about normality and abnormality, how do we explain their
exclusion and does this exclusion relate to time-consciousness?
Unlike the cases of normality described in the previous section, the insane cannot
diagnose themselves, so there must be some created standard by which their reported
experiences are considered abnormal.52 Husserl does not speak of normal and abnormal
in terms of pathology or mental illness, as he presumably reserves diagnosing for
psychology, making the abnormality of insanity something that is determined in the
natural attitude. But he does exclude the insane from world-constitution, and there must
be some criteria that allow Husserl to exclude them. It is likely that Husserl is simply
using some conception of reason or rationality to exclude them. In the Logical
Investigations, Husserl writes: “We call a man ‘reasonable’, if we credit him with a
habitual tendency to judge rightly, in his own sphere, of course, and in a normal frame of
mind. A man regularly capable, when normal, of hitting off ‘the obvious,’ what ‘lies to
hand,’ is a ‘responsible thinker.”53 It seems likely, then that for Husserl the insane do not

This notion is repeated in Husserls Lifeword manuscript: “Die Tiere, die „Wilden“, die
Säuglinge, die Verrückten haben für die Weltkonstitution nicht mitgezählt. Sie bauen nicht und
bauten nicht mit die Welt, die ich als die seiende vorgegeben habe.” See: Hua XV/486.
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This is a curious problem. As I mentioned earlier, you assume your experiences are normal,
and experienced in the same way as everyone else, until you have some evidence that others are
different. If you discover that you are in the minority, only then do you think of yourself as
abnormal.
53
See: Logical Investigations, p. 62.
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co-function in the world because they do not have reason or do not have enough reason to
constitute a world of shared cultural norms.
For Husserl, having a world is normal and rational, but to have a world, is it
necessary to experience time in the normal way? If we take Husserlian structures of timeconsciousness to be universal, then there is a sense in which these structures are
implicitly normal because all human beings are said to have them. If these are universal
structures, does this mean that what I am calling “abnormal time-consciousness” is not
even time-consciousness for Husserl? Husserl provides two clues to answer this question:
First, it is via the subjective phenomenological experience of time that allows us to
constitute world-time, and second, it is only normal subjects who constitute the shared,
cultural world. The insane are not excluded from living in the world, but they do not
contribute to world-constitution. It seems, then, that they also would not constitute the
world-time of a shared world. Thus, although they need not have an abnormal experience
of time to be excluded, nothing precludes the possibility of a subject having an abnormal
experience of time. Given Husserl's privileging of rationality, it seems likely that if
Husserl did acknowledge abnormal experiences of time-consciousness, he would explain
them as irrational experiences.
Even though the insane do not participate in all aspects of intersubjectivity, like
world-constitution, without Husserl giving a more specific definition of the insane, we
can assume someone deemed insane could very well have some temporal divisions. For
example, Binswanger's melancholic patient54 was able to communicate her experience in
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such a way that was comprehensible to Binswanger. In the next chapter I will provide
more examples of psychiatric cases of disrupted time-consciousness that employ
diagnostic methods that range from self-reporting to neurological studies. For Husserl,
these diagnoses take place in the natural attitude, and it still seems like there is a problem
of explaining abnormal experiences of time-consciousness from a phenomenological
standpoint. The insane for Husserl are marked by a lack of reason, and it is normal,
rational subjects who constitute them as insane. Because they do not participate in
intersubjectivity in the same way a normal person does, it seems like there is a lack of
empathy from the normal to the insane. The experience of the insane is a phenomenon we
cannot fully account for, because we cannot describe their anomaly as they experience it.
Of course, my focus is solely on cases of abnormal time-consciousness that occur
among those deemed mentally ill and not on the whole of insanity. My solution to this is
that we can compare their own self-reported experiences of time-consciousness (and
perhaps other neuro-biological diagnostic methods) to Husserl's universal form of timeconsciousness. We have seen one case where time-consciousness is disrupted, and its
abnormality can be identified using Husserlian time-consciousness as a normal standard.
If Husserl is willing to claim that some individuals are not world-constituting, and if this
does not exclude the possibility of at least some of these individuals being unable to
constitute world-time, then anomalies do occur on the level of time-consciousness and
Husserl's account of time-consciousness is at least implicitly normal.
Conclusion
We are still left with some questions regarding the connection between normal,
rational experience, Husserl's conception of the insane, and time-consciousness. It is
unclear what qualifies as irrational enough to be insane. I am suggesting, and I think there
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is enough evidence to support this suggestion, that anomalous experiences of timeconsciousness would fall in the realm of irrational for Husserl. It is also not clear if a
normal time-consciousness is a constitutive element of world-making because Husserl
does not directly refer to a normal time-consciousness, but it seems that his structures of
time-consciousness, achieved through the phenomenological method would have to be
structures belonging to a rational subject because he considers them universal. He
excludes the insane from world-constitution because they are not normal and rational.
This allows for the possibility that at least some of the excluded would also be unable to
constitute world-time due to some anomalous feature of their own internal timeconsciousness.
Thus, what I have shown in this chapter is that Husserlian time-consciousness is
in the discourse of abnormal and normal whether he intended it to be or not. I will relate
Husserl's work more directly to the pathological in the next chapter. Even though
Husserl's approach to normal and abnormal is not motivated by medical or diagnostic
interests, I will show that it could be utilized in a diagnostic way. Phenomenology begins
with the experiencing subject, but given our intersubjectivity, we can make claims about
the psychical state of others. In a psychiatric situation, a psychiatrist can make use of
self-reported accounts of abnormal experiences of time, but these will describe
abnormalities as compared to the individual's own set of standards. Yet, Husserl excludes
the insane from being world-constituting. This also means that the normal are excluded
from being able to empathize with the abnormal experiences of the insane. Nevertheless,
there is some set of standards that enables the psychiatrist to classify abnormalities and
make specific diagnoses. I am focusing on cases where the psychiatrist is able to identify
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abnormal time-consciousness, and in these cases, I suggest that what enables a diagnosis
is a comparison to Husserl's implicitly normal structures of time-consciousness.
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Chapter 2
By no means, sir: Time travels in divers paces with
divers persons. I'll tell you who Time ambles
withal, who Time trots withal, who Time gallops
withal and who he stands still withal.
- William Shakespeare, “As You Like It”
In Chapter 1, I established an account of the structure of time-consciousness
according to Husserl. I argued that Husserl relies both on the absolute flow of
consciousness and the linear flow of time to explain these structures. The importance of
this will become apparent in Chapter 3, but I must note that there also seems to be an
uncritical acceptance of both the flow of consciousness and of time as a linear flow in the
works I discuss below. I also argued in Chapter 1 that Husserl's account of timeconsciousness enters him into the discourse of normality and abnormality because there is
an implied normal consciousness that can be found in Husserl's work. Even without my
argument in Chapter 1, there is other evidence that puts Husserl's work on timeconsciousness into the discourse of mental illness. That is, both Husserl's
phenomenological method and his account of time-consciousness have been employed in
the psychiatric discipline, institutionally, clinically, and academically, since at least the
1930s. In 1933, Eugene Minkowski published Lived Time in which he attempted to unite
phenomenology (including that of Husserl) with psychopathology, putting Husserl
historically into normal/abnormal discourse.
As I showed in Chapter 1, one sense of normality for Husserl depends on the
concordance or optimization of one's perceptual experience. One reason why Husserlian
phenomenology has influenced work in psychiatry is because of the importance of the
experiencing subject. Through phenomenology, Husserl aims to systematically and
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objectively study what is generally believed to be subjective, i.e. conscious experience,
and studying consciousness is dependent upon how conscious experience is reported.
Likewise, psychiatry as practiced in the 20th century and up to present day, often uses
self-reported experiences of patients. In this chapter, I am interested in how Husserl's
account of time-consciousness gets taken up in psychology, psychiatry, and cognitive
science in its application to mental illness. I am interested in the role abnormal accounts
and experiences of time-consciousness play in diagnosing and studying cases of mental
illness.
In the previous chapter, I showed that Husserl's phenomenology of timeconsciousness is in the discourse of normal and abnormal; in this chapter, I will show
how Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness has been taken up for empirical use
in the fields of psychiatry and cognitive science in the 20th and 21st centuries. I will look
at specific cases of disturbed or anomalous experiences of time and explain these
anomalous cases in terms of Husserlian structures of time-consciousness to build on the
point made in Chapter 1 that Husserl's work fits into the discourse of normal and
abnormal. Obviously the ways in which Husserlian time-consciousness is used differ
depend on the nature of the field of study and the aim of the research. A clinical
psychiatrist may be interested in time-consciousness in order to treat a patient suffering
from a mental illness. A cognitive scientist, on the other hand, may be more interested in
the way Husserlian time-consciousness maps onto regions of the brain.
Although there is plenty of historical evidence to show that Husserlian
phenomenology has been employed empirically, some applications of phenomenology
are controversial, particularly in the field of cognitive science. In the outset of this
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chapter, I will very briefly mention this debate, but is beyond the scope of this project to
enter the argument. I am limiting my project to cases of mental illness, and the bulk of
cognitive science research takes place outside psychiatric research. Nevertheless, in
Chapter 3, I will offer an explanation as to why phenomenology and psychiatry emerge
under the same epistemic conditions, and how this could be applied to an argument for
the empirical employment of phenomenology. In this chapter, I will primarily look at
particular uses of Husserlian phenomenology and time-consciousness as they have been
applied to cases and studies of mental illness by psychiatrists and cognitive scientists. I
am not evaluating the methods used in these disciplines or evaluating their findings, that
work I leave to psychiatrists, neurologists and cognitive scientists. My purpose is simply
to show the way Husserlian phenomenology of time-consciousness has been taken up in
psychiatric disciplines and to show that there is a shared discourse between them. This
will support the argument I made in Chapter 1 that Husserl's time-consciousness is
normal.
Husserlian Time-Consciousness Taken Up Empirically
Most of the employment of Husserlian time-consciousness I will cite in this
chapter is a modification of Husserlian phenomenology and a rejection of certain aspects
of his transcendental philosophy. It seems important to note that Husserl himself likely
never intended his work to be employed exactly in this way. As I discussed in Chapter 1,
Husserl rejects psychologism outright, particularly in the Logical Investigations, and he
would relegate the work being done in psychiatry and cognitive science to the natural
attitude, which is the characteristic attitude of our everyday life as well as the natural,
empirical sciences. In the Crisis of the European Sciences, Husserl shows how Western
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thought has developed with an empirical and naturalistic orientation, and he argues that
mental and spiritual reality have a reality independent from physical reality. For Husserl,
a science of the mind [Geisteswissenschaft], namely phenomenology, must be established
as a foundation for all other sciences. I pointed to places in his work where he legitimates
psychology if it is grounded in phenomenology.
Although I think one has to be cautious when applying phenomenology, I do not
think it is an illegitimate move to apply Husserlian structures of time-consciousness to
considerations of mental illness. Furthermore, there are normative implications in
Husserl's work and he implicitly provides the means of comparing people to social and
cultural norms. That is, as I showed in Chapter 1, Husserl refers to “the insane,” so he
must accept some means with which to diagnose them. Not to mention, Husserlian
phenomenology has already entered psychiatric discourse. In spite of claims by Husserl
separating phenomenology from the natural attitude, it remains the case that many
scholars have shown that Husserlian phenomenology and certain empirical studies merge
in studying the mind. I do not want to enter the debate on whether or not this would be
agreeable to Husserl, nor am I setting out to evaluate whether or not the Husserlian ideas
employed are properly grounded in phenomenology. 1 I think it is important to be
reflective about how we use phenomenology, and I am qualifying my employment of
Husserl to structures of time-consciousness applied to studies of mental illness. I only
aim to show that Husserlian phenomenology already is in the discourse of
normal/abnormal, psychiatry and cognitive science, and my argument for this is largely
historical.
1

It is not exactly clear what a phenomenologically grounded, Husserlian psychiatry would
look like, but Eugen Fink seemed to think it was possible.
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Other scholars have made arguments for the employment of phenomenology in
broader studies of cognitive science and embodied cognition. Though this is beyond the
scope of this project, I will just briefly mention the debate here. One of the major
criticisms of phenomenology is that it begins from first-person experience of appearing
phenomenon instead of a neutral third-person. Daniel Dennett, for instance, has referred
to classical phenomenology as “the fantasy of first-person science” criticizing the
epistemological difficulties with first-person data.2 That is, because phenomenology is an
introspective investigation, according to Dennett, and data-extraction uses intersubjective
procedures, first-person access to the phenomenal content of their mental states cannot be
data. Dan Zahavi has argued against Dennett, stating that: “Phenomenology is a
philosophical enterprise; it is not an empirical discipline. This does not rule out, of course,
that its analyses might have ramifications for and be of pertinence to an empirical study
of consciousness, but this is not its primary aim.”3 In what follows, I support this
statement by providing examples showing that empirical ramifications of Husserlian
phenomenology, in particular his time-consciousness, can be seen in cognitive science
and psychiatry.
One explanation for the reason why phenomenology is being utilized in empirical
research is because it is only in the past decade that the body has gained importance in
cognitive science. Cognitive science is moving away from “embrained” cognition, and a
new wave is rising that acknowledges cognition as “inseparable from and shaped by the

Dennett, Daniel. “The Fantasy of First-Person Science” (2001). A written version of a debate
with David Chalmers, held at Northwestern University, Evanston, IL,. February 15, 2001,
supplemented by an email debate with Alvin Goldman. <http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/
chalmersdeb3dft.htm>
2

3

Zahavi, 2007. p. 28.
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concrete extra-cerebral structures and dynamics of the body, and the body's
embeddedness in the natural and social world” (Morris, 1). David Morris in particular has
recently shown the overlap between Husserlian time-consciousness and studies of
embodied cognition. For Husserl, consciousness is always an embodied and situated
consciousness. Morris shows how phenomenology complements empirical results in
cognitive science about embodiment, because time-consciousness is helpful in connecting
the mind to the body.4 Morris writes that “phenomenological description shows that the
mind is an inherently temporal process, that cognitive contents are not given all at once,
but take time. But the mind does not supply or regulate time. The mind is rather its
exposure to a time that exceeds it” (Morris, 6-7). When studying cognition or the mind,
cognitive scientists have had a tendency to reduce things completely to what is present
and furthermore “tend to reduce time itself to an already given dimension” (Morris, 7).
Husserl is helpful here, because for Husserl, the structures of consciousness, like
protention-primal impression-retention are fixed and universal structures, but
consciousness is a complex flow that constitutes experience, and things like perception,
memory, etc. do not happen in some cognitive instant. Husserlian phenomenology of
time-consciousness can be used to draw a more accurate picture of how cognition works.
Time allows us to explain embodied cognition, because consciousness is connected to a
living, moving body that changes in time.

4

A strong account of embodied cognition includes claims that cognition mixes with perception
and action as responses to a real-world environment and real-time demands, and that the body and
the environment are part of cognition. Activities like remembering, imagining and abstract
thinking also have bodily roots. For example, research has shown that walking is an integral part
of infant development, tactile cognition is shaped by movements and habits of touching, and even
that sentence formation is influenced by bodily speech rhythms. See: Morris, 5. Page numbers
refer to a reprint of the originally published article. Found here:
<http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/6667/1/Embodied_Cognition_Open_Access.pdf>
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What I want to show is how Husserl's account of time-consciousness has been
used since the 1920s in the discourse of normal and abnormal, how it has been used as a
diagnostic tool and as a way to complement both qualitative and quantitative psychiatric
data. In the two chapters that follow, I will turn more toward an analysis of the
naturalization of time-consciousness as well as the way time-consciousness has been
deployed in the abnormal/normal discourse that pervades our current era. But first, I must
show how Husserlian time-consciousness has been used since its inception.
My approach is Foucaultian in the sense that I am following Foucault's
archaeological method, looking at the intersection of time-consciousness and madness in
terms of what has actually been said and written on the topic. I am particularly looking at
the case studies of psychiatrists and research performed by cognitive scientists. Foucault
himself explored the history of madness, dating back to the 15th century and following it
through to the 19th century where it became referred to as mental illness. (This, of course,
is still how we refer to madness, and how I will refer to it in this chapter.) Studies on the
experiences of time date back to the ancients, but I am using Husserl as the starting point
of time-consciousness specifically as an object of study. To reiterate, in this chapter, I am
presenting information and providing little analysis other than to make connections to the
Husserlian account of time-consciousness more clear and explicit. My critical analysis
and employment of Foucaultian analysis will occur in the next chapter.
As a final disclaimer, I should note that there are numerous cases of timeconsciousness being the object of study in psychiatry and in cognitive science. One could
apply Husserlian time-consciousness to any number of states of altered consciousness.
For instance, someone who drinks too much at a party and blacks out is going to have
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gaps in their memories, and one could offer a Husserlian explanation for this.5 However,
there is no literature on this particular case that I am aware of. Most studies that examine
altered time-consciousness focus on those cases where there is some type of disturbance
in the structure of consciousness due to some persistent condition. My discussion in this
chapter will focus primarily on cases of schizophrenia, though I also mention cases of
trauma, but recognizing an abnormal experience of time-consciousness in a patient
diagnosed with mental illness is certainly not exclusive to cases of schizophrenia. A
comprehensive account of cases of mental illness that affect time-consciousness would
require volumes. I am limiting my study to cases of mental illness where timeconsciousness has been affected and where Husserlian phenomenology is explicitly
invoked in the research thereof. The cases and studies I examine here extend across
disciplines and philosophical traditions and are what I have deemed the best examples of
the employment of Husserlian time-consciousness. As I put forth these examples, I will
connect them to the account of Huserlian time-consciousness I provided in Chapter 1.
Husserlian Phenomenology and Psychiatry in the 20th Century
For my first example, I will look at the way Husserlian phenomenology was taken
up in the work of two 20th century psychiatrists, Ludwig Binswanger and Eugene
Minkowski. Both read Husserl and explicitly mention his influence and impact on their
work as clinical psychiatrists. However, it must be noted that both are critical of certain
aspects of Husserl's phenomenology. They were both more familiar with Husserl's work
on phenomenology published before he gave his now famous lectures on internal timeconsciousness, namely the Logical Investigations, in which he gives a sustained critique
5

For Husserl, this would probably be explained in the same way he explains the phenomenon
of sleep, which is not actually a disruption of time-consciousness.
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of psychologism. Given his rejection of psychologism, it makes sense that psychiatrists
would be cautious in using Husserl's work, but there is still an application of Husserlian
phenomenology within psychiatric discourse. For Husserl, as I mentioned above,
phenomenology is meant to establish the foundations for the natural and human sciences.
In Logical Investigations Husserl explains that for psychology, this would mean using
phenomenology to establish the essential features of perception, feelings, and other
features of psychic life (LI 262). Nevertheless, both Binswanger and Minkowski employ
phenomenology in their work, appreciating Husserl's project of finding the structures of
consciousness as well as the emphasis placed on subjective experience as a starting point
of investigation.
Unlike the other more contemporary examples I will use in this chapter, neither
Minkowski nor Binswanger invoke Husserl's time-consciousness by explicitly discussing
features like the protention-primal impression-retention structure, for instance. Both
thinkers employ phenomenology in an anthropological way;6 they do not perform the
phenomenological reduction and bracket the natural world of everyday experience,
instead remaining in the natural attitude. Nevertheless, that their conceptions of
consciousness and specifically time-consciousness are not explicitly Husserl's does not
defeat the analysis I am giving that places Husserlian time-consciousness within
discussions of normality. Both psychiatrists do claim to use a phenomenological approach,
but I am interested in their work for the case studies and the examples they provide of
abnormal time-consciousnesses in patients they have diagnosed with some type of mental
illness. Both Binswanger and Minkowski studied patients diagnosed with schizophrenia,
Both Minkowski and Binswanger use the term “anthropology” explicitly, and in both cases
they seem to mean that their work is based on empirical data taken from individual human
subjects.
6
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and it is these cases that most clearly show that time-consciousness is crucial to an
explanation of abnormal behavior. In what follows, I will show the overlap between the
diagnosis and treatment of mental illness and the conscious experience of time for the
patient, and furthermore that the cases of Binswanger and Minkowski show some of the
earliest instances of Husserlian phenomenology being pulled into the discourse of normal
and abnormal.
Binswanger
Ludwig Binswanger was a Swiss psychiatrist who practiced in the first half of the
20th century and is usually considered the first physician to incorporate existential
philosophy into psychotherapy. He is explicit about his debt to Husserl, admiring
Husserl's arrival at a prioris using the phenomenological method as well as Husserl's
interest in investigating the structures of consciousness. Nevertheless, Binswanger was
also critical of Husserl's “pure phenomenology” in that it can achieve insights into the
essential structures of consciousness, but draw no conclusions about the objects of
scientific knowledge in empirical reality. Because Husserl separates the consciousness as
an object of study separate from “empirical reality” (what Husserl would refer to as the
world of the natural attitude), following Heidegger, Binswanger insists that
phenomenology cannot say anything about the constitutive function of the mind. By this,
I mean that unlike Husserl, Heidegger's (and subsequently Binswanger's) approach to
phenomenology is not that of bracketing the natural world of our everyday experiences.
Nevertheless, Binswanger is interested in a type of phenomenological method in order to
arrive at a prioris and essential intuitions. Binswanger writes that “the phenomenological
method as adopted by [Husserl] is and remains of outstanding importance for
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psychological insight in so far as it is the most elaborate and purest form of all those
philosophical methods that do not aim at mere facts or scientific hypothesis.”7
Binswanger's aim in his work is to describe fundamental existential a prioris or the
essential potentialities of human existence that would enable the psychiatrist to
understand the mentally ill individual holistically, not only in terms of their mental states,
but also their relationship to the world.
How this overlaps with time-consciousness is most clearly found in individual
cases of Binswanger's patients. In his work on schizophrenia, Binswanger explains his
method of Daseinanalyse, where the aim is to ascertain an order from the “sheer,
dazzling, multitudinous plenum of historical, psychological, psychopathological, and
biological data that we bring together under the term 'case'” (BW 250). He also strives for
an order in communicating with the patient that goes beyond the “naturalistic-reductionist
dialectic” (BW 250). Binswanger asserts that clinical psychiatry works to compare cases
based on the similarity of symptoms and syndromes, but what Daseinanalyse adds is a
different kind of system, “one based, namely, on certain existential processes and
determinations” (BW 251). What this means is that an attempt is made to gain insight
into the specific structure of each case.
In the case of the schizophrenic, for example, the basic existential pattern is “a
breakdown in the consistency of natural experience, its inconsistency” (BW 252).
Binswanger describes this inconsistency as an inability to let things be, by which he
means having a sense of harmony with ones surroundings and circumstances. For a
psychologically normal person, even when an unfamiliar event occurs, so long as it is
Binswanger, “On the Relationship Between Husserl's Phenomenology and Psychological
Insight,” See: p. 206.
7
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consistent with his or her typical experiences, it will not disrupt his or her life. According
to Binswanger, schizophrenic patients, by contrast, have trouble residing “serenely
among things” and “they are not able to come to terms with the inconsistency and
disorder of their experience” (BW 253). One of the coping mechanisms is a pattern of
“psychosis” in which individuals fill in experiential gaps with phantasy often in the form
of hallucinations in order to unify their consciousness (BW 264). This is considered by
Binswanger to be a temporal problem, because there are gaps in the flow of experience
and hallucinations or phantasies that are marked by the phenomenon of “desocialization.”
Binswanger is taking this term from Minkowski, meaning that patients are not at all
surprised when they notice that others do not perceive what the patients themselves think
they are perceiving (BW 339).8 Here, Binswanger is emphasizing the fact that
hallucinations are not simply isolated phenomena that are given like any other perception.
They signify a design of the patient's particular world, marking an underlying condition
and a “deeply changed existential structure” (BW 340). The sense of a continuous flow of
consciousness could be compromised when gaps in this experience are filled in with
hallucinations.
We can see this more clearly in the case of Lola Voss presented in Binswanger't
text on schizophrenia. Binswanger's most famous case study is perhaps Ellen West, the
report on whom became a famous example of his Daseinanalyse, but he also wrote
extensively on Lola Voss. Voss was in her mid-20s when Binswanger's study begins.
After the man she fell in love with told her he could not marry her, she became
“melancholic” and “peculiarly superstitious” to the point where she thought her mother
8

This leads us to question whether Husserl was correct in excluding the insane from worldconstitution via a lack of understanding shared norms, as Binswanger suggests at least some
mental patients are aware no one else experiences their delusions.
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was bewitched (BW 268).9 At age 25, Lola was placed in a sanatorium. There, she was
chronicled as having a “good mind” and being “verbally astute,” yet, her behavior was
unpredictable and she was masterful at lying (BW 269). She had extreme anxiety that
focused on certain objects. For instance, the presence of umbrellas made her sick,
particularly the umbrella belonging to a specific nurse (BW 270). On Binswanger's
account, Lola's entire being was used up by attempts to protect herself from anything that
could disturb her existence, and she thought she could protect herself with certain rituals
like not allowing other people to touch her belongings and removing anything unfamiliar
from her possession (BW 286).
According to Binswanger's analysis, when Lola gets overwhelmed by her
superstitions, for instance when she thinks the nurse keeping her umbrella in the kitchen
will taint her food, there is “contiguity or temporal contingency” that prevails. Lola
invents a relationship between the presence of an umbrella and her food being tainted and
is possessed by an overpowering sense of dread. Binswanger explains that being
“possessed by” implies, in terms of time, that a genuine present is not temporalized out of
the future and the past (BW 294). Though Binswanger does not explicitly cite Husserl
here, the concept of a thick present containing both retained past and protended future is
at play. What Binswanger refers to as a lack of a genuine present is a present that is not
informed by the past and future, which is a clear disruption in the flow and structure of
time-consciousness.10 Specifically, the protention-primal impression-retention structure is
not conditioning Lola's experience. Binswanger seems to be claiming that her protentions
9

From Schizophrenie reprinted in Being-in-the-World (1963).

10

Binswanger is also concerned with the relationship between temporalization and
spatialization, and according to him, a bare present also has a lack of location. See: Being-in-theWorld, 294.
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are not realized in a primal impression; that is, she anticipates events that do not occur.
Lola was paranoid, and was always on alert for some danger that she thought would
happen, but to an outside observer these threats appeared to be unfounded.
According to Binswanger, on the surface, the way she seemed to experience time
might appear normal to someone else, because she did gather observations, made plans
for the future, and anticipated ways out of situations. Thus, a normal observer might be
able to explain her actions (BW 314-315). Nevertheless, simply having a general sense of
the future is not enough to claim that her time-consciousness is normal according to the
Husserlian structure I presented in Chapter 1. Her anticipations were unrelated to the
present because they were delusions that never became present. In Husserlian terms, this
means her protentions were never realized as primal impressions, and never sank back as
retentions.
From the psychiatric standpoint, Lola has no continuity and “continuity is
tantamount to freedom, to existence, or to formation of an authentic self” (BW 295).
Having a thick present is necessary, but having a continuous flow of consciousness is
important too. Binswanger muses that when there is no distinction between the memory
of an object and the object itself, there is a problem. There is no flow between past and
present, and when a patient gets stuck in memories, as in Lola's negative association with
umbrellas, than memories block the road into the future, and with it, the sense of being
ahead of oneself. If this happens, there is no freedom because the patient is closed off
from what Binswanger calls an authentic future. According to Binswanger, in the case of
Lola, it was “remarkable” that she still had a sense of self and was able to maintain any
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type of relationship with other people at all. When a patient's experience of time is
incongruent with continuity, according to Binswanger, the self is no longer authentic.11
Again, I must note that Binswanger is not directly applying Husserlian
phenomenology of time-consciousness to the study of mental illness, but Binswanger
does bring Husserlian phenomenology into conversation with time disturbances in
patients with mental illness, and we can see how his observations could seamlessly be
compared to Husserlian structures of time-consciousness.
Minkowski
Eugène Minkowski was a French Jewish psychiatrist in the 20th century and a
contemporary with Ludwig Binswanger. R.D. Laing described Minkowski's work as “the
first serious attempt in psychiatry to reconstruct the other person’s lived experience.”12
Minkowski's work in psychopathology centered on a patient's personal experience of time,
and he is credited with creating the concept of “lived time.” Minkowski was a clinician,
meaning much of his time was spent directly treating patients, so his work is not
particularly systematic or theoretical. Nevertheless, he was clearly influenced by
phenomenology. Though Minkowski was aware of Husserl, particularly the Logical
Investigations, he only occasionally cites Husserl in his work. Nevertheless, one can see
aspects of Husserlian phenomenology in Minkowski's case studies and in his approach to
the construction of lived time.

Binswanger also refers to the genuine present as an “authentic” present, which seems to be
an explicit use of Heideggerian terminology. There is also a debt to Heidegger where Binswanger
claims that temporalization is existence (See: p. 315). Despite the fact that this terminology is
more inspired by Heideggerian phenomenology than Husserlian, this, at the very least, points to
the fundamental role time plays in phenomenology.
11

Laing, “Minkowski and Schizophrenia.” See: p. 207.
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In the introduction to the English translation of Minkowski's Lived Time, Nancy
Metzel explains the influence of Husserlian phenomenology on Minkowski's work.
Though Minkowski criticizes the intentional analysis Husserl pushes in his early work for
being too conceptual and categorical, he does think Husserl had a profound effect on
psychology as a science. Minkowski rejects both Husserl's theory of intentionality and
the transcendental ego, because his own approach to psychology is more anthropological.
That is, whereas Husserl's understanding of a priori psychology involves intentional
analysis free from all presuppositions that we have from everyday experience and the
attitude used in the natural sciences, Minkowski maintains that while discovering the
structures of psychic life is important, psychology should remain in the natural world as it
is given in experience, but not just as an appearance to consciousness. Put differently,
Minkowski is concerned with lived time and the immediate spatio-temporal world of
experience, what Husserl would consider the natural world that must be bracketed to do
phenomenology. Nevertheless, like Husserl, Minkowski rejects naturalistic psychology
that uses a mechanistic approach, reducing human nature to something like a psychophysical machine.
Minkowski, like Binswanger, adopts the idea that part of the task of psychiatry is
to find structures of experience. Minkowski's approach is to use phenomenological
description of the experience of the world as lived by the mentally ill in order to reveal
the a priori character of the normal world. Presumably this would be helpful in the
diagnosis of patients.13 Again, this is not exactly like Husserl's attempt to find the

13

Obviously I cannot do an analysis of diagnosing methods, but it seems that this is the intent
behind Minkowski's analysis of the structures of the normal world. If the psychiatrist understands
the normal world, then the psychiatrist can try to reconstruct the patient's world in comparison to
it.
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structures of consciousness. Of course, the contexts in which both thinkers are
performing phenomenological analysis are completely different. Husserl is interested in
pure phenomenology and trying to ground any future science, while Minkowski
ultimately is a clinician attempting to provide therapy to patients. What is similar for both
men is that they see the importance of time as a structure of conscious experience, they
use phenomenological description to reveal a prioris, and Husserl's influence on
Minkowski is apparent.
One of the few places Minkowski explicitly mentions Husserl is in the
introduction to Lived Time. He claims that Husserl's approach, along with Bergson's:
helped us to realize that the conquest of time—far from being reducible to
the gaining of some extra leisure—must consist in a critical revision of our
entire attitude in regard to the phenomenon. Now, it appears that this is the
price we must pay if we are to free ourselves from the slavery to which
modern culture subjects us through the idea of time that it imposes upon
us. It is not a question of having free time but of learning how to live and
to breathe freely and spontaneously in time. (LT 5)
In this quotation, Minkowski is acknowledging the difference that Husserl stresses
between the way we view ourselves as at the mercy of the objective time of the natural
attitude and a sense of time that is lived. Instead of taking time to be a feature of the
external, natural world that we use to organize our experience, time is something we
experience subjectively and it is something human beings can experience differently from
one another. Time is a personal experience. Pathology shows that the phenomenon of
time is situated and organized differently in what Minkowski sometimes refers to as a
“morbid” consciousness, than in a normal consciousness. He goes onto state that,
Today I am persuaded, more than ever, that a whole series of
psychopathological manifestations can be understood and examined more
thoroughly from the vantage of the phenomenon of time and that the
constant confrontation of the normal and the pathological, considered
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from this point of view, is the principal, if not the only, avenue through
which we can sufficiently broaden our studies related to this phenomenon.
(LT 8)
This statement links a Husserlian-informed approach toward time with the discourse of
normal and pathological. Minkowski, as a practicing psychiatrist, is directly expressing
the need for phenomenology in the practice of psychiatry. Furthermore, this statement
reaffirms what I have set out to demonstrate, that is, how a phenomenological approach
to the study of the experience of time has been used in the field of psychiatry. For the
psychiatrist who follows the method of Binswanger and Minkowski, the
phenomenological method provides a way to let patients' reports of their experience
shape diagnosis and not simply put them into pre-established categories of mental illness
that are derived from observed symptoms and not self-reported patient experiences.14
Binswanger's existential a prioris and Minkowski's reconstruction of a patient's lived
time both show this marriage of phenomenology with psychiatry. Phenomenology,
particularly Husserlian phenomenology, allows us to see the essential characteristics of
normal experience.
Even though Minkowski, like Binswanger, is not explicitly or completely taking
up Husserl's entire account of time-consciousness, there is clearly a Husserlian influence
in his approach to the practice of psychiatry. Minkowski does not seem concerned with
the nuances of consciousness, but rather with the problem of constitution, which is
clearly present in Husserl's work. Where Binswanger rejected Husserlian constitution,
Minkowski is interested in the question of how a subject can constitute objective time.
Minkowski rejects the idea that there is an ego (which he seems to equate with Husserlian
14

Of course, even self-reported experiences are subject to the interpretation of psychiatrists as
well. This problem will be addressed later.
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consciousness) that accounts for the constitution of time. Rather, he employs the idea of a
“elan vital”15 (or personal elan) to express the existential character of the source of the
constitution of time. He claims that “everything that has a direction in time has elan,
pushes forward, progresses toward a future” (LT 38). This is not some external force, but
a personal force such that one spontaneously tends toward their personal future. Of
course, for Minkowski, there is no consciousness cut off from the natural world so a
person's future is tied up with their relationship to the world.
For Minkowski, an abnormal personality is most marked by the patient's lack of
harmony with the world. What he terms the “vital contact with reality” is what a normal
person experiences. Vital contact with reality is the way a psychologically normal person
resonates with the world, empathize with others, and act according to social custom. He
explains: “without being ever able to formulate it, we know what we have to do; and it is
that that makes our activity infinitely malleable and human”16 One of the fundamental
ways in which we have contact to reality is via the way we experience time. Minkowski's
method is to reconstruct a patient's lived time so it can be compare to a normal
experience. He writes, “Pathology, by showing us that the phenomenon of time and
probably also that of space are situated and organized differently in the morbid
consciousness than we ordinarily conceive them to be, puts the essential characteristics of
those phenomena in relief, which, because we are so close to them in life, could pass
unperceived or could be considered completely natural” (LT 8). When we examine the

This term comes from Bergson's “Creative Evolution” (1907) and can be traced back to the
idea of a “vital force” as found in the stoic philosopher Posidonius. The elan vital is similar to
Schopenhauer's “will to live.”
15

See: Urfer, “Psychopathology of schizophrenia: the views of Eugene Minkowski.”

16

83

abnormal experience, we also gain insight into the essential features of a normal
experience of time.
In order to recreate lived time of a patient, Minkowski looks at how temporality is
manifested in normal conscious experience. We see time unfolding before us, and our
perception is always flowing in a linear way, but there are also different levels of time.
We have a living succession we experience in the present,17 but we can repeat and
recreate our once present experiences at will (LT 29). That is, we can recreate events in
our mind with the use of our memory. We can see that this is a parallel to the levels of
primary memory and secondary memory introduced by Husserl. Primary memory
consists of the immediate retentions one has during present experience that occur as a
steady sinking back into the past, while secondary memories are those memories we can
bring up and recall in the time-constituting act of remembering. For Minkowski, we also
create the future in our minds. This is more than anticipation, we have a future-oriented
personal force (the elan vital) that sets precise ends and gives direction to life (LT 44). In
Husserl's terms, the elan vital would be conditioned by the protentional structure of
consciousness that anticipates the future, but it is an intentional, time-constituting feature
of consciousness. It also seems to provide the motivation to set goals, etc., like a futureoriented temporalization.
Minkowski takes as phenomenological data the discordance between the patients
psyche and a normal psyche. His method is to ask what the patient's idea of time is and
how it differs from our own (LT 186). He explains that patients with mental illness will
often “have a horror of the present and prefer to live in the past or even in the future by
Minkowski, like Husserl, rejects the idea of fixating on the present as a “now” as if it is a
point on a number line. He uses a thick present, stating: “There is duration, extension, in the
present” (LT 36).
17
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creating projects without caring about their realization” (LT 33). Minkowski describes
one patient diagnosed with schizophrenic melancholia, with whom he lived for two
months, in order to observe the way he reacted to normal external stimuli. This patient's
idea of time was that each day passed uniformly and monotonously.
No action, no desire emerged which, emanating from the present, could go
toward the future across this succession of dull and similar days. Because
of this, each day had an unusual independence. They did not vanish into
the sensation of the continuity of life. Each one emerged as a separate
island in the dark sea of becoming. What had been done, lived, or spoken
no longer played the same role as it does for us, because the desire to go
further did not seem to exist anymore. Every day there was the
exasperating monotony of the same complaints, the same words, so that
you felt that the human being had completely lost the conception of
necessary progression. (LT 186)
According to Minkowski, this patient's future was blocked by the paranoid conviction of
a destructive and horrible event to come. He was afraid that some atrocious fate awaited
his family, and he was so convinced this would happen that he showed no interest in
anything new. Minkowski sums this up as follows: “What our patient seems to lack
completely is this propulsion toward the future” (LT 187). This patient thought
everything he encountered in his life was designed to make him suffer, so he could not
project into the future anything other than the destruction of his family. According to
Minkowski, this can be explained in terms of the way he lives time. In Husserlian terms,
the way the patient constitutes time, particularly acts of anticipation, is not the way the
normal consciousness does, because the anticipations are never realized in the present. As
in Binswanger's case of Lola Voss, this schizophrenic patient fixates on a delusion and
that hinders their ability to anticipate the future as it happens for a normal consciousness.
Minkowski would describe this generally as a loss of vital contact with reality, it is the
recreation of a patient's lived time that enables this observation to be made.
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Though Minkowski, like Binswanger, rejects some features of Husserlian
phenomenology, and does not explicitly employ Husserl's terminology pertaining to
internal time-consciousness, his account of lived time is comparable to Husserlian
structures of time-consciousness. He understands the temporality of the vital contact with
reality as an experience of a successive flow in a thick present where past and future meet.
It is disruptions in the way that this temporality is lived that aid in his explanation of
mental illness. For my purposes, perhaps the most important thing to draw from the
above account is that Husserl has explicitly been brought into the normal/abnormal
discourse. Minkowski himself explains this as follows: “Phenomenology considerations,
sometimes too abstract by themselves, become more 'tangible' as a result of their
application to psychopathology” (LT 171).
Husserlian Time-Consciousness in 21st Century Psychiatry
One common element in my accounts of Binswanger and Minkowski is that the
clearest examples that explain the overlap of time-consciousness and mental illness were
cases of schizophrenia. Though schizophrenia is the most common case where Husserl is
invoked, Husserlian time-consciousness has a broader reach. Robert Stolorow is a
contemporary psychoanalyst whose most recent work looks at cases of trauma. In a short
piece entitled “Trauma and Temporality” he uses Husserlian time-consciousness to argue
that “an essential dimension of psychological trauma is the breaking up of the unifying
thread of temporality” (Stolorow, 158).
Stolorow's basic thesis is that trauma disrupts a subject's experience of time on the
level of time-consciousness, and therefore disrupts a sense of self. In his earlier research,
he explains that the essence of psychological trauma is a shattering of one's experiential
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world – in particular the absolutes that allow for someone to have stability, predictability
and saftey. Unlike the case of schizophrenia, which in contemporary psychiatry is
considered to be a condition that is often passed down genetically, trauma is caused by
some social event, meaning and valuation of the event. This means that traumatic
experiences are wide and can be triggered by a range of experiences including abuse,
death of a loved one, serving in combat, etc. Of course, because trauma extends to so
many different experiences, the way time-consciousness is affected is highly variable.
This makes it challenging to discuss because it is hard to make generalizations about
trauma, but it reveals why phenomenology could be helpful in that it starts from
subjective experience.
In explaining how temporality relates to trauma, Stolorow takes up the notion of a
“thick present” directly from Husserl, particularly the idea that the present contains both
the past and the future via the protention-primal impression-retention structure. This is
important for Stolorow, because according to him, lived experience is always in the three
dimensions of time – past, present and future. What happens in the case of psychological
trauma is that the sense of stretching along between past and future is disturbed.
According to Stolorow, a patient who has undergone trauma becomes “freeze-framed into
an eternal present” in which they are forever trapped or to which they always return. The
past, namely the traumatic event, becomes present and the future loses its meaning other
than as an endless repetition. Stolorow puts this simply: “Trauma is timeless.” If we put
this back into Husserlian terms, this means that the trauma causes an abnormal
experience of time to occur on the level of the protention-primal impression-retention
structure that conditions the flow of consciousness. When the patient is “stuck” in the
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traumatic experience, the future does not flow continuously into the past, and the present
is no longer the intersection of future and past. It is more like the trauma patient's
consciousness is on a loop, the past does not continuously sink back, rather, it lodges
itself in the present, blocking the future.
On Stolorow's analysis, the traumatized person lives in another world, one that is
incommensurate with other people's realities. Put differently, trauma is a fracture of
selfhood – the disorganization and reorganization of one's sense of time. Stolorow writes
about a patient18 who grew up with severe neglect and abuse from both of her parents.
Starting at the age of 2 ½, she divided herself into six fragments, each with its own
personality, name and attributes in order to cope with the trauma she underwent. She
received therapy to integrate these fragments so she could experience herself as one
person:
The patient began a session by bringing out 12 small pieces of paper. On 6
of the slips were written the 6 names of the fragments, and on the other 6
were short phrases designating the trauma she considered responsible for
each division. After asking her therapist whether he could match the
names with their corresponding traumas, she cleared off his desk and
assembled from the 12 pieces of paper 2 closely juxtaposed columns
displaying the temporal sequence of her shattering early experiences. The
act of arranging the names and experiences into a single ordered structure
and presenting this tangible structure to the therapist concretized the
process that was taking place between them—a process whereby the
therapist's unifying comprehension of her traumatized states was bringing
them into a dialogue in which the temporal continuity of her existence
could take form and grow stronger. (Stolorow 160-161)
In this case, the patient did not have a unified consciousness, and it was only putting the
traumatic events she experienced into a chronological, historical sequence that allowed
her sense of selfhood to come together. This is obviously a simplification of the complex
therapeutic process, but according to Stolorow, the unification of the patient's
18
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consciousness was made possible by temporal sequencing. In Husserlian terms, the
patient was able to reconcile the linear flow of consciousness that conditions all
conscious experiences with the sense of ownness that accompanies consciousness. The
flow of consciousness was initially disrupted by traumatic events, and for the patients,
memories were so incongruent, there was no unity of consciousness. If a person did have
perfect recall, then for Husserl, given the continuous flow of consciousness, with
retentions continuously sinking back into the past, that person would be able to remember
his or her entire life on a time line. In Stolorow's patient, there was so much of a
disruption to consciousness it was as if there were six separate consciousnesses, all of
them with huge gaps in temporal experience. It was only by piecing her traumatic events
together as they were experienced chronologically that enabled the patient to unify her
consciousness.
Unlike for Binswanger and Minkowski, Stolorow does not claim to use a
phenomenological method. Instead, he takes Husserlian time-consciousness out of the
broader context of Husserl's phenomenology. Again, I am not here evaluating the
philosophical legitimacy of this extraction; I am simply noting what is found in
Stolorow's work. We will see a similar extraction of the tripartite structure of
consciousness occur in what follows in the case of cognitive science.
Husserlian Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
It has been a recent development that phenomenology has been used as a
complement to philosophy of mind and of cognitive science. Cognitive science is a broad
field that consists of multiple research disciplines, but the main object of study is
cognition – what it is, what it does, how it works, etc. Contemporary cognitive science is
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generally thought to have its origins both with the work of cybernetics in the 1930s and
1940s, where scientists attempted to understand how the mind is organized, as well as
with the theory of computation and the modern computer. Until the 1950s, philosophy of
mind was dominated by behaviorist theory, which focused on the functional relationships
between stimulus and response, reducing human beings to mechanistic creatures without
recourse to internal (and hypothetical) constructs like the mind. Computational theories
of mind dominated cognitive science in the 1960s and 70s. A computationalist theory
views the mind as functioning like a computer or a symbol manipulator. The mind
computes some input from the natural world in the form of symbols or representations
and then creates outputs in the form of some mental or physical state. These theories
work on the assumption that the mind has mental representations like concepts, images,
and logical rules, and that it uses mental processes like deduction and memory retrieval.
More contemporary research has used this type of model as an analog of the brain. Of
course this is an oversimplification of the history of the discipline, but it is the case that
generally speaking, analytic philosophers of mind did not include phenomenology in their
works, deeming it too introspective to reach an understanding of the mind, preferring
naturalistic approaches.
The computational model is less dominant now than it was in the earlier days of
cognitive science, and there are numerous adaptations of it. Thomas Nagel in The View
from Nowhere (1986) rejects the computational model on the grounds that it is a psychophysical reductionist attempt to understand the mind. That is, consciousness as a
subjective experience cannot be fully explained by means of physical principles. He
writes, “Eventually, I believe, current attempts to understand the mind by analogy with
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man-made computers that can perform superbly some of the same external tasks as
conscious beings will be recognized as a gigantic waste of time. The true principles
underlying the mind will be discovered, if at all, only by a more direct approach” (VN
16). This “direct approach” points to his famous claim that this type of reductionist
science leaves out the experience of what it is like to be a thinker who is conscious of the
world from a particular perspective. Of course, it is not enough to reject reductionism
without providing some other account, and “there is still a question about how we are to
conceive of the inclusion of subjective mental processes in the world as it really is” (VN
16). On first glance, the inclusion of subjective mental processes could appear to point to
something like Husserlian phenomenology, which starts from subjective experience, but
Nagel claims his approach is different from that of phenomenology. Unlike the
phenomenologist, Nagel thinks of mind as a general feature of the world, making mind “a
concept under which we ourselves fall as instances—without any implication that we are
the central instances” (VN 18). Essentially, he rejects the phenomenological subject as
that which constitutes objectivity. Though Nagel himself does not employ
phenomenology he does describe the limitations of reducing the mind to simple physical
or mechanistic terms, with which a phenomenologist would agree.
By contrast, in the 1960s and 1970s, Hubert Dreyfus was the most persistent
thinker doing work within the discipline of cognitive science who insisted on the
relevance of phenomenology. He was openly critical of work on artificial intelligence that
depended on computational models. Dreyfus denies the assumption that cognition is
simply a matter of the manipulation of symbols and internal rules, because this would
make human behavior, to a large extent, context free. He argues that we cannot
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understand our own behavior and cognition in terms of internal rules in the same way we
understand the physical world in terms of external rules. Any attempt at a psychology
free of context is impossible. Dreyfus's position is largely influenced by the
phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. In order for artificial intelligence to create a
computer with human-like intelligence, it would require the computer to have Being-inthe-world, a body and a society analogous to a human society.19 Though Dreyfus uses
Heideggerian phenomenology, the notion of context in order to understand consciousness
is obviously not foreign to Husserl's thought. As I showed in Chapter 1, for Husserl, each
subject lives in a world full of shared norms that is constituted intersubjectively by the
pathologically normal. Even though Husserl's overall project that I am focusing on is an
attempt to find the structures of consciousness, he is not simply attempting to come up
with a set of internal laws (as in something like a computationalist model) to explain how
consciousness functions in isolation from a world. For Husserl, consciousness is always
intentional so it always finds itself in a world and subjective experience is always
influenced by context, so Dreyfus's position is also compatible with Husserl on this point.
As cognitive science has developed, work in the field has been more open to
phenomenological points of view. One of the developments motivating this consideration
is the advent of embodied cognition that has gained ground since the 1990s. Seeing flaws
in thinking of cognition as a computer program or a brain-in-a-vat has led cognitive
scientists and analytic philosophers to turn to phenomenology for support, including to
the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as well as Husserl. One aspect of phenomenology
that is important to emphasize is that there is an intentional structure to consciousness,
and this intentionality depends not only on the spatial, temporal and bodily situation of
19
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the subject, but also with the subject's environment and intersubjective relationships.
Phenomenology emphasizes the lived experience of the subject from their first-person
perspective.
Among cognitive scientists, first-person experience is considered by many to be a
necessary component to understanding consciousness. Ultimately the goal for many
cognitive scientists is to reduce consciousness to some type of natural or physical
explanation in terms of brain states or an embodied subject.20 Nevertheless, there is an
increasing interest in how classical phenomenology is a better conceptual framework for
understanding subjective experience than a purely physical explanation. In the late 1990s,
Dan Zahavi and Josef Parnas argued that the approach to consciousness found in
continental phenomenology “provides us with a more sophisticated and accurate model
of conscious experience than the models currently in vogue in the cognitive sciences.”21
This is a sentiment echoed by others in an increasing number into the 21st century.
Phenomenology is increasingly considered helpful to understanding subjective
experience, and particularly in cases of disturbed self-experience, which is important to
my project. In considering an overlap between phenomenology and pathology, Husserlian
time-consciousness in particular, has also gained ground in these disciplines, and it is this
case to which I am limiting my project.

20
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Temporal continuity seems essential for navigating everyday experience. As we
have seen in the psychiatric cases cited in previous sections, a lack of temporal continuity
can be a sign or symptom of a mental illness.22 In a recent text that gives an account of
the interaction of phenomenology with analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science,
Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, discuss the experience of disruptions in conscious acts like
perception. They write: “If we are to restore sense to these experiences, we have to take
them up into a more cohesive temporal framework” (PM 70). To make sense of
disruptions in our experience we need a temporal framework of consciousness that allows
for the complexity of human experiences, like one that Husserl provides. It is often via
disrupted experiences that we can determine what is essential to experience, and from this
we can give an account of normal structures of subjectivity (PM 72). One of the most
common disruptions to temporal continuity are disruptions of memory. It is commonly
accepted in contemporary memory research (involving many disciplines, including
cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and neuropathology) that memory is not a
single faculty of the mind (PM 70). This is corroborated in Husserl's account of timeconsciousness I presented in Chapter 1, as he distinguishes between primary memory and
secondary memory, or the difference between a retention (a memory in the thick present)
and a recollection (a memory that employs a temporalizing act of consciousness).
Husserl's account of time-consciousness does not simply run parallel to cognitive
science as it has been taken it up explicitly by some cognitive scientists. To relate
phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness to the cognitive sciences, some
thinkers, including biologist and neuroscientist Francisco Varela, suggest that Husserl's
22
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protention-primal impression-retention structure is best described as a “self-organizing
dynamical system” that maps onto neurological findings in the study of timeconsciousness. According to Varela, neural activities have various durations. He cites
three different but integrated scales of duration on which cognitive activity occurs. Each
scale has corresponding cognitive activities and they correspond to different parts of
brain, but they can happen concurrently.
The first of these scales is the the elementary scale (varying between 10 and 100
milliseconds), which is the minimum amount of time needed to perceive two stimuli as
distinct. Second is the integration scale (varying from 0.5 to 3 seconds) which
corresponds to Husserl's notion of a “thick present,” or the span of perceived time in
which we have our everyday conscious experiences of objects and intentional cognitive
activity. Varela suggests that the integration scale is describable in terms of protentionprimal impression-retention: “The now phase of consciousness, which includes the
retained just-past and the protended just-about-to-occur, is a dynamical now that
corresponds to the (variable) window of the [integration] scale, within which it
incorporates elementary events of the [elementary] scale” (PM 82). This means that, “the
temporal structure of experience, specifically the rearward and forward looking 'now,'
depends on the way the brain dynamically parses its own activity.”23 This corroborates
the picture of time-consciousness drawn by Husserl—the protention-primal impressionretention structure that conditions time-constituting acts and temporal objects has a
duration, showing we do not experience time as a sequence of disconnected “nows.” The
third scale is the narrative scale, which involves memory, so the length of time is
23
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anything over 3 seconds. This scale seems to correspond to temporal activities that
require longer durations of conscious activity, like recollecting secondary memories or
reconstructing a timeline.
Although these scales correspond to measured durations of time, Varela insists
they are not dependent on objective time in the sense that human cognition is not
explained in order to fit a fixed and pre-established timeline. The scales are dependent
upon the duration of neural activity and the three scales happen concurrently. That they
are measurable does not mean their existence is dependent on some objective time that is
outside subjective experience, making Varela's account compatible with Husserlian timeconsciousness.24 In addition, the dynamical system described by Varela is discordant with
the computationalist understanding of cognition. Unlike computer systems, biological
systems have an instability to them because the system exists in a body and a context that
affect how the system works. Because of this instability, using a dynamical model seems
to map on to an account of how we are actually conscious of time in lived experience
better than does a computational model, and it is more compatible with a
phenomenological account. Gallagher and Zahavi explain: “The self-constituting flow of
consciousness involves a perpetual change punctuated by transient aggregates underlying
momentary acts (at the [elementary] scale of duration)” (PM 82). Consciousness is a
constant, linear flow, but it is not always explainable by pre-established rules. The
computational model cannot account for all possible stimuli or contexts in which our
conscious acts occur.

24
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Furthermore, temporal experience is not simply the human being as being
consciously aware of an objective time that is an inescapable, measured feature of the
physical world as seems to be the case in the rule-based, computational model. Husserl's
phenomenological account provides the structures of protention, retention and primal
impression that constitute temporal consciousness. These structures make possible our
senses of past, present and future that we employ when constituting the objective,
measurable time used in the natural sciences. Scientists use this objective time to
organize data, but phenomenology provides an additional piece of information, namely,
how we consciously experience time as it appears to our consciousness. This subjective,
conscious experience of time as appearing is particularly helpful in studying mental
illness. If we allow that things like context and embodiment are important to
understanding consciousness, then phenomenology can account for the subject's firsthand experience as it appears to them in corroboration with a neurological account of
what is occurring in the brain. If a subject has an abnormal experience of time, then
Husserlian structures of time-consciousness taken as normal can be used by a psychiatrist,
for instance, as a point of comparison that can be used in diagnosis or treatment.
Stolorow's case of the trauma patient demonstrated this in a therapeutic setting, but it
seems that this could extend to other forms of treatment that corroborate with
neuropsychology.
In what follows, I will give a more detailed account of how Husserlian timeconsciousness has been taken up as a complement to findings in cognitive neuroscience.
Then I will look at the particular case of schizophrenia. Much like the cases found in
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Binswanger and Minkowski, schizophrenia is the mental illness which has the most direct
references to Husserlian time-consciousness.
Husserlian Time-Consciousness and Cognitive Neuroscience
In addition to cognitive science, Husserlian time-consciousness has also been
applied to certain studies in the field of cognitive neuroscience. This may seem peculiar
at first, because a phenomenological approach emphasizes not reducing consciousness to
a physical account of brain activity. Nevertheless, Husserlian time-consciousness has
been employed in neuroscience, and my interest is in any application of Husserlian timeconsciousness in the service of psychological and psychiatric research. Though
neuroscience was traditionally a branch of biology, in the 21st century, the brain has an
increasing role in the field of psychiatry.
The goal of neuroscience, broadly speaking, is to show the way that conscious
experience maps onto brain functioning. J.M. Fuster claims that consciousness is the
subjective experience of cognitive function.25 What cognitive neuroscience does is to
look at the way conscious experience results from the interaction and function of neural
networks. Fuster defines his agenda as “the search for a spatial and temporal order in the
cerebral cortex that matches the cognitive order in every respect,” and further, “By this
match I mean that the spatial or temporal constituents of the cortical order occupy the
same relative place with respect to one another as the corresponding constituents of the
cognitive order. Thus, a change or difference in the cortical order corresponds to a change
or difference in the mental order” (Fuster, 4).26 Fuster writes that “consciousness itself
already employs the temporal domain, even the most simple conscious experiences, such
25
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as perceptions, already require 'temporal continuity' as a necessary condition” (Vogeley
and Kupke, 157).27 We can see already how this maps onto Husserlian timeconsciousness. We saw this in the previous chapter with Husserl's protention-primal
impression-retention structure as well as with the underlying flow of consciousness that
constitutes intentional acts of consciousness. Both of these structural features employ a
temporal continuity.
Much of the work specifically on time-consciousness in the field of cognitive
neuroscience focuses on the region of the brain called the prefrontal cortex (from here
PFC). The PFC is located in the frontal lobes of the brain, lying in front of the primary
motor cortex and premotor cortex.28 It is thought to be used in planning, decision-making,
moderating, and orchestrating internal goals. It is an executive system that manages other
cognitive processes. Fuster claims that the PFC is crucially involved in the neural
constitution of time, particularly the tripartite concept of past, present and future. Fuster
refers to these basic functions of the PFC as 1) working memory, 2) interference control,
and 3) preparatory set. Integration across time is a function of the PFC, and it plays a role
in the temporal organization of behavior.
According to Fuster, the working memory29 constitutes the “temporally
retrospective” function of the PFC. That is, it has an operative function that is not
necessarily related to the content of a given memory or to the temporal period with which

Though, they are attributing the phrase “temporal continuity” to Fuster. See: Cortex and
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the particular content is retained. Vogeley and Kupke explain this as follows: “Working
memory is essential for our subjective time experience by providing an online access to
actual perceptions and contextual memory contents in the present” (Vogeley and Kupke,
159). In other words, working memory is like retention, in that it provides present access
to the content of memories, what Husserl refers to as primary memories. The preparatory
set functions to anticipate action, that is, it is a neural indicator of forthcoming actions. It
is this function of the PFC that “most likely primes the motor apparatus in anticipation of
the action.”30 This is comparable to protention, which is Husserl's term for the
anticipatory feature of the consciousness. Fuster's third function of the PFC is the
inhibitory interference control which acts like a form of attention. It protects the structure
of the memory or anticipation, keeping it in attention, or in something like Husserl's
“thick present.” Fuster's work shows that the working memory and the preparatory set
work together to constitute a holistic result, like a melody, for example.31 The PFC
bridges temporal distances between the contingent elements of an experience connecting
them in much the same way the primal impression unites retention and protention for
Husserl.
Vogeley and Kupke acknowledge that although Husserl is critical of psychological
explanations of consciousness as well as the naturalization of consciousness, there is a
convergence of the phenomenological and empirical explanations – namely in the
tripartite conception of consciousness and in the notion of the “thick present.” As we just
saw, Fuster proposes a tripartite structure similar to that presented by Husserl, obviously
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using different terminology. This is significant because there are two common
conceptions of time found in cognitive science: 1) the binaristic series model of time,
commonly called clock time, which relies on the before-and-after relationship of points
of time and 2) the tripartite series of relationships of the past, present and future. It should
be noted that the first model is more prominent in cognitive science generally, but work
like Fuster's calls it into question. The present in the latter model is dynamic and
impermanent (i.e. subjective) and the present in the former model is taken as a static
point that is fixed on a time line (i.e. objective). Husserl's model is clearly the second,
tripartite model, where the “now” is not some point on a time line, but is rather a thick
present. There's no point of time that is “now” and then other points that are “before” or
“after,” rather, what cognitive scientists have taken from Husserl is that any temporal
object is a “unity of memorial and expectational groups in which a different now-stage
corresponds to each group. Or rather, each group is a different now-stage. For now is
something relative. It is relative to stages” (Vogeley and Kupke, 159). The now is
formally structured by the interrelation of protention, primal impression and retention in
passive synthesis. So, Husserl's idea of the “thick present” is helpful in overcoming a
mere objective, scientific, numerical account of time-consciousness.
In addition to Fuster's work, Vogeley and Kupke point to another way to look at
time-consciousness that corresponds to a different approach, namely time as “scales of
duration” of which there are three. These are similar to Varela's scales of duration, but are
presented differently: 1) basic or elementary events corresponding to temporal moments;
2) large-scale integration associated with perception-action, memory, motivation; 3)
descriptive-narrative assessments related to linguistic capacities or the flow of time
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related to the continuity of the self (autonoetic awareness). Vogeley and Kupke draw a
direct comparison to Husserl with these three scales. The first (1) describes the basic
underlying protention-primal impression-retention structure where 'temporal moments'
occur in a thick present. This is the scale that conditions the experience of time objects.
The second (2) is an explanation of time-constituting acts like memory, anticipation, etc.
The third (3) is a different type of temporality that I have mentioned but not developed in
Husserlian terms, although Husserl does acknowledge this level of subjective time. This
level also seems to apply to the sense of ownness one has of one's consciousness, by
being able to construct a narrative of their life. As in Varela's work, this scale of duration
approach reaffirms the notion that time-consciousness is not a matter of sequentiality.
That is, consciousness is a complex process that does not simply map onto a timeline of
befores and afters like in a binaristic model. The subjective experience is not a point of
time on some sort of physical time scale; it is a duration that is dynamic and impermanent.
The most important aspect of Vogeley and Kupke's work is not simply that they
show how Husserlian phenomenology converges with work in cognitive neuroscience,
they also propose that “the integration of phenomenological and neuroscientific
approaches can stimulate the development of enriched pathophysiological concepts of
mental disorders” (Vogeley and Kupke, 157). They note that “with respect to psychiatric
diseases, time-consciousness has been shown to be disturbed both in schizophrenia and
affective disorders” (Vogeley and Kupke, 157). What I will show in the final section is
this specific case where we can see Husserlian time-consciousness get taken up in
contemporary work on schizophrenia.
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Returning to the Case of Schizophrenia
One must be cautious applying phenomenology to studies in fields like psychiatry
and cognitive science that historically have developed independently of phenomenology.
I have shown that Husserlian phenomenology has been employed in psychiatry, cognitive
science, and even neuroscience. It does seem that the phenomenological approach to
psychiatry and cognitive science can bring additional information into a study (the
subjective experience of time as it appears to the experiencer), but this is not a universal
application of phenomenology. I am only looking at Husserlian time-consciousness as it
is applied to cases of mental illness. There is a wealth of other types of research in the
field of cognitive science that employs phenomenology, and that requires an examination
that goes beyond the scope of my project. I am only claiming here that this overlap of
application occurs in cases of mental illness, because the patient's subjective experience
of consciousness is crucial to diagnosis (in some practices of psychiatry).
I have already looked at cases of time disturbances in schizophrenic patients in the
work of Binswanger and Minkowski, and more recent research into schizophrenia
continues to emphasize time disturbance as consistent feature of the mental illness.
According to the revised, fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, a diagnosis of schizophrenia requires that three criteria be met. The
criteria are evaluated based on self-reported experiences, reported abnormalities in
behavior and a clinical assessment by a mental health professional. These criteria are: 1)
Characteristic symptoms including, delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech,
grossly disorganized behavior, and lack or decline in emotional response, speech, or
motivation; 2) Social or occupational dysfunction; 3) Continuous signs of the disturbance
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that persist for at least six months. The DSM-IV includes five sub-classifications of
schizophrenia—paranoid, disorganized, catatonic, undifferentiated, and residual, which
further complicate the research on and treatment of schizophrenia.32
Though different cases of schizophrenia manifest themselves differently, there are
unifying features in cases of schizophrenia that make it diagnosable as one particular
mental illness. Time-consciousness and the experience of time frequently arise in trying
to pinpoint the characteristics of schizophrenia that arise in patients. Disturbances in time
have been associated with research on schizophrenia at least since Binswanger and
Minkowski, and this is corroborated with contemporary research. Schizophrenia is
commonly marked by delusions or hallucinations, meaning the patient's perceptual
reactions are affected. A patient might hear voices that no one else hears and respond to
them. This might be explained as a disturbance to time-consciousness insofar as
perceiving is a time-constituting act. More directly related to time-consciousness, though,
is memory loss, which is a common symptom of schizophrenia.33 Patients may have a
marked inability to retrieve memories, or a problem with conscious recollection of
specific memories, and particularly those recollections of “highly specific sensory and
perceptual details of recent experiences.”34 This is commonly referred to as impaired
“autonoetic awareness.” Autonoetic awareness is episodic memory that deals with selfawareness, where episodic memory is the retrieval of memories of personally
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experienced events.35 Memory loss of this type seems to indicate a defect or problem in
what Husserl referred to as the unity of time-consciousness. If the time-constituting act of
recollection is disrupted, then the form of time-consciousness is not working together as
it does in a normal consciousness. Insofar as our recollection of autobiographical
memories helps shape one's sense of self, this failure of recollection may also indicate a
disruption in a continuous sense of self extended in time.36
Phenomenology helps the psychiatrist understand a schizophrenic's sense of self
and agency from the patient's reported experiences, and this subjective experience of
time-consciousness can be compared to a normal account (via Husserl's universal form of
time-consciousness) to pinpoint how the patient's experiences are disturbed. Gallagher
has written on the topic specifically showing the value of Husserlian time-consciousness,
because “the ubiquitous retentional-protentional structure permeates experience,
cognition and movement and shapes the sense of self” (Gallagher, 3).37 What
phenomenology gives us that cognitive neuroscience does not, is ipseity – a phenomenal
sense of what is feels like to be me that is generated in the fundamental structure of timeconsciousness. Gallagher explains that the protention-primal impression-retention
structure goes beyond the act of having a memory or constituting a time object. Our
motor system retains and anticipates in the same way as our consciousness, meaning our
bodies employ a sort of retention and protention in our actions of which we are not
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necessarily conscious. A sense of agency is generated in the process of anticipation, and
the process of anticipation is crucial to human experience. Even when I do something as
banal as reach for a pen from my desk, my hand anticipates the best shape to make in
order to grasp the pen. There is also a retentional structure that can be found in bodily
movement. The previous instance is not lost sight of, and we can see this clearly after we
stumble while walking and we continue to unconsciously check our balance afterward.
Yet, “In the case of delusions of control, something starts to go wrong with these
anticipatory/preparatory/protentional processes” (Gallagher, 3). Delusions of control
often occur in schizophrenic patients, where they think someone else or some outside
force is controlling their thoughts or behaviors. In contrast, a normal person will not
consciously monitor his or her motor control, that is, one is not aware of sensory
feedback. Normal persons adjust to changing sensory situations, like adjusting for
balance, without notice. This type of sensory suppression fails in the case of delusion.
Gallagher explains the relevance of this to the case of schizophrenia. “The
schizophrenic becomes explicitly aware and concerned about what are normally the tacit
aspects of bodily movement and sensation—in terms of temporality, this is a hyperretentionality—the subject focuses on what has just happened, or the sensory feedback
that registers his just-past movement” (Gallagher, 3). There is something out of joint
within the flow of consciousness structured by protention-primal impression-retention.
When a patient is fixated on what is just-past, the structure breaks down because there is
a lack of anticipation. Protention is necessary for consciousness to function (and as I
argued in Chapter 1, function normally). It is a constant feature of experience, even of
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passive experience.38 Anticipating a note to come in a melody, for instance, is a structure
included in the intentional act of listening. Nevertheless, sometimes the content of what
we expect does not happen. A musician can hit a wrong note or stop playing abruptly, and
even though what we anticipated happening does not happen, the structure of retention
does not break down. We immediately correct for the shift in content.
Schizophrenic patients often have a different experience. For example, Frith and
Done conducted an experience with schizophrenic patients suffering from delusions of
control. In the study, subjects were asked to press a button that caused a loud sound to
play. Normal subjects were able to draw the connection between pressing the button and
the sound. The schizophrenic patients showed no anticipation for the self-generated
sound. They were constantly surprised39 by it. There are different ways to formalize
schizophrenic thought disorder, but from a Husserlian point of view, the study cited
above shows an inability to anticipate the effects of one's action, meaning there is some
disruption in protention. In fact, there is a breakdown in the fundamental protentionprimal impression-retention structure. For the normal patient, the button is pressed, the
sound is heard and this experience sinks back into the past, but kept in retentional
memory so there is an almost immediate understanding that pressing the button again will
reproduce the sound.
This is corroborated in other studies of schizophrenic patients. For instance, Tysk
has performed a series of studies on time estimation tasks in schizophrenic patients. The
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Passive experience as opposed to active experience like remembering, perceiving, etc. A
passive experience is something we are not explicitly aware of, or something unintentional, and
relates to what is simply given to us in experience.
The phenomenology of surprise has recently been studied by Depraz in “Phenomenology of
Surprise: Levinas and Merleau-Ponty in the Light of Hans Jonas.”
39
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overall finding of these studies was that schizophrenic patients showed either an overestimation or an under-estimation.40 In addition to time-estimation tasks, there is
neurological evidence to support the studies I mentioned above that illustrate impaired
autonoetic awareness. Both the inability to judge the duration of events and the inability
to retrieve past memories support the claim that patients with schizophrenia are unable to
link separate aspects of events into a cohesive, distinct whole. The neurological evidence
shows that there is a disturbance in connectivity between different brain regions in certain
time frames. Vogeley and Kupke write that “the disturbance of time-consciousness in
schizophrenia is a fundamental 'structural disturbance' of time-consciousness that is
related to a dysfunction of the PFC and its related structures” (Vogeley and Kupke, 162163). In terms of Husserlian time-consciousness, this means that there is a disruption in
the flow of consciousness. Instead of a steady, continuous flow of consciousness, there
are experiential gaps that cannot be accounted for by the patient.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided examples of how Husserlian phenomenology has
been applied in psychiatric research over the course of the last 80 years. Although I think
one must be cautious in using phenomenology and qualify how it is being used, it seems
to be helpful, particularly in cases of mental illness where where time-consciousness is
disturbed in some way. In the next chapter, I will explore in more detail that historical
framework that conditions these studies of time-consciousness. What I have shown in this
chapter is not that Husserl was actually doing psychiatry or cognitive science himself, but

See: Tysk, “Estimation of time by patients with positive and negative schizophrenia.” Of
course, we should note that these studies draw conclusions based on a binaristic model of time
and not a tripartite structure. Similar findings have been found in: Franck, Posada, Pichon, and
Haggard, “Altered Subjective Time of Events in Schizophrenia.”
40
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that Husserl's work, particularly on time-consciousness, has its mark on psychiatry and
cognitive science that continues to this day. I have followed the academic literature and
research that employs Husserlian time-consciousness to show that it has been applied
across a variety of disciplines.
The employment of Husserlian time-consciousness in particular reinforces the
central importance of time to understanding human thoughts and experiences. One of the
reasons why Husserlian time-consciousness has been taken up is because it is considered
to be one of the most foundational experiences of consciousness a human being can have.
As I showed in Chapter 1, one of the strong aspects of Husserl's account is that he shows
just how complex consciousness is. We can remember, anticipate and perceive without
any effort. If this is disrupted in some way, it is indicative of an abnormality (usually a
diagnosable mental illness) that impairs fundamental human experiences. Husserl's work
has been helpful in better understanding how time-consciousness works for an
experiencing subject, but the biggest implication of Husserl's work is seen in cases of
time-disturbances. The case of schizophrenia is particularly interesting because
disturbances in time-consciousness are often a very clear symptom, and it makes sense
why Husserl has been employed.
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Chapter 3
Much Madness is divinest Sense -To a discerning Eye --Emily Dickinson
My approach in Chapter 2 is in the Foucaultian vein, particularly his
archaeological approach adopted in the 1960s, in his works The History of Madness and
The Order of Things. The idea behind Foucault's archaeological method is that systems of
thought and knowledge are governed by rules that operate to order thought on a level that
runs under the consciousness of individuals. In other words, the conceptual possibilities
for knowledge in a particular historical epoch are governed by the episteme of that era.
With this in mind, I argue in this chapter that there are transcendental conditions that
Husserl and the psychiatric studies that have taken up Husserl rely on, and that these
conditions are not context neutral. In fact, these conditions are historical. The
phenomenology of time-consciousness has been naturalized by its employment, but both
Husserlian phenomenology and its uptake rely upon a certain framework of thought that
is only possible in what Foucault deems “the modern era.” Foucault explains in The
Order of Things that the concept of “man” emerges only in the modern era, where man is
taken to be an empirico-transcendental doublet, and knowledge of man is conditioned by
his finitude. I show how studies of time-consciousness emerge under these conditions.
Furthermore, Foucault offers a sustained critique of phenomenology in general using the
archaeological method. In this chapter, I apply his critique to the particular case of
Husserlian time-consciousness. I show that the way we think about the fundamental
structures of consciousness changes over time and this is further evidenced by the deviant
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cases I examined in Chapter 2 when they are put into context with the way madness has
been viewed historically.
My analysis in the previous chapter showed how Husserl has been taken up in
psychiatric disciplines informed by phenomenology. Despite the differences in
motivation and method employed by Husserlian phenomenology and psychiatric research,
my purpose is to show that these disciplines share the study of time-consciousness is
indicative of their historical position. This becomes apparent when we examine studies of
time-consciousness in terms of Foucault's archaeological analysis of modernity. Neither
Husserl nor the psychiatrist historicize their accounts, instead relying on certain
transcendentals (taken as absolute) to ground their work. My interest is exactly in
historicizing their accounts, using the work of Michel Foucault to see how these studies
are possible only given certain epistemic conditions that mark our modern ways of
approaching the human sciences. In The Order of Things, Foucault gives a detailed
account of how knowledge of what today we call the human sciences has changed over
time. Of particular interest to my project is the way man has emerged as an object of
study in the modern era, while remaining the subject of this knowledge. In addition, the
impact of historicization of madness is seen in History of Madness where Foucault gives
a sweeping account of how madness has been viewed in three different historical eras,
where what we have in our current era is a medicalization of madness as mental illness,
possible because man is now an object of scientific study.
Ultimately in the next two chapters, I will analyze what I call the “naturalization
of time-consciousness” and open up a critique of normal/abnormal discourse as it
pervades the modern era specifically in the instance of time-consciousness. In this chapter,
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I will make two arguments to show that time-consciousness is historically conditioned.
First, I will develop a claim I employed but did not expressly state in Chapter 2 that
Husserl and the psychiatric research that employs Husserlian phenomenology use the
same transcendental conditions in order to study time-consciousness, namely a linear
flow of time and a linear flow of consciousness. I will first comment on Husserl's
commitment to transcendental idealism and then show that there is a similar reliance on
the naturalized transcendental conditions used in the psychiatric discourses that employ
his phenomenology of time-consciousness. Put differently, the use of a linear flow of time
and a flow of consciousness condition the study of time-consciousness both in Husserlian
phenomenology and in the psychiatric disciplines that have employed it.1 I will then
argue that these conditions are actually historically conditioned and specific to at least
one way of dividing historical eras, namely Foucault's. I will conclude that timeconsciousness as an object of study is a historical phenomenon and contingent upon
particularly modern2 ways of thinking. Thus, the reason why phenomenology and
psychiatric disciplines are both studying time-consciousness and employing the same
transcendental conditions is because they fall under the same episteme that conditions all
knowledge and work done in the human sciences in the modern era.
Second, I will offer a critique of the phenomenology of time-consciousness that
shows its reliance on the Cartesian cogito. The basic argument is this: Even if Husserl
allows for a historically conditioned conscious experience, his conception of

1

I am not aiming to resolve the tension that appears frequently between phenomenology and
naturalism, nor am I entering the debate between idealism and realism, rather, my intention is to
employ a Foucaultian analysis, particularly his archaeological method to show that this use of
transcendentals to explain time-consciousness is a modern phenomenon.
That is, in Foucault's sense of “modern.”

2
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consciousness is always considered rational and absolute. So, time-consciousness is not
conditioned by what appears to it, but by a reliance on transcendental conditions taken as
given. That is, the starting point of Husserl's phenomenological method is to bracket all
assumptions and to only examine phenomena (like time) as they appear to consciousness,
but to interpret what appears requires certain assumptions (like the linearity of time). This
is a common criticism of phenomenology, but I will take it in a direction that shows the
effects of this on mental illness. To show this, I will turn to the link between
consciousness and madness. In his first Meditation, Descartes dismisses madness as a
threat to reason, because only a sane person can engage in hyperbolic doubt. Husserl and
20th century psychiatry and cognitive science still follow in the tradition of Descartes and
continue to uphold this value of a rational consciousness. It is in the work of Michel
Foucault, particularly in the History of Madness that we can escape the cogito and look at
the centrality of time-consciousness in Husserl's thought (and the psychiatric work that
takes it up) as historically conditioned.
Naturalizing Transcendentals
In using phenomenology to support and demonstrate psychiatric diagnoses and
cognitive structures, psychiatrists and related researchers employ Husserl by stripping out
the transcendental elements of phenomenology and using certain features of it on the
psychiatric (and thus empirical) level. What I am calling a “naturalization of the
transcendental” is the stripping away of the transcendental elements of Husserlian
phenomenology before employing Husserlian structures of consciousness in psychiatric
research. Naturalization can mean many different things. I am using “naturalization of
transcendentals” to mean taking transcendental conditions of experience and using them
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as empirical facts about the natural world. In other words, this occurs when
phenomenologically determined conditions, particularly the linearity of time and the
linear flow of consciousness, are employed in the natural attitude that Husserl claims to
bracket. My criticism is not with the empirical disciplines for using features of the
transcendental consciousness and employing them in psychiatry. In fact, I think these
particular conditions are needed by both the phenomenologist and the psychiatrist in
order to study time-consciousness. My critique points to a common criticism of
Husserlian phenomenology, namely that Husserl cannot bracket the natural attitude in
order to do “pure” phenomenology. Nevertheless, my critique is not directly a criticism of
Husserl's phenomenological method. Rather, my claim is that the inability to maintain a
distinction between empirical and transcendental (for both Husserl and for the
psychiatrist) is an inevitable result of historical epistemic conditions. I am concerned only
with time-consciousness, and my claim is that using transcendental conditions, namely
the linear flow of time and the linear continuity of consciousness, to give an account of
conscious experience is a modern phenomenon.
I have shown in Chapters 1 and 2 that the structures of time-consciousness are not
universal for all people (cases of mental illness show this). In this Chapter, I will employ
a historical analysis like that of Foucault to argue that these structures are also not
universal at all times. In this section, I will briefly discuss Husserl's transcendental
idealism and then show that on the particular issue of time-consciousness, the
transcendental conditions needed to analyze time-consciousness are the same conditions
used in psychiatric studies of disturbances in time-consciousness that I have cited in
Chapters 1 and 2. In order to make my critique about the inseparability of the
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transcendental and empirical in the case of Husserlian time-consciousness, I will look at a
similar critique Foucault gives to Kant in what Foucault sees as Kant's failure to separate
anthropology from transcendental idealism.
Husserlian phenomenology occurs in the tradition of transcendental philosophy
after Kant, wherein Kant introduced the term “transcendental” as the condition of the
possibility of knowledge itself. For Kant, space and time are forms of intuition by which
we must perceive objects. A condition for experience is not a property assigned to objects
nor an entity in and of itself; rather, it is a condition for a person to perceive an object and
understand it in space and time. The way Kant explains this conditioning of all possible
experience is via a transcendental subject that conditions knowledge, and although we
can deduce from experience that it exists, it cannot have empirical predicates.3 In a
similar vein, Husserl's transcendental idealism is concerned with the relation of
consciousness to the natural, physical world, but the natural world along with the human
mind are intentional structures of a transcendental consciousness that exists in absolute
independence from the natural world. By “absolute” Husserl means that it can exist when
nothing else exists.4 What this means is that the natural world is ontologically dependent
on the transcendental consciousness which intends it.
In §50 of Ideas I, Husserl claims that the natural world is an intentional correlate
of consciousness, which means it depends on consciousness for existence.5
Transcendental idealism also means that consciousness is independent from the natural
3

See: Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.

4

Husserl, Logical Investigations. See: Investigation III, §5, 7, 10-11, 13-17, 21.

5

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl insists that human consciousness is a part of nature, and
that mental events can be causally explained, which means they depend on a natural causal
account in some way. See: Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, p. 336.
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world. When we perform a phenomenological reduction and bracket the natural attitude
(the attitude taken in naturalism) what remains is the transcendental consciousness. The
transcendental consciousness bestows meaning on objects and describes them exactly as
they appear. In §33-38 of Ideas I, Husserl argues that our flow of consciousness is a unity
which is determined by the essence of its own conscious experiences, independent of the
assumptions that mark the natural attitude. This means that for Husserl, consciousness
cannot be the subject matter of epistemology in the natural attitude, because the naturalist
cannot investigate the conditions of possibility of objective experience. Nevertheless, we
can still investigate consciousness. There are structures of consciousness at work that
condition all experience, and to find them we must adopt a phenomenological attitude.
Husserl is critical of the naturalistic attitude because the naturalistic perspective takes the
natural world for granted and rigidifies it as given, primary, and absolute. For Husserl, the
natural attitude is not primary. Rather, naturalism is subsumed [aufgehoben] in
transcendental idealism, which must be performed in the phenomenological attitude.
While performing the phenomenological reduction, the temporal flow of
consciousness is something that cannot be bracketed, and for Husserl this temporal flow
cannot be doubted. As I argued in Chapter 1, Husserl's account of time-consciousness
relies on two basic conditions he takes as given and absolute, the linear flow of
consciousness and the linear flow of time. Husserl does not express these two flows as
appearing phenomena; instead he seems to take them as given, because he does not
bracket them. Likewise, these same conditions appear as evident features of the natural
world in the naturalistic disciplines like psychiatry and cognitive science. Because of the
dependence on these conditions, which are employed both as transcendental conditions
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and as natural phenomena, Husserl's conception of time-consciousness is linked to the
natural attitude. That is, the linear flow of consciousness and the linear flow of time seem
to be both transcendental and natural phenomena, and I will examine this seeming
contradiction later in this chapter.
First, I will say more about each of these conditions. Throughout Husserl's corpus,
consciousness is always intentional and always described as a flow. If consciousness is a
moving flow, then it entails that it has a temporal nature. Consciousness is always
continuous. That is, when we perceive an object it appears in our consciousness, and “we
necessarily find a flow of continuous 'change'; and this change has the absurd character
that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither 'faster' or 'slower'” (Hua 10/76).
This implies an unchangeable regularity to one's consciousness, and a flow that Husserl
claims is necessary. What this means is that time-consciousness is reliant upon a
continuous, linear flow of conscious awareness. As I have explained above, Husserl also
assumes that consciousness is unified. If we have a flowing and unified consciousness,
this supports the claim that temporal structures like the protention-primal impressionretention condition time-constituting acts like perceiving, which is an intentional act of
consciousness that connects the experiencer to objects of consciousness.
Second, time-consciousness is also reliant on a continuous, linear flow of time
itself. This linear flow of time as a succession of past, present and future is something
Husserl never calls into question. As I explained in Chapter 1, Husserl is not interested in
what he calls “objective time,” the measurable time of the natural attitude, but instead
“the time we assume is the immanent time [erscheinende Zeit] of the flow of
consciousness” (Hua 10/5). Returning to the famous example of the melody from the
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1905 lectures on time-consciousness, he explains the fundamental structure of immanent
time. We hear a note and that note remains in our immediate awareness as the note we
heard sinks back into the past, and this process occurs continuously. The entire melody
exists in a thick present, so we hear it as a unified object and not as a series of
disconnected notes. Husserl does, nevertheless, assume a succession of connected points,
each appearing as a primal impression, but in a thick present where future notes are
anticipated and past notes are retained. The notes sink back into the past in a steady,
linear running-off. This flow of constant and continuous changes is immutable with
regard to its form, and Husserl never calls the linearity of past, present, and future into
question (Hua 10/29). That is, he does not consider that the past, present, and future
always occur in this linear, chronological order, with the future always lying ahead of the
present and the past lying behind it. Though Husserl does not examine “objective time”
that is measured and employed in the natural sciences, he still uses the assumption of a
regular, linear flow of time to explain the fundamental structure of internal timeconsciousness as it appears.
It may seem peculiar to a 21st century, Western reader to call the past-presentfuture structure into question at all. Many ancient cultures have a concept of cyclical time,
including the Incans, Mayans, Babylonians, Ancient Greeks, et al., wherein repeating
ages occur to all living beings. Linear time is, generally speaking, a Judeo-Christian
concept, based on the Bible, beginning with an act of creation from God. Furthermore,
not all conceptions of time are numeric and chronological. The Greek language, for
instance, has two words for time, Chronos [Χρόνος] and Kairos [καιρός], where the
former is numeric time and the latter is a qualitative notion of time, an indeterminate
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moment in which something special occurs. This very issue comes up in Plato's
Statesman and Timaeus. That Husserl never questions time as linear demonstrates his
thought as rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Furthermore, this linear flow of time is
also assumed in the natural sciences as an objective feature of the natural world.
If we look at the way time-consciousness has been taken up in psychiatric
disciplines, we see a similar reliance on these two conditions of experience in order to
explain cases of deviancy even though their methods differ widely from Husserl's.
Introduced in Chapter 2, the thinkers who have taken up the concept of Husserlian timeconsciousness would all reject his transcendental idealism. Eugene Minkowski, a
contemporary of Binswanger, explicitly rejected Husserl's notion of the transcendental
ego. Instead of bracketing the natural world, Minkowski used phenomenological
description of the experience of the lived world of a mentally ill patient in order to treat
them. Nevertheless, Minkowski assumed that a normal patient would have a linear flow
of time-consciousness in order to identify the abnormalities in the lived time of mentally
ill patients. For instance, he observed that his schizophrenic patients often experienced
dissociation between having ideas and verbalizing those ideas. He described this
dissociation as indicative of a loss of vital contact with reality and a breakdown of lived
time (LT 284). In order to describe dissociation as a disconnect in a patient's mental life
from reality, he must assume that reality has a normal flow of time that the dissociated
experience can be compared against.
Contemporary work in phenomenologically-informed cognitive science and
psychiatry not only corroborate Minkowski's claims, but all such research takes place in
the natural world and in what Husserl would refer to as the natural attitude. Instead of

119

relying on a transcendental consciousness, they assume the mental relies on the physical
in some way. For instance, as I showed in Chapter 2, cognitive science is a broad
discipline, but one of its narrow goals is to explain how cognitive acts arise from brain
activity. This means that, “the temporal structure of experience, specifically the rearward
and forward looking 'now,' depends on the way the brain dynamically parses its own
activity.”6 Some cognitive scientists see Husserlian phenomenology as helpful as a
descriptive abstraction and an attempt to map these described experiences onto the brain.7
This research has been extended to psychiatric studies, enabling researchers to explain
what Minkowski had called “a breakdown of lived time” in terms of brain functioning. In
Chapter 2, I also used the example of Vogeley and Kupke's research on the different
scales of duration that describe consciousness. Although Vogeley and Kupke claimed that
different levels of time can exist concurrently and thus are not depended on sequential
time, the studies they perform are carried out with a linear, continuous time that
conditions duration studies and time estimation tasks.8 People with schizophrenia, for
instance, have difficulty estimating periods of time, and this difficulty can only be

6

See: Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, p. 334.

7

For example, Van Gelder and Varela use a dynamical systems model where every cognitive
experience, including basic perception and motor behavior to human reasoning, arise through
several functionally distinct and topographically distributed regions of the brain. See: Van Gelder,
“Wooden iron? Husserlian phenomenology meets cognitive science.” See also: Varela, “The
specious present: a neurophenomenlogy of time-consciousness.”
8

Time estimation studies performed by Tysk, have shown that schizophrenic patients showed
either an over-estimation or an under-estimation. See: Tysk, “Estimation of time by patients with
positive and negative schizophrenia,” p. 826ff. See also: Tysk, “Time perception and affective
disorders,” p. 455–464. In addition to time-estimation tasks, schizophrenic patients also appear to
have an impaired ability to relive events from their personal pasts or impaired “autonoetic
awareness.” Autonoetic awareness is episodic memory that deals with self-awareness, where
episodic memory is the retrieval of memory of personally experienced events. See: Baddeley,
Eysenck, and Anderson, Memory.
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considered deviant if a regular, linear sense of time is used as a basis for identifying
normal time estimations from abnormal.
Psychiatric studies of time-consciousness in the 20th and 21st century employ the
same transcendental conditions Husserl uses in order to explain conscious experiences of
time. Without explicitly acknowledging these features, Husserl assumes these conditions
are given to the transcendental consciousness, and psychiatrists and cognitive scientists
assume them to be features of the natural world. Even though alternative conceptions of
consciousness and of time that do not express these experiences as linear flows exist,
particularly in historical accounts, both phenomenology and psychiatric research on timeconsciousness in the 20th and 21st centuries relies heavily on linearity. I have shown that
this has to be the case given the way deviations of time-consciousness are explained as
compared to normal accounts of time-consciousness. If one adopts a naturalistic attitude,
and assumes time is a linear, fixed feature of the outside world, then one assumes it
applies universally until a deviant case arises. If one starts from a phenomenological
attitude, one assumes the way time appears to one's consciousness is normal until there is
a failure to reach an intersubjective understanding of time, for instance. This is why
Husserl excluded the insane from those who are capable of world-constitution.
Although the natural attitude and the transcendental consciousness seem like
discordant conceptions, I am claiming that they are compatible historically. That is, the
linearity of time and the past-present-future of consciousness are conventions particular
to a tradition and historical period. It is through using Foucault's work, particularly his
archaeological method that I will corroborate the claims I make above and provide an
explanation as to why these particular conditions appear in the 20th century in the
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disciplines of phenomenology and psychiatry. I will move beyond this analysis to offer a
critique of transcendental philosophy (particularly Husserlian) and extend this critique to
the naturalization of allegedly universal transcendentals employed in phenomenological
psychiatric discourses.
The tension between transcendental conditions and empirical experiences is not
only a problem for Husserlian phenomenology. In the Introduction to Kant's
Anthropology, Foucault argues that in Kant's transcendental subjectivity, the conditions of
the possibility of experience refer back to the empirical existence of the subject. Human
subjects study themselves as empirical objects in the field of anthropology in order to
understand experience. Foucault writes, “A collection of empirical observations,
anthropology is not “in contact” with a philosophy of the conditions of experience” (KA
66). Yet, Kant holds in the first Critique that the transcendental subject is the starting
point of knowledge, and it needs to be outside perception in order to condition
experiences in order, for example, to fit experiences into a chronology. If we exist in this
chronology, then we are an object of knowledge (KA 89-93). This is essentially the same
claim Husserl implicitly makes, that we need to have a linear concept of time working in
order to explain consciousness, but we need to have a consciousness in order to constitute
a linear concept of time. The transcendental subject (which requires no empirical
evidence to be known to exist) cannot be the foundation of all empirical knowledge if it
can also be investigated as an object of that knowledge. There is an oscillation between a
knowing subject and a known subject. Likewise, in Husserlian phenomenology there is
an oscillation between a constituting consciousness and constituted experience of
consciousness. This oscillation will continue to be important in what follows.
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Foucault's Archaeology
Foucault's archaeological method dominated his work in the 1960s, wherein he
takes a historical approach to analyzing particular regions of knowledge. In the Order of
Things he examines the human sciences; in History of Madness he examines madness, etc.
Foucault's project is a transcendental critique. As opposed to Kant's transcendental
project, in which he explores universal conditions of experience, or Husserl's
transcendental idealism, in which he aims for absolute structures of consciousness,
Foucault seeks historical a prioris that structure the parameters of certain regions of
knowledge.9 That is, there are conditions that make knowledge possible, but they are not
transcendent conditions that apply for all times, these conditions are a framework for all
knowledge within a certain historical era. What emerges are historical divisions
distinguishable by certain “epistemological figures” and arrangements of knowledge that
are not consciously imposed on fields of study but unconsciously influence the research,
discourses, variations within discourses, and practices that pertain to a certain area or
object of study. These epistemological figures are what Foucault refers to as episteme that
condition and arrange knowledge as well as cause disciplines like the human sciences to
emerge.
By his own accord, Foucault confines himself to looking at the epistemic
transformations that have occurred historically, such that predated the emergence of the
human sciences in the modern era (OT xiii). Foucault looks at scientific works from the
point of view of the rules that organize their discourse and he tracks the way terminology
is used in order to uncover an episteme particular to the era that underlies all regions of
9

Later in Foucault's work, he emphasizes instead the parameters of individual and collective
experiences and not simply regions of knowledge.
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thought (OT xiv). These episteme ground knowledge as the conditions of possibility of
discourses; they represent historical a prioris or the epistemological conditions of a
particular era. For Foucault, these episteme act like the epistemological unconscious of an
era. He explains clearly in the Forward to the English edition: “What I would like to do,
however, is to reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge: a level that eludes the
consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing
its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature” (OT xi). The assumptions of the
episteme are so fundamental that the figures working in the particular disciplines and
discourses are unaware of them. Though Foucault's work eventually moves away from
his archaeological method, he does not abandon the concept of the episteme. In 1980,
Foucault defines episteme as follows:
I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus
which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are
possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific
theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or
false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation,
not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be
characterised as scientific (“Confessions of the Flesh,” 197).10
The episteme does not condition truth and falsity, which would require some appeal to a
universal or absolute truth; rather, the episteme conditions what is acceptable to evaluate
as true or false within a scientific field during a certain era.
An important feature of these episteme is that they change suddenly and
thoroughly.11 Foucault claims that within a few years the tradition of general grammar

See: Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh” in Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings, 1972-1977.
10

11

Though in The Order of Things Foucault makes this strong claim, it is not the case that all
knowledge or all discourse changes completely. There are certain ideas and practices that carry
through eras. The dominance of demonstrative truth is one such example that I will discuss later.

124

was replaced by historical philology, for example (OT xvii). There might be a
genealogical account that could explain how the episteme transform causally, but in his
archaeological works, Foucault confines himself to just describing the changes. In The
Order of Things, Foucault historicizes certain regions of knowledge and discourses based
on what appear to be discontinuous episteme that marked the way knowledge was
organized in three historical eras – the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and the modern
era, which we are still in today. He focuses on three regions of knowledge – the study of
living beings, laws of language, and economic facts – and shows how these subjects were
studied differently in each historical era. For instance, in the Classical era, the study of
nature and natural forms was practiced as taxonomy, where species were classified in
terms of their visible physical structures – form, number, arrangement, and magnitude –
and then arranged into tables (OT 268). This type of organization was indicative of the
Classical episteme which was marked by the overarching organizational principle of
representation. In virtue of having ideas, we represent what we know, and so knowledge
is based on things like clear and distinct ideas or simple impressions.
At the end of the eighteenth century, this basis of knowledge changes and biology
emerges to replace taxonomy as the study of living beings. Foucault claims that the work
of Georges Cuvier, a French naturalist and zoologist, indicates a rupture in the Classical
episteme. Cuvier overthrew the taxonomic arrangement and changed the way species
were classified. Instead of via their outside features, the classification of living beings
“now arises from the depths of life, from those elements most hidden from view” (OT
268). In the modern era, the study of living beings is called biology and beings are
classified in terms of the function of internal organs. Identity can no longer be analyzed
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by visible features, because now living things “resemble each other at their centers; they
are connected by the inaccessible, and separated by the apparent” (OT 267). When Cuvier
began to look at underlying structures and functions, taxonomy was no longer a viable
means of classifying and living beings were “regrouped around the central enigma of life”
(OT, 304). This is just one example of the type of study Foucault is performing, showing
how similar objects of study (like wealth and money, as another example) are analyzed
differently, spoken about differently, and known differently depending on the historical
episteme. Where the Classical era relied on principles of representation, internal
functioning became more important in modernity.
Foucault's archaeological method, simply put, is to do a historical analysis of
thought and discourse, examining on what basis knowledge and theory become
possible.12 In the introduction to The Order of Things, Foucault writes, “I should like to
know whether the subjects responsible for scientific discourse are not determined in their
situation, their function, their perceptive capacity, and their practical possibilities by
conditions that dominate and even overwhelm them” (OT xiv). This calls into question
the universality and objectivity of the human sciences, like psychiatry and
phenomenology (which both make universal and objective claims). Looking again at the
example of the science of living things, the coherence with which we establish the fact
that a cat and a dog resemble each other less than two greyhounds do is not determined
by some a priori and necessary concatenation. The way we classify is historical. There is
an experience of order and on that order knowledge is constituted, ideas appear, sciences
are established, rationalities are formed, and experiences are reflected in philosophies
12

Foucault defines this more precisely in The Archaeology of Knowledge. Archaeology's aim is
to describe the archive, or “the general system of the formation and transformation of statements,”
that exists during a particular time period (AK, 129).
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(OT xxii). Perhaps the most important feature of Foucault's method is that this is not a
progress of knowledge toward an objectivity that today's science can finally recognize.13
Of course, Foucault's method has been criticized. In a 1976 review, Leary raises
three questions that have become common criticisms of The Order of Things. In the first
criticism, Leary questions the possibility of Foucault actually being able to uncover these
episteme, because Foucault does not provide enough evidence for the claims he makes.
Although Foucault insists that historical work should provide the context for all of his
claims, he manages to recreate too little supporting evidence. He relies on a narrow range
of works, and those works are predominately French. The second major point of criticism
is that Foucault does not explain how or why the episteme change. If they happen
unconsciously then it seems difficult to provide any kind of explanation. The final
criticism is perhaps the most damning. Leary writes, “If one denies any kind of continuity
in history – and it is Foucault's avowed task to demonstrate the radical discontinuity in
history – then how is one to explain the possibility of doing history?”14
While I cannot defend Foucault against these criticisms here, I will note that they
do not defeat my project. I am focusing only on Western thinkers in the modern era,
looking at studies of time-consciousness that have occurred starting with Husserl and
continuing into the 21st century. The question as to why time-consciousness became an
object of study is beyond this project. What my paper does address is the first criticism,
that Foucault's research was too narrow to provide enough support for his proposed

13

Of course, Foucault's method has been criticized because it cannot explain the causes that
underlie these shifts in thought. There is no way to tell how the transition from one era to another
occurs. Foucault's later method of genealogy, as employed in Discipline and Punish for instance,
is meant to remedy this.
See: Leary, “Essay Review: Michel Foucault, An Historian of the Sciences Humaines.”
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epistemes. I maintain that there is some feature that underlies studies of timeconsciousness that fits with the modern episteme as Foucault details in The Order of
Things and those modern features also allow time-consciousness to enter the discourse of
normal and abnormal.
We can apply Foucault's archaeological analysis to the studies of Husserlian timeconsciousness under scrutiny in my project as well as the way we can speak of
disruptions of time-consciousness as symptoms of mental illness. Husserlian
phenomenology and psychiatric disciplines may appear to be very different. Husserl is
committed to transcendental idealism, where the psychiatrist and the cognitive scientist
are committed to some type of naturalism. Nevertheless, as I argued above, both
phenomenology and the psychiatric disciplines function with similar underlying
assumptions, namely the linearity of the flows of consciousness and time. According to
my application of Foucault's analysis, time-consciousness becomes an object of study in
the modern era, where it previously was not considered. Augustine wrote on human
knowledge of time itself in his Confessions,15 but it was not taken up as a study of
consciousness or a condition of personal experience.16 On Foucault's analysis, fields like
psychiatry and cognitive science did not exist until the modern era. There are
unconscious epistemological conditions in the modern era that enabled them to emerge,
and along with them the study of time-consciousness as a condition of human experience.
In the next section, I will look at the specific features of Foucault's modern era that
enable looking at time-consciousness this way.

St. Augustine. The Confessions of St. Augustine. See: Confession XI – Time and Eternity.
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I mean this in the sense that these concepts were not available to Augustine.
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The Modern Episteme
I am most interested in the modern era, because this is where time-consciousness
emerged as an object of study. Central to Foucault's analysis of the modern era is that
“the strange figure of man” only appeared in this era. According to Foucault, before the
end of the 18th century “man did not exist” (OT 308). In the Classical era, human nature
was distinguished from nature, but there was no epistemological consciousness of man as
such. Foucault claims that “...in the general arrangement of the Classical episteme, nature,
human nature, and their relations, are definite and predictable functional moments. Man –
the difficult object and sovereign subject of all knowledge, has no place in it” (OT 310).
It is only in the modern era that man emerges as an object of knowledge and the subject
that studies man as an object. This claim is a reiteration of what Foucault asserted in the
Introduction to Kant's Anthropology. With man as an object of study in the modern era,
life, labor and language also emerge as objects of study (OT 250-2). Foucault refers to
them as “quasi-transcendentals,” transcendental because they condition experience, but
only 'quasi' because they are studied empirically in the fields of biology, economics, and
philology, respectively.17 Of course, there are other human sciences that emerge in the
modern era, including psychiatry and in as much as it studies human experience, it seems
that Husserlian phenomenology could fall under this category.
In addition to the emergence of new fields of study conditioned by quasitranscendentals that did not exist before, knowledge itself changes in its nature and form.
For instance, “life” is a foundational concept to the field of biology. “Life is no longer that
which can be distinguished in a more or less certain fashion from the mechanical; it is that in
which all the possible distinctions between living beings merge. It is this transition from the
taxonomic to the synthetic notion of life which is indicated, in the chronology of ideas and
sciences, by the recrudescence, in the early nineteenth century, of vitalist themes. From the
archaeological point of view, what is being established at this particular moment is the conditions
of possibility of a biology.” (OT 269).
17
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Throughout The Order of Things, Foucault provides evidence for this claim, looking at
archives of data and historical records to substantiate the conditions of possibility for
thought in a particular era. He explains, “What is important, what makes it possible to
articulate the history of thought within itself, is its internal conditions of possibility” (OT
275). Even though we are already inside a historical era, Foucault's method involves
specifically looking at the episteme or quasi-transcendentals that condition particular
fields of study; this enables us to study our own era even while we remain in it. We can
still determine the conditions and a prioris that are relied upon to practice the human
sciences in our era. In the modern era, the emergence of man conditions all other studies
that take man as its object. This hinges on the now familiar notion that man cannot be
subject of knowledge without also being the object of empirical knowledge. Foucault
explains this in terms of four theoretical segments: analysis of finitude, empiricotranscendental repetition, the unthought and the origin to show what makes knowledge
possible in modernity where man emerges. What I aim to show is how Foucault's analysis
of the emergence of man applies to the study of time-consciousness in psychiatric
discourses.
When the Classical era ends, new discourses and practices take shape along with
the modern episteme. In modernity, man emerges in the ambiguous position of being both
the subject that knows and the object of knowledge. In the modern era, man is a living
being, an instrument of production, and a vehicle for words that already exist. Life, labor,
and language are all older than man and they anticipate man as if he were merely an
object of nature, “a face doomed to be erased in the course of history” (OT 313). As man
comes to be viewed as an object of nature, man's finitude is exposed in a way that it never
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was before. Foucault pointed to this in The Introduction to Kant's Anthropology where he
warns against attempts to make anthropology out to be a science that provides natural
access to fundamental structures of man. In other words, he is critical of attempts “to turn
anthropology into a positive field which would serve as the basis for and the possibility
of all the human sciences, whereas in fact it only speaks the language of limit and
negativity: its sole purpose is to convey, from the vigour of critical thought to the
transcendental foundation, the precedence of finitude” (KA 121). Man emerges as an
object of study in anthropology but is framed negatively. That is, the anthropological
institutions that emerge in modernity view man as an object to be limited and restricted,
but I will leave this issue aside until Chapter 4. In The Order of Things, Foucault expands
on the theme of finitude in terms of knowledge, showing a positive way finitude frames
knowledge. Although man's knowledge is limited because man is restricted by his
limitations as a knower, this leaves open the possibility that man as an object can be
known completely by science. “Man” emerges as a being whose finitude conditions the
positive knowledge of that finitude.
The analytics of finitude reveal a crucial problem Foucault sees with knowledge
in the modern era: Man is an empirico-transcendental doublet. Man is both an empirical
thing that can be studied as an object of science, but man is also the subject doing the
studying, the thing that conditions the possibility of the sciences. Thus, knowledge will
be attained in him because of his finiteness as an object, but he also renders all
knowledge possible because man performs the scientific investigations in which
knowledge is obtained. Man is the object of knowledge, but he also conditions
knowledge. Because man is this double, there are two kinds of analyses of man that
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Foucault sees emerging in modernity. Both of these types of analysis claim to rest entirely
within themselves and to be the foundation of truth. The first type of analysis operates
within the space of the body, studying things like perception, sense mechanism, and
physiology. This analysis is positivist and relies on empirical truth to be found in the
objects of study. The second type of analysis shows that knowledge has historical, social,
or economic conditions. It is a history of human knowledge “which could both be given
to empirical knowledge and prescribe its forms” (OT 319). According to Foucault, this
approach is eschatological, where truth is found in the order of discourse, and defined by
history which is developing toward some end. These discourses are indissociable,
because they both appear in discourse that is trying to be both empirical (positivism) and
critical (eschatology), and truth is sought either in the order of a reduction (positivism) or
of a promise (eschatology).
Positivism treats man as an object and eschatology treats his discourse as
objective, so modern thought has been searching for a locus of discourse that would make
it possible to analyze man as a subject. If man could be studied as a subject, then man
would be empirically known but referred back as closely as possible to that which makes
it possible, keeping the empirical and transcendental separate but directed at both. This
has been attempted with an analysis of actual experience, which is “both the space in
which all empirical contents are given to experience and the original form that makes
them possible in general designates their primary roots” (OT 321). This type of analysis
tries to restore the transcendental dimension by moving away from the naivety both of
truth reduced to the empirical (positivism) and of prophetic (eschatology) discourses.
Foucault has phenomenology in mind as an example of such an analysis as it attempts to
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seek foundations and escape ambiguity by applying descriptive and meticulous language
as it tries to look for conditions of possibility. Foucault is critical of this direction, and I
will look at his critique later in this chapter.
In the modern era, Foucault claims that man is a “locus of misunderstanding”
because of this doubling. Man as a subject conditions his understanding of himself as an
object. In the Classical era, Foucault notes that man tried to find conditions outside
himself, particularly in God, but in the modern era, man conditions knowledge by turning
inward. With this inward turn, the cogito had to be revived, and this leads to the third
theoretical segment that conditions the emergence of man. Though Foucault is using the
term made famous by Descartes, this modern cogito is different from Descartes'. With the
modern cogito, the “I think” is already embedded, situated. Descartes' cogito led to an
affirmation of existence (I think, therefore I am), the modern cogito instead questions
how thought can reside anywhere other than in the subject (OT 324). In modernity, I can
say that I am the language I speak, the labor I perform, the life I sense within me, and that
I am wrapped up in an immanent time that prescribes my death, but that I think does not
lead me there. It is not because I think all of these things that allows me to affirm these
aspects of my existence; rather, they are conditions that appear to me as outside me, and
in that sense they are unthought.18

18

Here, Foucault notes that this is where the subject-object relationship emerges in philosophy.
While the human sciences evaluate man in terms of life, labor, and language, philosophy has
concerned itself with man's relationship to what is other. Foucault cites Hegelian phenomenology
that opposes the An sich with the Fur sich, Schopenhauer's Umbewusste, Marx's alienated man,
Husserl's analyses of the implicit, sedimented, and inactual that ground man's truth. Though he
does not expressly mention Sartre, he also comments on the relationship of In-itself and For-itself,
which call forth Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Foucault claims that these studies think the
unthought in their attempts to end man's alienation by reconciling him with his own essence (OT
327).

133

The final axes that conditions the study of knowledge in modernity is man's
relationship to origins. In The Order of Things, Foucault shows how life, labor, and
language cannot express their origin. Man emerges in the modern era, but man can only
be revealed when bound to previously existing conditions that have their own history.
Man is already bound to a language, purpose, and a life that began before him, such that
he cannot think of himself otherwise. A man's origin does not start at the moment of his
birth; it links him back to things that do not have the same time as himself and connects
him with contents and forms that are older than he is. Foucault explains this as follows:
“Without knowing it, and yet it must be known, in a certain way, since it is by this means
that men enter into communication and find themselves in the already constructed
network of comprehension” (OT 331). Man has language, for instance, and though that
language is known to some extent, man never knows the origin of it. He cannot go
outside of a language because it conditions his own self-understanding. This indicates
that things began long before his life began, and since his experience is constituted and
limited by things, he cannot be assigned an origin. One cannot go back to the origin of
language or the origin of life. Instead, in modernity that language and life emerges as
objects man studies, but these are also the things that hang over man, so the double
relationship of man as subject and object appears once more.
Though this is only a portion of Foucault's analysis in The Order of Things, what I
want to take from it are these four axes: finitude, the doubling of the empirical and the
transcendental, the modern cogito, and the elusive origin. On Foucault's analysis, these
are the ways in which the philosophical foundation for the possibility of knowledge has
been sought since the nineteenth century. Man is determined by objects of knowledge that
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are outside him, but it is in man that positive truth about the objects that condition appear
as a possibility. There is an endless oscillation between what is given in experience and
what renders experience possible. We can summarize this with the conception of man in
the modern era as a doubling, where man is taken as both subject and object.
Historicizing Time-Consciousness
The analysis of the conditions of knowledge in modernity can be applied to
studies of consciousness and time-consciousness. My claim is that Husserl's work on
time-consciousness and subsequent psychiatric studies are only possible because of the
same modern rubric that marked other human sciences and the emergence of man. In
other words, I maintain that in addition to the human sciences Foucault outlines in The
Order of Things and his other archaeological works, another consequence of the modern
way of thinking is the emergence of studies of time-consciousness. Furthermore, we can
see Foucault's analysis corroborate my claim that a linear flow of time and a linear,
chronological flow of consciousness condition any study of time-consciousness. With
man stuck in an oscillation between subject and object, I argue that we can explain the
tension between empirical studies of time-consciousness and Husserl's own
phenomenological approach to determine the structures of time-consciousness as
transcendental conditions of experience. With man now an object of study and scientific
inquiry, and Husserlian time-consciousness taken as a feature of an experiencing
individual, we can see how time-consciousness emerges in the modern era within the four
axes Foucault outlines.
Foucault does not address the particular issue of time-consciousness in his work,
but he does claim that studies of time in its relation to man emerge for the first time in
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modernity. For Foucault, time in relation to man is most clearly seen in the way man
seeks origins. As I explained above, man is cut off from the origins that would make him
contemporaneous with his own existence, that is, man cannot seek origins to the things
outside himself that condition him as an object. Foucault writes: “So that it is in him that
things (those same things that hang over him) find their beginning: rather than a cut,
made at some given moment in duration, he is the opening from which time in general
can be reconstituted, duration can flow, and things, at the appropriate moment, can make
their appearance” (OT 332). It seems that Foucault is invoking Kant here, where time, for
Kant, is a condition of all possible experience. In trying to contest origins of things but
reclaim them in man, the possibility on which time is constituted is called into question.
Without access to origins, the story of how things come into being is complicated. I am
looking at Husserl instead of Kant, and this causes the story to change slightly. Time as a
shared concept (i.e. world-time) comes to be in an intersubjective world constitution, but
this originates in a conscious subject. Man explains the experience of conscious
appearances happening as a flow, because consciousness (in a normal subject) is always
situated in a flow, the shared conception of time is assumed to be a linear flow that never
ceases. Husserl does not suggest seeking a start to time, and on Foucault's explanation of
modernity, this would be because of the elusive origin.
Foucault claims that since the 19th century, people have tried to grasp what
beginnings, recurrences, returns and ends could be in the human sphere. For example,
“the positivist attempts to insert man's chronology within that of things... [so] man's
origin would be no more than a date, a fold, in the sequential series of beings” (OT 333).
Foucault claims that we can see this in studies that attempt to mark a time and a place for
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the birth of civilization. Here, there is a heavy reliance on the linearity of time that
unfolds in one direction, to which no point along the line can be returned. Another
consequence of this is the inverse: instead of man positioning himself in the chronology
of the world, he attempts to align the experiences that man has of things, how he has
acquired the knowledge of things, and how the sciences have been able to constitute the
knowledge of things. Instead of conceiving of an initial origin, using the same linear
unfolding of time, this approach focuses on ends to be achieved in anticipation of the
future. When this is a shared vision of the future, it is constituted as a linear time
progressing in the direction of some ultimate end, often considered as scientific or social
progress. In both cases, time is taken as a unidirectional, continuous linear flow, so if
there are origins we cannot go back to them. If this is what time itself is taken to be, then
it “cuts [man] off not only from the dawn from which he sprang but also from that other
dawn promised him as still to come” (OT 335).
Time is taken as a condition of experience, so man cannot subjugate time, and “it
is because man is not contemporaneous with his being that things are presented to him
with a time that is proper to them” (OT 335). This claim is seen in the way Husserl
presents time-consciousness as the structure that conditions the flow of consciousness as
it appears to us. When we experience a time object like a melody, for instance, we
experience it in a thick present, but the presentation of the notes are always sinking back
as retentions. This is experienced normally as a continuous sinking-back, so not only is
time taken as a linear flow, consciousness is also experienced as flowing in a linear
manner to a subject. Foucault explains that in the modern era, there is a modern cogito
that reveals the unthought, or the things we cannot know in themselves but that function
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to ground our thinking and knowledge. The unthought is at work where Husserl posited a
fundamental level of time-consciousness that is not personal and universal, that is, the
“absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness” (Hua 10/73). This absolute flow is a
primal process underlying all conscious experience. It is a ground that constitutes the
fundamental structure of protention-primal impression-retention. It is not an object of my
consciousness, so this corroborates Foucault's claim that the unthought is one of the
conditions through which knowledge emerges in the modern era.
Finitude, another of Foucault's axes that condition modern thought, is already a
temporal concept, but it points to the idea that each individual man has a beginning but
finds himself “determined by positivities which are exterior to it” (OT 336). Man is finite
and comes into this world situated by the things around him, including time, and that a
sense of time is considered the same for all human consciousnesses that they may be
studied in the human sciences. Finally, when we consider that man is an empiricotranscendental doublet, we can see time-consciousness as both a condition of experience
and a feature of human consciousness taken as an object of study. The phenomenological
method attempts to study man as an object, but certain objective features, like a linear
flow of time, are assumed in order to perform the analysis as objective. As I explained in
Chapter 1, Husserl would account for objective time by means of shared constitution, but
I am arguing that there is already an underlying assumption of linear flowing time and a
linear flowing consciousness which allows intersubjectivity to occur in the first place.
We can see now why time-consciousness emerges as an object of
phenomenological study in this era. Foucault is critical of phenomenology, which I will
address in the next section, but the point here is that phenomenology, particularly
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Husserlian phenemonology of time-consciousness does emerge in terms of Foucault's
four theoretical segments that are features of modernity.
Foucault's Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology
In the last section, I showed how time-consciousness fits into Foucault's modern
rubric with the emergence of Husserlian phenomenology. In my project, I am also
interested in the appearance of Husserlian time-consciousness in psychiatric disciplines
as another mark of modernity. The Foucaultian explanation of this employment of
phenomenology actually emerges most clearly in Foucault's criticism of phenomenology.
In a 1983 interview, Foucault assessed his early work and that of his contemporaries in
relation to phenomenology: “Everything that took place in the sixties arose from a
dissatisfaction with the phenomenological theory of the subject, and involved different
escapades, subterfuges, breakthroughs, according to whether we use a negative or a
positive term, in the direction of linguistics, psychoanalysis, or Nietzsche.”19 During the
early 1960s in France, Foucault's contemporaries, like Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice
Merleau-Ponty were turning to Marxism and away from classical phenomenology just as
structuralism began to emerge. In this interview, Foucault gestures toward his criticism of
phenomenology as simply being a reflection of the situation at the time. Foucault's initial
criticism of phenomenology began in his first published work, “Dream and Existence,”
but his most sustained critique of phenomenology appears in The Order of Things.20 My
purpose here is not to defend phenomenology against these criticisms. I am using

See: Raulet, “Structuralism and Post-Structuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” p.

19

199.
In “Dream and Existence,” Foucault maintains that phenomenology will never be able to
describe the contents of consciousness because it is the imagination that makes possible the
intuition of the objects of perception.
20
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Foucault's critique to show how phenomenology extends to the psychiatric disciplines
given its inherently modern situation. I will show this in two ways: first, because
phenomenology is empirical in spite of itself and is always trapped in the empiricaltranscendental doubling, and second, because Husserl's commitment to transcendental
subjectivity creates conditions of the exclusion of the mentally ill.
Foucault claims that one of the stated aims of phenomenology is to separate the
empirical and transcendental, grounding both in a theory of the subject, in particular the
conscious subject. Indeed, Husserlian phenomenology, particularly his work on timeconsciousness, starts at the level of the consciousness of an experiencing subject in order
to find the structure of consciousness that makes the experience of things like time
objects and time-constituting acts possible. Phenomenology requires a description of
actual experience, which Foucault claims is empirical in spite of itself, and resolves itself
“into an ontology of the unthought that automatically short-circuits the primacy of the 'I
think'” (OT 326). Foucault explains that phenomenology was first suggested as an antipsychologism and revived the problem of the a priori and the transcendental motif, but it
has “never been able to exorcize its insidious kinship, its simultaneously promising and
threatening proximity, to empirical analyses of man” (OT 326). For Foucault,
phenomenology is too rooted in psychology despite Husserl's attempts to free it from
psychologism by practicing phenomenology as a study of transcendental conditions.
Furthermore, Foucault's assertion that phenomenology is empirical in spite of itself is
supported by the fact that explicitly empirical disciplines like psychiatry employ
Husserlian time-consciousness in their own work. Of course, as I showed in Chapter 2,
these applications of phenomenology abandon certain positions of Husserlian
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phenomenology, particularly transcendental claims. On Foucault's assertions here,
because of its reliance on descriptive experiences, phenomenology in practice seems to
be empirical, although it claims not to be.
As I mentioned in the previous section, in The Order of Things, Foucault
discusses the two directions of thought in the modern era that emerge in the 19th century:
positivism and eschatology. Because these two lines of thinking are incompatible,
modern thought has continued to search for a locus of discourse that would separate the
empirical (positivism) and the transcendental (eschatology), while maintaining certain
aspects of both. Phenomenology is one such attempt21 that tried to analyze man as a
subject – a point of knowledge empirically known but referred back as closely as possible
to what makes it possible – by analyzing actual experience (OT 321). Phenomenology
has tried to restore the transcendental by making the empirical, in man, stand for the
transcendental. The descriptive experiences of consciousness are supposed to be specific
enough to be the subject of a precise descriptive language (empirical) and to be able to
provide the foundation for all experience (transcendental), but using the domain of
experience as a starting point, it will never be able to achieve this. Thus, Foucault argues,
phenomenology remains caught in an endless oscillation between the empirical (what is
given in experience) and the transcendental (what makes experience possible) (OT 336).
This is a critique of the findings of phenomenology in its attempt to walk the line
between empiricism and transcendentalism, but Foucault is also more generally critical of
the phenomenological method, particularly Husserl's starting with the transcendental
subject. In the introduction to The Order of Things, Foucault explicitly rejects the
phenomenological method:
21

The other attempt Foucault mentions being structuralism.
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If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is that (one might call
it, broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach) which gives
absolute priority to the observing subject, which places its own point of
view at the origin of all historicity – which, in short, leads to a
transcendental consciousness. It seems to me that the historical analysis of
scientific discourse should, in the last resort, be subject, not to a theory of
the knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive process. (OT xiv)
It is obvious here again that Foucault has Husserl in mind, and particularly Husserl's
reliance on a thinking subject that provided a foundation for all other experience. For
Husserl, knowledge hinges on the intentional consciousness. In the phenomenological
method of reduction, Husserl brackets the natural sciences and the natural attitude in
order to examine the essential features of pure conscious experience. One very
elementary problem with phenomenology is that consciousness is the object of study and
man cannot escape this as the subject performing the study. So, the transcendental
reduction fails because it attempts to give transcendental significance to what are
empirical contents.
In trying to get to the structures of time-consciousness, for instance, Husserl is
always stuck performing this analysis as a consciousness. There is no point of view
outside of consciousness or outside of time in order to perform the study, yet it seems to
require one anyway. Husserl relies on a transcendental consciousness, and psychiatry
relies on the naturalized transcendentals (the linear flow of consciousness and of time
Husserl also employs) that can be described in natural, empirical terms. In contrast to the
phenomenological approach, Foucault's archaeological method looks particularly at
practices and discourses within a given historical era and its corresponding episteme. I
have provided evidence above that the transcendental conditions of time-consciousness
are framed in accordance with the modern era. The structure of time-consciousness might
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be better thought of as a historical object than a transcendental structure of all conscious
experience. Being a historical object does not prevent the structures of timeconsciousness from being applied universally. Nevertheless, because the epistemic
conditions of modernity are historically contingent, we can question whether the
structures of time-consciousness are an essential feature of human consciousness that
holds for all people at all times.
In Husserl's later work, particularly Ideas II, he does admit that the
phenomenological attitude occurs in a historical situation, but this is not the same way of
looking at history as in Foucault's archaeological analysis. Like I mentioned in Chapter 1,
Husserl acknowledges the shared cultural and historical situation that conditions one's
lifeworld. This move actually pushes Husserl further into the empirical-transcendental
doubling, because this historical conditioning does not apply to the transcendental
subjectivity that still grounds the experience we can have of a world. This can be seen in
the Cartesian Meditations, a work published in the midst of Husserl's work on the
lifeworld. Husserl writes, “The bare identity of the 'I am' is not the only thing given as
indubitable in the transcendental self-experience. Rather there extends through all the
particular data of actual and possible self-experience... a universal apodictically
experienceable structure of the Ego (for example, the immanent temporal form belonging
to the stream of subjective processes)” (CM 28). Instead of the Cartesian cogito, Husserl
introduces the ego cogito as “the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgments”
(CM 18). Unlike Descartes, this is a transcendental subjectivity, a Transcendental Ego
that is a universal structure that conditions all conscious experience. He goes on to
suggest that the Ego is predelineated for himself with subjective dispositions but also as
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an experienceable object. Just as in Foucault's analysis of modernity, Husserl is affirming
man as an empirico-transcendental doublet.
In Husserl, we see the idea of an experiencing consciousness that is separate from
the world of objects. Consciousness for Husserl is always intentional, but the object of
consciousness is only assumed to come from outside. He writes, “The 'object' of
consciousness, the object as having identity 'with itself' during the flowing subjective
process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a
sense in the subjective process itself – and thus as an 'intentional effect' produced by the
synthesis of consciousness” (CM 42). For Husserl, the whole of conscious life is a
synthetic unity of all particular conscious processes that ever become prominent” (CM
42-43).22 It appears as a total unity, but it can also be thought about and contemplated.23
Husserl explains further that transcendental subjectivity is not simply a chaos of
intentional processes, nor a chaos of types of constitutions, instead, there is a universal
constitutive synthesis in which all synthesis function together in an ordered manner and
in which all actual and possible modes of consciousness are embraced (CM 54).

22

It is also important to note that time-consciousness is a fundamental aspect of this unity.
“The fundamental form of this universal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses of
consciousness possible, is the all-embracing consciousness of internal time” (CM 43). Not only
does this reaffirm Husserl's reliance on an absolute flow of consciousness, it also affirms that this
absolute flow is necessarily temporal.
Foucault mentions this idea as a positive consequence in the modern era – man and the
unthought as contemporaries. The unthought has accompanied man since the 19th century, but it
has never been the object of reflection. For Marx, the unthought was alienated man. For Hegel, it
was the An sich in opposition to the Für sich. For Husserl, it was the implicit, the inactual, the
sedimented, and the non-effected. For Husserl, there are passive processes of consciousness along
with active processes, and it is this relationship that allows consciousness to be an object of study
and the object studying.
23
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Eventually in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl will argue that the spatio-temporal
world of objectivity is constituted by the transcendental subject.24
The Foucaultian critique of this approach of Husserlian phenomenology is that
where the phenomenological reduction is happening, the subject is transparent. The
transcendental subject conditions things like intersubjectivity and objective constitution,
but the subject is a blind spot. That is, one can never look at the subject itself. One must
assume there is a constituting, conscious subject and one comes to it in transcendental
self-experience. With the move to transcendental subjectivity, there is always a reliance
on transcendentals that we cannot investigate like the linear flow of consciousness, for
example. Husserl's transcendental move is thoroughly modern according to Foucault's
four axes, but Foucault's critique reveals part of the problem with Husserlian
phenomenology of time-consciousness that I am highlighting in this chapter.
My claim is that Husserl's transcendental ego-cogito inherits the solipsistic
problem of the Cartesian cogito, and because of this his method will not lead him to the
objectivity he seeks. We can call the universality of the structures of time-consciousness
into question based on the psychiatric cases I cited in Chapter 2. Empirically, Husserlian
time-consciousness has been employed as normal and used in psychiatric cases to show
that there are abnormal experiences of time-consciousness. Nevertheless, because
Husserlian time-consciousness is taken as the normal consciousness that individuals
should have, the alleged universality of the structures of consciousness allows for the
exclusion of any individuals who do not fit. I have used Foucault's archaeology to show
that what makes Husserl's subject normal is based on conditions that emerge from a
24

Husserl actually claims this constitution is intersubjective, which is important, but not for my
purposes.
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historically contingent framework, so this exclusion of individuals who do not fit is also
historically contingent.
The Cartesian subject justifies its existence because of its rational capacity.
Foucault explains in the History of Madness that for Descartes, “One cannot suppose that
one is mad, even in thought, for madness is precisely a condition of impossibility for
thought: 'I would be thought equally mad'” (HM 45). Furthermore, Foucault writes:
Descartes knew immediately that he was not of their number, noting: 'such
people are insane.' The inevitable recognition of their madness appeared
spontaneously, in a relationship between the self and others – the subject
measured the difference against his own self: 'I would be thought equally
mad if I took anything from them as a model for myself'. (HM 181)
Here we see the subject relating to itself as an object, though Descartes in the Classical
era does not see this as problematic. In the modern era, man is simultaneously a knowing
subject and an object of knowledge, but Foucault argues that within the modern episteme,
phenomenology is too subjective to the point of solipsism. That is, according to Foucault,
phenomenology is tied to Cartesian reductions of knowledge to self-knowledge, and so it
cannot constitute objectivity as, say, Husserl claims.
My interest in the relationship between Descartes and Husserl is in the way
Husserlian phenomenology always maintains an adherence to rationality. Much the same
way Descartes was able to assume he was not mad because of the presence of rationality
in his thinking, Husserl also maintains an uncritical view toward the insane, putting the
insane into the margins where they do not constitute the shared world. He never considers
alternate conscious experiences as problematic enough to interfere with his universal
apodictic structures of consciousness that have time-consciousness at their foundation.

146

We have seen in Chapter 2 that there are indeed cases where the structures of
time-consciousness do not fit Husserl's supposedly universal rubric of time-consciousness.
Husserl offers no explanation for these cases, but the explanation for deviant cases in
psychiatric discourse is that these cases are pathological. I argue that this is a historical
claim much the same way that thinking of time-consciousness as a foundation for
consciousness is a historically situated claim. What this analysis has shown is that timeconsciousness is not a universal feature of an ahistorical consciousness. It is the result of
a certain way of thinking that has emerged as man has emerged as an object of study in
modernity. One of the consequences of this is that we can see that the way we think about
time-consciousness could be otherwise, given different epistemic conditions. The
practical consequence of this analysis comes in the way time-consciousness has entered
the discourse of normal and abnormal as I showed in Chapter 2. It is not simply that we
have a time-consciousness and it is structured a certain way, it is that the structures of
time-consciousness are implicitly the mark of a normal subject. Though Husserl does not
acknowledge this implicit normalization, the reason why psychiatry can employ this, is
because it is a science of man that emerges under the same epistemic framework as the
phenomenology it utilizes. In his exclusion of the insane, what Husserl neglects to notice
is that madness is a historical concept. Modern studies of mental illness have a
consequence on what we can say about the universal structures of consciousness, and one
of the justifications of this claim is the way that Foucault exposes the historical
development of madness which I will develop below.
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Archaeological Analysis of Madness
Foucault used his archaeological method in the History of Madness, in which he
focuses primarily on the shift from the Renaissance to the Classical Age, but also our
modern era which takes up “madness” as mental illness. What Foucault does in this work
is to show that madness, defined differently, appears in the discourses and practices of
different historical periods. Descartes in the Classical era and Husserl in the modern era
both neglect to give any import to madness other than as a contrast to the rational subject
or rational consciousness they are interested in. Again, one need not accept Foucault's
explanation of the ruptures between eras or the idea of episteme that serve as historical a
prioris to accept the basic notion that there have been different conceptions of madness
over time that have been studied, treated, and discussed. What Foucault does provide is
evidence for these different conceptions of madness, particularly in Western Europe. I
will argue that because madness can be analyzed historically, the way we look at another
related feature of human consciousness, i.e. time-consciousness, is also historical. (I will
argue in the next chapter that madness and time-consciousness come together in the
subject.)
Foucault begins his analysis in History of Madness at the end of the Middle Ages
and the beginning of the Renaissance, where madness and the figure of the madman take
on a new ambiguity: “they are both threat and derision, the vertiginous unreason of the
world, and the shallow ridiculousness of men” (HM 13). Men deemed mad were placed
on “ships of fools,” and though they were isolated from society, they were romanticized.
Madness infiltrated art for the first time, as painters like Hieronymous Bosch and Pieter
Brueghel included madwomen in their works. According to Foucault, madness hung over
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mankind as an uncertainty that could potentially strike anyone. After the Middle Ages,
seeing a huge decrease in the population of Europe, death was accepted as something
man could never escape, so “the derision of madness took over from the seriousness of
death” (HM 14).
The Classical Age, which began in the 17th century, changed what madness was,
how it was spoken about, and how people deemed mad were treated. It became related to
reason in a way it was not before; in fact, madness only had value or meaning in relation
to the field of reason. Where the Renaissance “liberated the voice of madness,” the age of
reason, the Classical Age sought “to reduce it to silence” by separating those deemed mad
from society (HM 44). Though the ship of fools existed in the Renaissance where the
mad were isolated, there was still an element of romanticism to this isolation that was
gone in the Classical age. With madness tied to a lack of reason, it was no longer a threat
to just anyone the way it was in Renaissance; so long as one had reason, one could not be
mad. Nevertheless, even though madness was marked by a state of “unreason” this was
not clearly defined. The status of the mad was not classified in the Classical era and “the
insane” were mixed in with the poor, the unemployed, the criminal. Madness was a social
disorder, not a medical disorder, so anyone that was marked by unreason could be put
into hospitals like the Hôpital Général, which was set up in Paris in 1656. Hospitals like
this were not medical in purpose or function but were instruments of order and directly
connected to the government. Criminals, vagrants, and the insane could all be confined
by the state. Foucault summarized Classical confinement as follows:
Confinement was an institutional creation peculiar to the seventeenth
century. It immediately took on a scale that bore no relation to the practice
of imprisonment in the Middle Ages. As an economic measure and a social
precaution, it was an invention. But in the history of unreason, it signals a
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decisive event: the moment when madness is seen against the social
horizon of poverty, the inability to work and the impossibility of
integrating into a social group. (HM 77)
From this, we see how powerful the tie to unreason was in the Classical era in defining
madness and justifying this confinement. Foucault adds that in addition to poverty and
crime, madness was lumped in with sin, so people with venereal diseases, the
debaucherous, and homosexuals were all confined and the unreason of madness became
mixed in with moral reason. Even though these hospitals were unlike medical hospitals as
they exist today, within the Classical age, a notion of cure did develop. Foucault recounts
this in detail in The History of Madness and I will not repeat it here, but the general
theme to the Classical cure can be explained as a call for the “mind to return to wisdom
by accepting its place in the general order, thereby forgetting madness, which was a
moment of pure subjectivity” (HM 320). The subject is supposed to turn away from this
pure subjectivity (locked in their own world) and be reinserted in the world, so the cure
was not medical in the way we speak of medicine in the modern era, it was more of a
return to a behavioral norm. In the Classical age, there was no marked difference between
physical medicine and moral treatments, and the mad were seen as character types rather
than cases of illness (HM 116-117). Today, though a moral element remains in the study
and treatment of madness as mental illness (guilt), it is distinguished from the medical
standpoint that diagnoses and treats mental illnesses in the manners I described in
Chapter 2.
As the epistemic conditions shifted at the end of the 18th century, the practices
dealing with madness also changed with the introduction of the insane asylum. As man
emerged as an object of study in modernity, positive psychiatry became possible and
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madness became contained in pathology. Those deemed mentally ill were categorized as
such based on the epistemic conditions of modernity, diagnosed in terms of internal
functions. The mentally ill were separated from the criminal and the poor who were also
confined in hospitals and placed in asylums designed specifically for the insane. In one
sense, this was confinement of a different sort, but the mentally ill were now separated
based on medical grounds that were considered objective as positive psychiatry emerged
as a specific science of treatment. In another sense, this is not confinement, but madness
being reinserted into society as a humanitarian and social concern brought about by new
economic and social thinking that concerned poverty, sickness, and social assistance (HM
417).
According to Foucault, two analyses of man that appear in modernity are
positivism and eschatology, and we can fit the study of mental illness into both. In the
modern era, we have a tendency to view the medicalization of madness as a step that
leads to some scientific truth, “if not of a truth, then at least of something that made
possible the knowledge [conaissance] of the truth” (HM 328, my translation). It is true
that Foucault shows the story of historical development, but he claims that the medical
explanation of mental illness was born out of moral reason. He claims that: “From the
point of view of history, it should be seen for what it really was: the reduction of the
classical experience of unreason to a strictly moral perception of madness, which secretly
unified all the conceptions that the nineteenth century would later consider to be
scientific, positive, and experimental” (HM 328). With this explanation, Foucault
explains this transformation of madness to mental illness not in terms of progress, but of
internal restructuring that marked a change in social significance. “It is because

151

confinement itself slowly took on a therapeutic value, bringing a realignment of all the
political and social gestures, and the moral and imaginary rituals that for more than a
century had been used to ward off madness and unreason” (HM 437).
To summarize, the shift between the Renaissance and Classical age is marked by a
move toward confinement and from something unknown to reason. The shift between the
Classical age and the modern era is marked by unreason becoming relegated to the
psychological. This did not happen as a completely abrupt shift. Notions of morality, for
instance, are still intertwined with notions of madness, though less explicitly so in
discourse. Today the mentally ill are not lumped in with the debaucherous, the libertine,
the impoverished, and the criminal. This is seen in the modern lens of positivism or as
progress toward scientific truth. Nevertheless, I will argue in Chapter 4 that this
medicalization takes place in a social context that uses the objectivity of mental illness to
exclude the mentally ill from participating in certain social institutions and discourses.
Conclusion
What I have shown in this chapter is that both time-consciousness and mental
illness are modern objects of study and thus are historically situated. This contests both
explicit and implicit claims of objectivity and universality made by Husserl and by
psychiatric disciplines that employ time-consciousness. Foucault's archaeological work
provides an epistemic framework for the claim that man and the human sciences emerge
as regions of study in the modern era. One of the crucial features of this framework is that
man is taken as both a subject and an object. That is, man performs the studies that take
him as object. This doubling creates problems for phenomenology, because a
transcendental subject is supposed to be unable to be an object of study. For my project,
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this means that the transcendental conditions that enable studies of Husserlian timeconsciousness to emerge are simply taken as true, but what Foucault's historical analysis
reveals is that they are historically contingent. To further support this claim, Foucault's
work in the History of Madness shows the historical contingency of studies of mental
illness. Because Husserlian time-consciousness is employed in psychiatric work, it can be
put to the same critique. In what follows, I will extend my historical critique of the use of
Husserlian time-consciousness in studies of mental illness to a broader social context.
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Chapter 4
"But I don't want to go among mad people," Alice remarked.
"Oh, you can't help that," said the Cat. "We're all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad."
"How do you know I'm mad?" said Alice.
"You must be," said the Cat, "or you wouldn't have come here."
-- Lewis Carroll
In the previous chapter, I showed that Husserlian time-consciousness is a
historical phenomenon, explainable in terms of Foucault's modern episteme. The reason
why psychiatry can employ a Husserlian notion of time-consciousness as a norm is
because it is a science of man that comes about under the same historical conditions that
frame Husserlian time-consciousness in the modern era. I have called both its descriptive
and its universal claims into question with my historicization. In this chapter, I am going
to look more closely at the social creation of madness as mental illness in Foucaultian
terms and the role of the mad subject, that is, the experience of madness for the
experiencer and what this means for the subject diagnosed with some type of mental
illness. More particularly, I will examine and call into question the normalization that
occurs to patients diagnosed with mental illness and the more far-reaching social
implications this medicalization has for those of us considered normal, or not mentally ill.
I will also show the role time-consciousness plays in this discourse of normalization.
Foucault's work shows how madness became incorporated in the chronology of
history and how the categories of madness have changed over time. We are currently in
an era that understands madness in terms of mental illness. Throughout the History of
Madness, Foucault shows how the modern, rational subject emerged out of the Classical
era which viewed madness as unreason, silencing madness and confining those deemed
mad. In the modern era, madness “returned to reason” as knowledge became more reliant
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on internal structures and functions, and madness came to be defined in medical terms,
which are both demonstrable and rational. If we look at Foucault's later lectures on
Psychiatric Power, we see more particularly how the subject emerges through social
conditions via power regimes and relations, ideas that get explained in Foucault's later
published works like Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. That is,
subjects are diagnosed and treated in medical terms, and this move towards
medicalization is a product of certain power structures and commitments to certain types
of truth.
I will develop this more below, but Foucault interestingly makes a distinction
between two types of truth, demonstrative truth used in the natural sciences and truthevent which is a revelatory truth, and thus unpredictable and non-demonstrable. Husserl's
work and the psychiatric research that employs a Husserlian conception of timeconsciousness both work under the demonstrative type of truth. They rely on the linearity
of time taken as an objective fact and a transcendental condition for human experience.
This other type of truth Foucault points to is a truth that happens to an individual person.
Although I am not suggesting that all mad experience this type of truth, this type of
revelatory truth-event could be seen as mad within a modern framework, and it exposes
the tendency in modernity to reject alternate types of truth. From this discussion I want to
suggest that even though we cannot experience what the mad experience, we can still
learn something from the mad. At the very least, we can point out the historical
contingency of demonstrative truth and call into question the normalization that comes
from the psychiatric practices that employ it.
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Why is this important? Because of the history of madness. Foucault shows that in
the Classical era, people who we would not consider mentally ill today were confined
along with the mad—the poor, the sexually deviant, the criminal, etc. This exposes one of
the dangers of psychological normalization and assimilation to the status quo.
Normalization, especially at the psychological level, becomes a social and political issue,
and not simply something like exclusion from world-constitution. There is a risk that
what categorizes madness will continue to change until everyone is mad, and one
possible consequence of this is that we would all need to be fixed and normalized. This
sounds extreme, but consider, for example, the prevalence of antidepressant use in the
United States1 or the example of homosexuality. It was not until 1973 that homosexuality
was declassified as a mental illness by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, and today there are still people who disagree with this declassification, i.e. exgay movements that attempt to change sexual orientation in accordance with some
perceived norm. These examples point to social effects of normalization.
In the course of this chapter, I will first show how madness and mental illness are
influenced by social conditions. I will then explain this in terms of Foucaultian power
relations. I will show that mental illness, via practices of medicalization, gets fixed into a
demonstrative type of truth at the neglect of another type of truth that acknowledges the
subject. I argue that although this type of truth cannot be adopted by other people as their
truth, acknowledging its possibility renews interest in the subject and exposes the fact
that the subject is threatened and subsumed under normalizing practices. I am looking at
the specific case of time-consciousness, and the way it is used as a tool of normalization
1

According to the Center for Disease control, from 1988–1994 through 2005–2008, the rate of
antidepressant use in the United States among all ages increased nearly 400%. See: Pratt, Brody,
and Gu, “Antidepressant Use in Persons Aged 12 or Over: United States 2005-2008.”
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in certain disciplinary practices at the expense of the individual's sense of freedom. Timeconsciousness is just one criterion that can be used to define mental illness, and what I
ultimately suggest is that different experiences of time-consciousness lead the
experiencers to different truths about the world.
Society Creating Madness
In Chapter 3, I argued that the Husserlian account of time-consciousness is
historically conditioned and deviant cases of time-consciousness are diagnosed as such
based on a conception of reason indicative of modernity and on rationally determined
transcendental conditions. According to Foucault, in the Classical era, madness was
marked by unreason, where in the modern era, madness is taken as a form of mental
illness, bringing reason back to madness. I showed how time-consciousness and its
relationship to madness are conditioned by the episteme of its era. I acknowledge the
difficulty in studying madness historically, because to do a historical analysis is to
examine discourse and practices where madness appears, all from a perspective that is
also historically conditioned. It is important to make clear that Foucault, and I agree with
him in this regard, is not claiming that madness is simply the same phenomenon
occurring over the course of time and we give a different name to it. The story is more
complicated. While it may be the case (and it is quite likely) that the symptoms and
experience of schizophrenia, for instance, occurred in individuals before schizophrenia
was a possible diagnosis, it is still true that mental illness did not exist 200 years ago. The
medicalization of madness changed not only how we talk about madness, but it changed
what “madness” is in contemporary society. As I discussed in Chapter 3, madness no
longer means an absence of reason, and madness does not apply to criminals or the
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debaucherous. Madness in the modern era is understood as mental illness and this
changes the parameters (putting them in the field of medicine) of what we can know
about madness and how we can speak about madness. Foucault's work explains the clear
shift to medicalization that occurred with the development of psychiatry in the 19th
century. In this section I will not just show that this change happened, but I will use
Foucault's work to give two explanations as to how it happened.
In Foucault's later work, he changed his focus from archeological analysis to the
study of relations of power. This supposedly marks a methodological switch from
archeology to genealogy, where genealogy shows that a system of thought (uncovered
archaeologically) was the result of contingent changes in history and not the product of
rational development toward some ultimate truth. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault
looks at how modern systems of punishment, which imprison rather than kill, become a
model for control in other social institutions like schools and hospitals. This modeling
was not a decision made by any type of controlling group, but developed for other
reasons, converging to create a modern system of disciplinary power, which I will explain
in more detail below. In what follows, I am going to look more closely at the
phenomenon of madness and how it is conditioned by more than just an episteme. I will
first show how this shift to medicalization occurred by social, historical, and economic
conditions. Secondly, I will explain the shift to medicalization more specifically in terms
of relationships of power. I will not abandon Foucault's archaeological analysis found in
the History of Madness, but because this text focused more on the Classical era, marked
by practices of confinement in the 17th and 18th centuries, I will use it only as a
foundation to bring my analysis into modernity and look at how the concept of mental
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illness and the practices to diagnose and treat actually instances of it developed
historically.
In the History of Madness, Foucault writes: “To the classical mind, madness could
easily be the effect of an external 'milieu,' or more exactly the stigmata of a certain
solidarity with the world” (HM 373). As the Classical era progressed, more and more
political and economic explanations were sought, and the explanation for this was that
freedom drove men from their “natural” essence and the immediacy of nature into
civilized society. That is, man began to distance himself from nature, specifically the
immediacy of nature, and without this immediacy to simply survive and protect oneself,
alienation became more common. Foucault claims that “the gesture of confinement” in
the Classical era creates alienation; the people who were confined experienced
themselves as alienated (HM 80). Confinement “brought together in one field characters
and values where preceding cultures had seen no resemblance” and it was after being
confined that the mad identified themselves as being mentally alienated (HM 82). In
being confined, individuals were distanced from their lives, from others, and even from
their feelings, and this distancing had an effect on how madness was considered. Foucault
writes: “The late eighteenth century began to identify the possibility of madness with the
combination of a milieu: madness was lost nature, misplaced sensibility, the wanderings
of desire, time dispossessed of its measure” (HM 373). The mad were individuals who
were separated from society, but they did not freely separate themselves in the same way
that free individuals separated themselves from nature. According to Foucault, it was only
in the 1800s that speculation on mental illness started to focus on the relationship
between society and nature.
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In the beginning of the modern era, thinkers writing on madness speculated that
the mad in confinement are not only separate from nature, but are separated from their
own human nature. In 1858, Dr. Daniel Tuke wrote a paper suggesting that civilization
generates mental illness.2 He cites numerous studies, including those of American Indians.
For instance, in the early 19th century, Dr. Benjamin Rush observed that there had been
very few instances of madness and melancholia among American Indians.3 Dr.
Lillybridge, a physician appointed by the government to observe disease among
American Indians, found no cases of madness. Dr. Butler, who lived among Cherokee
Indians for 25 years “never witnessed a well-marked instance of insanity” and cited a
colleague who at age 80 had never seen an American Indian affected “in the same way
those were whom he had seen in the Philadelphia asylum” (Tuke, 105). Foucault does not
cite these works, but he does corroborate their claims with the work of Humboldt, who
“never heard of an alienated man among the American Indians” (HM 374). It was
generally thought that madness was made possible when man repressed his animal nature,
as “civilization offered men ever-increasing means to become insane” (HM 374). Of
course, these claims by Rush, et al. come from a racist tradition where native people were
considered less human than white citizens, but it does bring up some interesting questions:
Is madness dependent on region and culture as well as historical period? Are there more
cases of madness the more man “distances himself from nature”?

As mentioned in “Does Civilization Favour the Generation of Mental Disease?” by Tuke. See:
p. 105.
2

3

It should be noted that Benjamin Rush is associated with scientific racism, suggesting that
being black was a disease like a non-contagious form of leprosy. Much research, medical and
anthropological, done involving American Indians is tainted with racism, and one must read their
analyses with that in mind.
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In the course of the 18th century, at least in Europe, it was agreed that madness
was increasing in society. In the previous chapter, I explained how Foucault showed that
removing the mad from being enchained and imprisoned marked the pivotal moment that
moved the classification of the mad from unreason into the direction of mental illness.
According to Foucault, there was a silence in Classical confinement. That is, the mad
were locked away and removed from participating in society, effectively silencing them.
This changed when Philippe Pinel was appointed to Bicêtre hospital, taking it from
essentially a place of confinement and transforming it into an asylum specifically for the
mad. What Pinel did specifically was create more humane means of confinement. He was
not medical (in the contemporary sense) in his approach, but he did develop non-violent
means of treating the mad. What was innovative about his approach was that he talked to
the men confined there, allowing them to speak for themselves in a way they could not
when they were viewed as prisoners instead of patients. Foucault writes, “All that was
alienated in man was given a voice, and for the first time these stammerings were lent an
ear” (HM 394). Foucault continues this history with Daniel Tuke, who I mentioned above.
About 50 years after the shackles were removed from the insane at Bicêtre, Tuke
developed Quaker retreats for the treatment of the mad in England, removing them from
confinement in a different way. Because madness in the late 18th and early 19th century
was seen as a disease of society, things like emotions, uncertainties, agitation, and
artificial food were all considered causes of madness. So, the idea behind the retreats was
that patients were taken back to the point where society emerged from nature in order to
bring madness back to the truth of man. That is, bringing the mad back into contact with
man's nature, at the point where he recognized himself as a free and rational individual.
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We see two things happening with Pinel and Tuke that change the attitude toward
the mad. First, with madness now returning to reason on its path toward medicalization,
the alienation found in Classical hospitals that silenced the mad, chained them, and
equated them with criminals, deviants, the poor, etc. is undone. Second, and perhaps a
negative consequence of the work Pinel and Tuke did, we see that mere liberation of the
mad was not enough to cure them. Pinel and Tuke did make an attempt to separate the
mentally ill from those who were confined for other reasons. Yet, those deemed mad were
not simply released from the hospital; they were put into asylums where they were
confined in a different way, under the guise of treatment. In fact, it paved the way for the
discipline of psychiatry as we recognize it today to emerge, where we still speak more of
treatment and management and less of cure.
As the Classical era shifts to the modern era, madness increasingly looks like an
affliction that is the result of something unnatural, and the result of increasingly civilized
society. Foucault declares the Classical “Age of Confinement” over with a declaration of
human rights in 1791 (HM 420). With this claim, Foucault is pointing to the publication
of Thomas Paine's Rights of Man, justifying a people's revolution when their government
does not protect their natural rights. Though this is a political statement, it marks a
broader shift in thinking about human beings while citing man's emergence from nature
as free and rational individuals. This type of revolutionary thinking was in contrast to the
Classical era where individuals could be imprisoned for numerous reasons, all of which
fell under the general category of “unreason.” This label of reason was imposed on them
from a sovereign, via the law, the police, or some representative of the state. The shift to
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modernity is marked by thinking of individuals not at the mercy of a sovereign's
determination of their reason, but as free individuals in possession of inalienable rights.
In modernity, madness is no longer thought of as unreason in relation to reason,
but from the point of view of the rights of the free individual. Foucault marks this change
in view with the work of Pierre Cabanis, a French physiologist and philosopher in the late
18th century who was a strict materialist and sketched early ideas of physiological
psychology. With freedom at the heart of man's nature, then according to Cabanis, any
legitimate reason to restrict the exercise of freedom, had to mean something in the natural
form of man has been altered, i.e. something psychological (HM 438). If men acted in
ways that went against reason in the Classical era, they were confined. In modernity,
there needed to be justification for the imprisonment of individuals because all men4 were
considered free subjects. If confinement or separation from society occurred on the
grounds of madness, then that justification is found in psychological or physiological
determinations. Foucault's purpose here is to show that madness is now seen as
something unique and separate from the other afflictions that led to confinement in the
Classical era. As madness becomes mental illness, it is the object of its own science, it
needs its own doctors, and thus it has a measurable and scientific 'truth' to it that it never
did before.5
Psychiatry starts to develop into a human science with its increased
medicalization, treating patients not simply as mad individuals who were to blame for
their illness and needed to be removed from society, but as objects of scientific and
The term “men” is important here, as women were still excluded from certain “inalienable”
rights.
4

5

Of course, this is up for debate, but in modernity, generally psychiatry (and often psychology
because it is grounded in the scientific method) is considered natural science.
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medical inquiry.6 This is seen with the development of nosologies, etiologies of mental
illness, and pathological anatomy. Nosological discourse describes madness as an illness,
notably found in Phillipe Pinel's work where he began to classify mental illnesses
according to symptoms and signs that marked dysfunction. Nosology is still used in
public health to explain epidemics, to keep patient records, etc. Pathological anatomy (via
the autopsy, which permitted the attribution of a physical cause to mental illness) along
with statistical medicine also came about to provide epistemological tools for for 19th
century medicine (PP 248). Foucault still places these early developments in psychiatry
into the category of “proto-psychiatry,” but they still fall under the modern episteme.
Even with more systematic means of categorizing mental illness, it was still very much
up to the doctor in the psychiatric hospital to have the last say in determining whether or
not a patient was mentally ill.
The methods for determining the presence of mental illness have changed
dramatically over the last 200 years. Along with an increase in medicalization, doctorpatient discourse became more prevalent, starting with Pinel who spoke to patients in
Bicêtre and employed therapeutic methods that required patients to recount their
experiences. Methods of questioning eventually developed into psychoanalysis as well as
the methods of phenomenological psychology I discussed in Chapter 2. For the last 100
years, neurology and neuropathology have also developed as a way to determine who is
mentally ill and who is not at the level of the body (or the brain). These developments
and refinements in understanding the body have made symptoms appear more constant
and regular, and diagnoses to be taken as absolute because they were considered
6

Foucault writes extensively about guilt and shame and the moral component to madness, and
the way it is carried over into modernity. (PP 175-179).
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demonstrable. Foucault also notes, importantly, that along with the development of
medical research, the appearance of insurance is also important alongside the scientific
developments. Illness, including mental illness, has become profitable (PP 313). In the
Classical Era, the mad were seen as a danger to society, silenced, and confined. In the
modern era, as madness is considered an illness, it can be treated at the cost of the patient.
I do not intend to give a history of the field of psychiatry here or the development of the
medical industry as a business, but I want to stress Foucault's point that the development
of psychiatry and the doctor's appropriation of a patient are the effects of economic,
technological and epistemological transformations in the field of medicine. This
development retrospectively supports the claims made early in the 1800s that madness is
increasing in society.
Indeed it does seem that mental illness is increasingly prevalent in contemporary
Western society. The Department of Health in the United Kingdom cites that one in four
adults experience some type of mental illness in their lifetime and one in six experience
symptoms at any one time.7 In the United States, the National Institute for Mental Health
states that, “Mental disorders are common in the United States, and in a given year
approximately one quarter of adults are diagnosable for one or more disorders.”8 Though,
only about 6% of those cases are “seriously debilitating.” With 25% of these populations
being diagnosable with mental illness, it is safe to say that this type of illness is not only

See: “Mental Health.” <http://www.dh.gov.uk/health/category/policy-areas/socialcare/mental-health/>
7

See: “Statistics: Any Disorder Among Adults.” <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/
1ANYDIS_ADULT.shtml> Statistics from 2005. See: Kessler, Chiu, Demler, and Walters,
“Prevalence, severity, and comorbidity of twelve-month DSM-IV disorders in the National
Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R).”
8
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pervasive in modern society, but statistics will show that it is increasing.9 This is not
likely what Pinel and Tuke had in mind when they “freed the mad” by giving them their
own asylums, as now the reach of what we call mental illness goes far beyond the asylum.
Why are these numbers increasing? It is probably not the case that the whole
world is going mad. One possible answer to this question is that the way we define
mental illness is always evolving, but debilitating or not, there are increasingly nuanced
definitions of mental illnesses. It could also be the case that the stigma of mental illness is
decreasing. Or, it could be the case that mental illnesses are invented for the purpose of
selling more pharmaceutical drug treatments. I will not delve into this line of answering
any further. I will note that along with the development of human rights, this birth of
psychiatry occurs contemporaneously with the development of consciousness (and timeconsciousness) as an object of study in philosophy. As I established in Chapter 3, these
are not unrelated, but indicative of the historical episteme and the emergence of man as
both object and subject. I would now like to explore the explanation Foucault would give
for this phenomenon, with an analysis of power.
Medicalization and Psychiatric Power
In Foucault's works of the 1970s, he explains the social conditions that define how
we think of madness in terms of power. The most sustained accounts of power appear in
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. For my purposes, I am also going to
focus on the 1973-1974 lecture course on Psychiatric Power. In the course of these
lectures, he looks at the transition from the asylums of the classical age to the way
madness is viewed as mental illness in the modern era. In the opening lecture, Foucault
criticizes his own work in History of Madness, claiming that although one of his tasks
9

Ibid.
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was to investigate the asylum as an institution, institutions mean individuals and groups,
and so we should show imbalances of power that distort their reality and make them
function. The individual, particularly the mad individual and the doctor, are a part of this
analysis, but the individual is only the effect of power (PP 15).
First, it is important to understand what Foucault means by power. Mainly,
“Power is never something that someone possesses, any more than it is something that
emanates from someone” (PP 4). Power does not belong to anyone, but it exists in
dispersion, relays, networks, reciprocal supports, difference of potential, discrepancies,
etc. It is “always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of
their acting or being capable of action” (DP 220). In the asylum, for example, there is a
dissymetry of power. Power is dispersed among the employees, servants, and patients at
the asylum, but the doctor is at the top of the system of power, like a sovereign who is
ultimately in charge of all decisions over the patients. Nevertheless, even the doctor does
not possess power. As medicalization enters the psychiatric discipline, the operation of
sovereign power is replaced with the emergence of disciplinary power as the governing
form of power in other social institutions.10
Foucault asserts that something like disciplinary power exists in our society today,
and this marks a change from sovereign power (PP 40). In a system of sovereign power,
power is centralized in the state, or the king, and people are expected to follow laws and
regulations. When a law is broken, the sovereign administers the punishment, often in a

10

It is not the case that other types of power do not exist or that disciplinary power did not
exist before the modern era. Foucault gives an account of the history of disciplinary power in the
21 November 1973 lecture. It at least started in the Middle Ages and continues into contemporary
times, but during the Middle Ages, it operated on the margins of society, where religious
communities were founded. Disciplinary methods were established in these communities for daily
life and pedagogy.
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public execution, in order to instill fear and to discourage crimes by the other citizens.
Disciplinary power, by contrast, has a panoptic character, which Foucault developed most
thoroughly in Discipline and Punish, published a year after the Psychiatric Power
lectures. In a disciplinary regime, power is decentralized into institutions and power is
exercised over individuals via discipline of the body (DP 30) and, for instance, criminals
are to be restored to some normative standard (DP 179). One of the ways the panoptic
character of this type of power comes from the idea of the panopticon. The panopticon
originated with Jeremy Bentham, and it was a model for a prison, but also for hospitals,
school, workshops, orphanages, etc. Bentham described it as a mechanism which gives
strength to any institution. The idea behind the model is that prisoners' cells are arranged
in circle, centered on a guard tower, so the prisoners know they are being watched at all
times. This gives continuous control to the prison guards, even if the tower is unmanned
(because the prisoners think they are being watched), and interestingly, it also makes
power anonymous. Instead of a sovereign at the top of all power relations, in the
panopticon, anyone who is not a prisoner can enter the guard tower. The prisoners cannot
see into the tower, so even though they know they are being watched, they do not know
by whom. This alleged anonymity is one of the marks of disciplinary power.
Disciplinary power is one of two forms of power that exist in what Foucault calls
the modern framework of “bio-power.” Disciplinary power is focused on the individual
body. Its aim is the production of “docile bodies” which are politically manageable and
economically useful subjects. Disciplinary power consists in practices of training,
observation, and normative judging. This form of power is exhibited in military training,
industrial organization of workers and pedagogical techniques. According to Foucault in

168

the Psychiatric Power lectures, it did not exist before the Thirty Years War. Before then,
soldiers were hired for a particular cause. When militaries started training as units, power
was exercised as a total hold, an exhaustive capture of the individual's body, actions, time
and behavior (PP 46). “It is no longer a levy on the individual's activity but an occupation
of his body, life, and time” (PP 47). In this type of practice, the individual's body is taken
charge of and everything is tracked and recorded. There is perpetual visibility, much like
Bentham's idea of the panopticon, so intervention by the state can happen immediately.
This type of power coincides with the emergence of the individual into fields of
knowledge (DP 191), that is, disciplinary power fits in with the emergence of “man” as
Foucault put forth in the The Order of Things. Disciplinary power is not only found in
prisons or punishment, it also appears in processes of medicalization. Foucault writes:
“The medical supervision of diseases and contagions is inseparable from a whole series
of other controls: the military control over deserters, fiscal control over commodities,
administrative control over remedies, rations, disappearances, cures, deaths, simulations”
(DP 144). The individual is medicalized, and evaluated and controlled in terms of certain
statistical norms, presumably determined through medical research. An individual person
comes to be defined by its normality or where it fits into statistical norms. Foucault
claims that “right from the start, and in virtue of the mechanisms, the individual is a
normal subject, a psychologically normal subject; and consequently desubjectification,
denormalization, and depsychologization necessarily entail the destruction of the
individual as such” (PP 57). If the individual is viewed as abnormal or as not a subject,
then their sense of individuality is taken away from them. The individual is turned into a
“docile body” in this process, and treated as an object. It is not a stretch then, to see how
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psychiatry was made possible within this regime of power (and could not have existed
before).
To summarize, the main difference between disciplinary power and sovereign
power is that with sovereign power, the individual is at the top, and disciplinary systems
put individualization at the base. Instead of having one individual above all the others,
making them nameless, disciplinary systems make power anonymous and tied to faceless
institutions that seem to run on their own without an individual sovereign pulling the
strings. Another feature of disciplinary systems is that they pin what Foucault calls the
subject-function to the body to the point where the individual is nothing other than the
subjected body (PP 55). By subject-function, Foucault means that the individual does not
exist beneath the mechanisms and procedures that pin power on the body. The subjectfunction refers to a variable in a statement or a role in discursive practices into which any
individual can be inserted. Foucault summarize the appearance of the individual in a
disciplinary system as follows: “It is because the body has been 'subjectified,' that is to
say, that the subject-function has been fixed on it, because it has been psychologized and
normalized, it is because of all this that something like the individual appeared, about
which one can speak, hold discourses, and attempt to found sciences” (PP 56).
Disciplinary power is only one form of a larger category of power Foucault terms
bio-power. The second form of bio-power is biopolitics, which is concerned with largescale phenomenon at the level of the population. Biopolitical practices focus on
statistically quantifiable phenomena such as morbidity, birth rate, public health and
economic indicators like production and consumption. Taken together,11 we can broadly
11

See Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume 1. Here, after setting out these two distinct poles
of bio-power, Foucault explains that one social and political problem in which they become
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say that, according to Foucault, social and political problems are framed “biopolitically.”
What this means is that the object of politics is the living bodies of individuals and
populations. Within the modern regime of biopolitics, the aim of power is to foster and
manage the lives of subjects. Unlike in a sovereign model of power, notable in the
classical age, in which the characteristic privilege of power is to kill and subtract (tax,
execute, etc.), in a biopolitical model, the essential concern of power is to shape and
make life flourish.12 So in this regard, Foucault shows how the concerns of medicine are
at the center of political power in contemporary society. Put differently, power that is
focused on the life of the individual and population is fundamentally medicalized.
The biopolitical apparatus focuses on the care of bodies. The era of biopower
coincides with the development of capitalism, where bodies become inserted into the
machinery of production. Simultaneously, the body served as the basis of species
propagation, birth rates, mortality rates, life expectancy, etc., and because of this, the
body became a site of regulatory control.13 Medical discourse becomes pervasive, and
the language of epidemic and disease appears. Thus, mental illness comes to be a
phenomenon at the level of the medical, the statistical, etc., as well as a field at the level

connected is sexuality: “[Sex] was at the pivot of the two axes along which developed the entire
political technology of life. On the one hand it was tied to the disciplines of the body: the
harnessing, intensification, and distribution of forces, the adjustment and economy of energies.
On the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations, through all the far-reaching
effects of its activity” (HS 145). Foucault explains that sex fit into both categories at once,
allowing access to both the individual body and the population, and giving rise to statistical
assessment and interventions aimed at the entire social body.
12

Of course, this flourishing is in a specific way that suits specific interests.

13

The medicalization of sex and the opening psychological domain of perversions began in the
early 19th century. This shift was political, as well as a project for organizing marriages, births,
life expectancies, etc. See: Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume 1, p. 118, 139-40.
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of the individual. Like the medicalization I described above for individuals, there comes
to be a requirement of medicalization in the asylum as well.
There are limits of disciplinary power, particularly when disciplinary systems
come up against individuals who cannot be easily classified. That is, all disciplinary
power has people in its margins, and this is why it holds interest for my project. Some
individuals do not fit into the disciplinary practices or do not fit into a statistical normal
such that they can be assigned a role or fit into the subject-function in certain institutions.
For instance, a physically disabled person may be marginalized because they have limited
labor power. In his November 21st lecture in the Psychiatric Power series, Foucault
discusses the mentally ill in this position, describing them as social “residue.” Foucault
states: “As for the mentally ill, they are no doubt the residue of all residues, the residue of
all the disciplines, those who are inassimilable to all of a society's educational, military,
and police disciplines” (PP 54). They have a necessary existence when what defines
normal does not include an entire population. Foucault argues that disciplinary power
creates these margins. For instance, there were not deserters in the army prior to there
being disciplined armies. Foucault adds that “in the same way, you see the appearance of
the feeble-minded or mentally defective when there is school discipline” (PP 53).
Foucault does not mean that soldiers and students were models of expected good
behavior prior to this time period. Rather, feeble-mindedness did not exist in the sense
that the “feeble-minded” later became a category type that was used to classify people.
Furthermore, Foucault argues that disciplinary power needs these “residues” or people at
its margins. So long as there are people who do not fit into the status quo, more
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disciplinary systems can emerge to bring those individuals to the status quo via practices
of normalization. This means that disciplinary systems are somewhat self-perpetuating.
Foucault claims that a phenomenon that emerges is “the integration, organization,
and exploitation of what I would call profits of abnormalities, of illegalities or
irregularities” (PP 110). Disciplinary systems are normalizing and they necessarily
produce abnormalities and irregularities that the system was designed to reduce. As I
mentioned above, when individuals are put into an asylum, they can be viewed as a
source of profit. Even though the asylum is in the business of treatment, it always needs
patients from whom to profit. So not only does disciplinary create the mentally ill, in a
way, it also tries to normalize and treat them.
I have been talking in this section about bio-power, and specifically disciplinary
power, but Foucault also specifically defines psychiatric power. Psychiatric power exists
within the biopolitical apparatus, and Foucault defines it as the power by which the real is
imposed on madness in the name of a truth possessed by the power in the name of the
medical science (PP 133). Drawing on Foucault's account, I am claiming that insofar as
Husserlian time-consciousness is employed in psychiatric practices, it is a tool of power
used to impose normality on the mad. An abnormal time-consciousness is a feature that
helps pick out individuals as mentally ill (obviously among many other features), so
Husserlian time-consciousness, insofar as it is employed in this way becomes an
instrument of power. That is, Husserl's structures of time-consciousness, like the unity of
consciousness and the protention-primal impression-retention structure, describe features
of a normal consciousness. Via practices of psychiatry and psychiatric research, this
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conception of time-consciousness is associated with a pathologized, embodied subject, so
it becomes medicalized.
If Foucault is at least historically correct that there is a shift toward medicalization
in the modern era as mental illness emerges, then this provides a possible explanation for
the increase in instances of mental illness that continue to this day in terms of power. Of
course, the story the psychiatrists give will be different. They may claim that we have
gotten better at diagnosing mental illness or that the more we understand the brain, the
better able we are to diagnose mental disorders. I'm not rejecting that story, per se, but in
the previous chapter, I eliminated the history of psychiatry as a story of progress toward
some complete knowledge of human beings. Both positivism and eschatology are
problematic because according to Foucault ultimately truth will not be found in them;
positivism is too reductionist and incomplete and eschatology is rooted in a promise that
can never be grounded. In the next section, I will further question these approaches in
terms of truth.
Truth of Madness
In a few places above, I have mentioned the truth of madness, although I have not
yet discussed it in great detail. This is an important theme in the study of madness and,
particularly, madness as mental illness. Because mental illness is medicalized and
becomes an object of science, it enters into the domain of scientific truth in a way it did
not before the modern era. Furthermore, the overlap mental illness has with timeconsciousness, which has entered the domain of scientific truth via the psychiatric
disciplines, reaffirms the argument I made in Chapter 3. That is, the use of naturalized
transcendental conditions reflects an idea of a human nature that reduces the human being
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to a physical essence. This leads to the marginalization of any individual who does not fit
into a normal account of good health. People who do not fit into this picture may feel less
human, or they are considered functionally less human. This also trivializes the
experience of deviant time-consciousness for the experiencer, pushing the deviant
experience into the margins, so it can later be treated with some kind of medical
procedure. Even though these consequences sound undesirable, this type of
marginalization on the basis of medical statistics and treatment, be it for a physical or
mental condition, is justified because it is dependent upon science as a basis of its truth.
In the Psychiatric Power lectures, Foucault marks a switch from truth to reality in
20th century psychiatric practices. This is a different historical division than we have seen
previously. Foucault is working within the modern era, but he shows how psychiatry has
continued to develop within it.14 Remember that Foucault defined psychiatric power as
“the power by which the real is imposed on madness in the name of a truth possessed by
the power in the name of the medical science” (PP 133). This means for the mentally ill
patient that there is an imposition of “reality” on them as a part of treatment. To tie this
back to the examples I have given of deviant time-consciousness, the patient who hears
voices or who has a disrupted flow of time is not considered to have the reality found in
true, scientific inquiry, so treatment must involve the patient accepting a common reality.
Foucault claims that to be adapted to reality is to accept a power that one recognizes is
insurmountable and relinquish the omnipotence of madness. He writes: “To stop being
mad is to agree to be obedient, to be able to earn one's living, to recognize oneself in the
biographical identity that has been formed of you, and to stop taking pleasure in madness”
14

We also see this in Foucault's discussion of Freud. Freud's psychoanalysis looks like
something new, but it is not a rupture in the technical way Foucault uses it. All of 19th and 20th
century psychology employs the same medicalized human subject, and that is what ties it together.
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(PP 166). Reality is imposed on the mad person in the asylum, and I am adding to this the
claim that the common reality (in modernity) involves a linear flow of time appearing to
a linear flowing consciousness.
Foucault made a similar claim in the History of Madness but without making a
further distinction between truth and reality. He claimed that with the advent of the
asylum, there is now a concern for the truth of madness (HM 443). In the modern era,
madness was no longer just a negation of reason the way it was in the Classical era. It
was not a challenge to humanity as a whole; rather, it could bring something new to what
was known about man (HM 443). This could be seen as a move that recognizes the rights
of the mad (as free individuals) as mentioned above, but this also means that madness
could be known 'objectively.' Not only does this put madness into the realm of objective
science, it also clearly makes man an object of study. That is, madness became “the first
great figure of the objectification of man” (HM 461).15 Foucault goes on to claim that:
“The status of the object was now to be imposed immediately on any individual
recognised as alienated: alienation was suddenly deposited as a secret truth at the heart of
all objective knowledge of man” (HM 462).
Foucault does not talk about the difference between truth and reality as they are
employed in the treatment of patients in History of Madness, but he does show that the
truth of the mental patient is not a truth that the patient comes to on his own. That is,
despite the fact that psychiatric positivism is linked to a promotion of knowledge, it is
only so in a secondary manner, fixing a particular mode of being outside madness.
Doctors can assert: I am not mad, therefore you are. The consciousness of not being mad
15

Of course, mental illness is not the only type of objectification. We see a similar type of
attitude toward studies of the body in modern anatomy as well.
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is at the foundation of modern psychiatry. Even though Descartes was in another
historical era, this is still reminiscent of the first meditation, where Descartes was able to
simply assert that he was not mad. As I explained in Chapter 3, he was able to do this on
the grounds of his being a rational subject. In the modern era, there is now science and
objective criteria to back up this assertion. I can claim that I am not mad and provide
evidence to show I fall into accepted ranges of normality. Nevertheless, mental illness
still remains pervasive, and there seems to be no sign of curing it, which allows us to
question how beneficial to the treatment of mental patients the use of truth, or reality, is.
What madness gained in precision through its scientific outline, it lost in
the rigour of concrete perception; the asylum, where it was to rejoin its
truth, was not a place from which it could be distinguished from that
which was not its truth. The more objective it became, the less certain it
was. The gesture that set it free in order to investigate it was also the
operation that disseminated it, and hid it in all the concrete forms of
reason. (HM 471)
Foucault claims that doctors came across the liberty of the mad when they engaged with
the insane for the first time, but this liberty vanished when one tried to pin madness down.
Madness could speak for itself, but then it was fixed by the gaze and reappeared
as engaged, constrained, and reduced (HM 513). Foucault adds that “A madman is only
mad to the extent that his madness is never exhausted in his own truth as a madman”
(HM 514). Doctors tried to objectify madness, but when they thought they understood it,
it was trapped in contradictions. In the classical era, these contradictions would have
justified a label of “unreason.” The unreasonable would have been confined. In the
modern era, not being understood still results in a loss of freedom for the mentally ill.
Foucault sums this up in the following: “The madmen was henceforth completely free,
and completely excluded from freedom. Previously he was free in that tenuous instant in
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which he began to abandon his liberty; now he was free in the large space where he had
already lost his liberty” (HM 515, my translation).
According to Foucault, in the modern era, and in the asylum, the mad became
objects of study and were locked into their objectivity (HM 519-523). We can support
this claim with the way the mad were given treatment via conversations with the doctor.
This started as early as Pinel. In the Psychiatric Power lectures, Foucault claims that the
autobiographical account was introduced into psychiatric practice in the time period of
1825 to 1840. The account of one's own life became an essential component in the
process of disciplining individuals (PP 158). The purpose of making the patient recount
their autobiography was to pin the patient to his own history. That is, the truth was not
what the patient perceived, instead the truth of the patient's biography was imposed on
the patient by the doctor (who already knew the patient's history) getting him to recall
episodes the doctor already knew. Foucault claims that “... this truth is not the truth of
madness speaking in its own name but the truth of a madness agreeing to first person
recognition of itself in a particular administrative and medical reality constituted by
asylum power. The operation of truth is accomplished when the patient has recognized
himself in this identity” (PP 161). So, to stop being mad is for you (the patient) to agree
to be obedient and to recognize yourself in the biographical identity that has been formed
of you. Though this is a historical practice, this still happens today in cognitive behavior
theory and psychoanalysis. In the example of Stolorow's trauma case I used in Chapter 2,
a patient with six separate identities was made to reconstruct her life story in a
chronological arrangement according to an already constructed timeline in order for her
to unite her identities.
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All of this confirms the idea Foucault presents in History of Madness—that the
mad cannot have their own truth, and that both truth and reality are imposed on them
from the outside. Nevertheless, all of this discussion of truth is indicative of a particular
type of truth. In his lectures on Psychiatric Power, Foucault takes a detour in his lecture
to offer a discussion about two kinds of truth that appear in history, and it is this
distinction I would like to develop as it pertains not only to the way madness is
understood as mental illness and the way treatment is administered, but also how it ties in
to a conception of human nature that Foucault rightfully, I think, rejects.
At least since the Renaissance, the natural sciences have operated under the
assumption that there is always some truth at which observation is aimed and
experimentation is supposed to reveal. It might be a truth that is difficult to reach given
human limitations, but it permeates human understanding of the world. This is what
Foucault calls demonstrative truth. To tie this back to Foucault's other work, the criteria
for determining truth are historically determined and contingent upon an episteme, but it
is just a generally accepted notion that science is in the business of revealing true,
objective facts about the world.16 Nevertheless, there is another standpoint of truth that
has been covered over by demonstrative truth. It is “a truth which, precisely, will not be
everywhere and at all times waiting for us whose task is to watch out for it and grasp it
wherever it happens to be” (PP 236). Foucault describes this truth as dispersed,
discontinuous, and interrupted. It will only appear from time to time and to certain people.
It is not a universal truth, and it is not waiting for us. This truth is the “truth-event.”

16

This idea is probably Western, but it is so pervasive, I do not think I need to make an
argument for it.
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So, according to Foucault, there are two series in the Western history of truth, the
constant, constituted, demonstrated, discovered truth and the truth that belongs to the
order of what happens. “It is not a truth that is given through the mediation of instruments,
but a truth provoked by rituals, captured by ruses, seized by occasions” (PP 237). The
person who seizes this truth is not in a subject-object relationship with it.17 This type of
truth is harder to pin to an era, because there are no identifiable historical conditions on it.
It is an event that happens as a singular occurrence or a truth that is revealed. It is not a
practice that follows any sort of epistemic rubric that can be imposed on it, and it is not
something there to be discovered. The relationship between the truth-event and the
person to whom it is revealed is not marked by knowledge, but by power (PP 237).
What Foucault is trying to do is not to look at the history of psychiatry in terms of
demonstrative truth, but to do a history of truth starting with this other series of truth.
“Showing that scientific demonstration is basically only a ritual, that the supposedly
universal subject of knowledge is really only an individual historically qualified
according to certain modalities, and that the discovery of truth is really a certain modality
of the production of truth; putting what is given as the truth of observation or
demonstration back on the basis of rituals, of the qualifications of the knowing individual,
of the truth-event system, is what I would call the archaeology of knowledge” (PP 238).
On Foucault's account, and his supposed “archaeological works” confirm this, it was
during the Renaissance that demonstrative truth took over the truth-event, exercising a
relationship of power over it. He acknowledges that the other type of truth exists
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This is just an interesting but tangential point. According to Foucault, Heidegger wrote the
history of truth in terms of the forgetting of Being, but in doing so placed himself within the
privileges of established knowledge, and thus demonstrative truth. That is, something like
forgetting can only take place on the ground of the assumed knowledge relationship.
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historically, it could go all the way back to the Greeks, but it has been silenced by
demonstrative truth. With regard to psychiatry, what Foucault does is show how in the
19th century the event type of truth is gradually hidden by a different technology of truth.
Or that this type of truth, with regard to madness, was covered up with observation
(demonstrative truth).
There seems something right about Foucault's calling demonstrative truth into
question and my argument will continue along this line of thinking. What Foucault's
archaeological work reveals is the historical contingency of demonstrative truth, but what
his later work on power does is also show how truth gets tied in with practices and
discourses of power, and that allows us to call into question the pervasiveness of this type
of truth. Because the other type of truth is hard to pin down for someone not experiencing
it, it is likely to fall under criticism. But I would like to take the possibility seriously that
there can be other types of truth than the purely demonstrative.
To tie this into my overall project, I have shown that time-consciousness is
historical and normalized in terms that would clearly place it in the domain of
demonstrative truth. Nevertheless, via psychiatric research, I have also shown that there
are alternate experiences of time-consciousness that occur for those diagnosed as
mentally ill. What Foucault's further discussion about truth reveals is that knowledge of
mental illness can be taken in at least two ways. The predominant way that the
knowledge of madness appears in the 20th century falls under what Foucault calls
demonstrative truth, but this type of truth ignores the experience of the patient. The
addition of Husserlian phenomenology to psychiatry provides a methodological vehicle
for taking the subject's experience into account. Nevertheless, phenomenology is also
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used in the service of demonstrative truth, and I have shown this in terms of how
Husserl's structures of time-consciousness have been employed in explaining cognition
and in helping a patient reorder their experience into a predetermined chronology. What I
am arguing is that in attempting to understand mental illness in terms of demonstrable
structures, the psychiatrist or researcher could ignore different experience the mentally ill
patient may have of truth. More specifically, the danger in ignoring their experience is
that the objectifying power of the demonstrative truth of medicalization can be used to
silence them just as much as Classical era confinement did, and medicalizing and
normalizing practices do not recognize their rights as free individuals. I will discuss this
more in the next section.
Extending the Analysis of Truth
There are a few directions we can go to analyze Foucault's assertion of the two
types of truth—demonstrative and truth event—particularly as truth relates to mental
illness. I am most interested in the domination of demonstrative truth since the
Renaissance. I think there is something correct about Foucault's assessment of its
domination, even though an alternate form of truth is hard to pin down or express.
Nevertheless, what this discussion of two types of truth does is provide a starting point
for critique. In the context of this project, I will call the demonstrative truth of psychiatry
into question by offering a broader critique of truth as it is used in what Foucault referred
to as the human sciences. As I showed in Chapter 3, the human sciences emerge in
modernity when man emerges as an object that can be studied. In studying man as an
object, there is a reliance on a conception of human nature that includes certain
demonstrable features that are taken as true. When this is employed in psychiatry, these
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demonstrable features of human nature appear as norms and standards. Not only has
Foucault clearly shown that these norms are historically conditioned, but also that when
demonstrative truth is used in the service of normalizing practices, it justifies certain
forms of objectification.
Before I provide this argument, I will mention another way to critique
demonstrative truth in its relationship to mental illness, which is not to reject
demonstrative truth, but to criticize psychiatry for employing it. There are numerous
critiques of psychiatry on these grounds, and Foucault's work has been employed to make
anti-psychiatry18 arguments of this type. The most common criticism anti-psychiatry
gives is that definitions and criteria for diagnosing mental illness are arbitrary and there is
too much room for interpretation.19 Some holders of this view reject the idea that
psychiatry is its own scientific discipline and instead focus on biological psychiatry as the
correct approach to treating ailments labeled as mental illness. In this manner, in a
famous, and rather scathing, paper opposed to the existence of mental illness, Thomas
Szasz writes:
The notion of mental illness thus serves mainly to obscure the everyday
fact that life for most people is a continuous struggle, not for biological
survival, but for a "place in the sun," "peace of mind," or some other
human value. For man aware of himself and of the world about him, once
the needs for preserving the body (and perhaps the race) are more or less
satisfied, the problem arises as to what he should do with himself.
Sustained adherence to the myth of mental illness allows people to avoid
facing this problem, believing that mental health, conceived as the absence
of mental illness, automatically insures the making of right and safe
choices in one's conduct of life. (“The Myth of Mental Illness,” 118)
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David Cooper first used this term in 1967. See: Cooper, Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry.

19

There are numerous sources that corroborate this claim, but one commonly cited work about
anti-psychiatry generally is: Baker, Mind Games: Are We Obsessed with Therapy?
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He goes onto say that, “The myth of mental illness encourages us, moreover, to believe in
its logical corollary: that social intercourse would be harmonious, satisfying, and the
secure basis of a "good life" were it not for the disrupting influences of mental illness or
"psychopathology"” (“The Myth of Mental Illness,” 118). His opposition to mental
illness is on biological grounds. If mental illness can be reduced to some type of
neurological malfunctioning, then it should be treated as a physical illness. When people
use the terminology “mental illness” Szasz writes, “what they mean is that people so
labeled suffer from diseases of the brain; and, if that is what they mean, it would seem
better for the sake of clarity to say that and not something else” (Ideology and Insanity,
14).
Again, this is not the type of critique I will expound upon in this chapter, although
we can see that this criticism fits into the modern rubric as presented by Foucault. In fact,
Foucault's work could be used to support the inevitable appearance of this criticism in
history. As demonstrative truth becomes prevalent and dominant, then man can be known
objectively (that is, as an object), and reducing man to a mere body that can be measured,
studied, and controlled is an inevitable consequence. Even though this criticism of
psychiatry is common, ultimately Szasz's account is still subject to the critique of
demonstrative truth I am giving, because it replaces one form of demonstrative truth with
another. Not only does it reduce the mentally ill to mere bodies, it ignores the experience
of mental illness for the experiencer, eliminating the validity of things like talk therapy or
the possibility of a different experience of truth.
The way I am questioning the demonstrative truth of psychiatry is to offer a
broader critique of demonstrative truth, particularly as it appears in the human sciences. I
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showed in Chapter 3 that transcendental conditions including those that are naturalized
are used to ground demonstrative claims about time-consciousness. In a similar way,
appeals to human nature are used to ground psychiatric claims, in terms of mental
capacities, developmental stages, etc. In 1971, Foucault and Noam Chomsky had a public
debate that focused on the question: Do we have something in common called human
nature? Chomsky takes what seems to be the more commonly held position in the debate,
and the one used in psychiatric discourse. That is, Chomsky asserts that things like
language and other domains of human intelligence are instinctive and “this collection,
this mass of schematisms, innate organizing principles, which guides our social and
intellectual and individual behavior, that's what I mean to refer to by the concept of
human nature” (HN 5).
Foucault disagrees: “It seems to me more likely that the transformations of
biological knowledge at the end of the eighteenth century were demonstrated on one hand
by a whole series of new concepts for use in scientific discourse and on the other hand
gave rise to a notion like that of life which has enabled us to designate, to delimit, and to
situate a certain type of scientific discourse, among other things” (HN 6). Human nature
is that type of thing. It is not that biologists or psychiatrists have studied human nature;
rather, “In the history of knowledge, the notion of human nature seems to me mainly to
have played the role of an epistemological indicator to designate certain types of
discourse in relation to or in opposition to theology or biology or history” (HN 7).
Foucault's archaeological work supports this claim. As we saw in Chapter 3, “man” did
not even exist until the modern era, and this is an indicator that human nature in the way
defined above by Chomsky is also a modern idea. This is not to say that there have not
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been other accounts of human nature in history, but the way human nature is seen as a
complex of internal structures and functions is exactly the mark of the modern episteme
for Foucault, so we can call Chomsky's account of human nature into question on
historical grounds. If we reject a story about human nature that pins human beings down
to a particular, measurable psychology, then we can also call into question supposedly
universal structures of human consciousness upon, particularly time-consciousness, and
the normalizing practices that occur in consort with these ideas.
In this same interview, Foucault again rejects the idea that science is progressing
to some ultimate point of knowledge. He says, “For a long time the idea has existed that
the sciences, knowledge followed a certain line of progress, obeying the principle of
growth, and the principle of the convergence of all these kinds of knowledge” (HN 26).
Chomsky seems to accept this story, and argues that although the fundamental properties
of human intelligence have not changed since Cro-Magnon man, the level of knowledge
and social conditions change. Nevertheless, Foucault does not see the principles of
regularity and structure of the mind as a part of human nature. He uses the history of
madness to argue against a universal notion of human nature: “The fact that at a certain
time madness became an object for scientific study, and an object of knowledge in the
West, seems to me to be linked to a particular economic and social situation” (HN 29).
This reiterates many Foucaultian themes I have already explored, but in a very pointed
way at the issue of human nature.
I do not want to deny the reality of mental illness like Szasz, or take a hard
empirical line that reduces psychiatry to biology and neurobiology. What I do want to do
is support the rejection of human nature in the same way that I rejected the universal
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claims used in the employment of the phenomenology of time-consciousness. What the
criticisms that reduce individuals to the body or the criticism of human nature open the
door for is a need for a way to talk about the subject and a way to talk about a different
type of truth. In a very broad sense, this need might be phenomenological in the sense
that it requires a return to the subject's experience of mental illness, but I am not making
a critique that goes in the transcendental direction and tries to get to essences that
condition human experience. That would be too much like an appeal to human nature,
just one that is phenomenologically determined.
There is still more to say about truth, and a different way to look at it in terms of
the subject. How does the subject construct itself? How does the mad subject construct
itself when it is told that its identity is abnormal or diseased? In the Psychiatric Power
lectures, we see that over the course of the history of psychiatry, subjects are meant to
accept that they are ill. In certain talk therapy techniques, they are pinned to their identity
with a biographical account the doctor prompts them to recall based on someone else's
version of their life. I will now look at the subject in a Foucaultian way, in terms of a
subject to whom a different type of truth is revealed, but my analysis is not one Foucault
himself makes.
Returning to the Subject and the Experience of Madness
One can take Foucault, even in his early work, as being concerned with the
subject.20 In a late interview, Foucault himself said that he was more concerned with the
subject who constitutes than he was with power.21 His later work on ethics as care of the
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I showed from The Order of Things that Foucault is critical of the idea of a transcendental
subject, but particluarly in his later works, like the History of Sexuality volumes, he is interested
in the possibility of a self-constituting, self-forming subject.
21
This is found in more than one place, particularly in Foucault's published interviews. In “Le
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self also corroborates this concern for the subject as something more than just a product
of power relations. One helpful take on Foucault's conception of the subject is given by
Gilles Deleuze. On Deleuze's reading of Foucault, “the subject is coterminous, contingent
or contiguous with an outside that is in a continual process of transformation and
expansion” (Deleuze, 43). Without using the term “power”, this captures the idea that a
subject is not a static entity or something that exists over and above a context or set of
relations. For Foucault, the subject is not a grammatical figure, nor is the subject just
“socially constructed.” It is more like “a sort of event” (Deleuze, 115).22 This is an
interesting claim when we tie it back to the two different types of truth Foucault mentions
in the Psychiatric Power lectures.
When we take man as a scientific object of study, then we are claiming man can
be known via demonstrative truth. If we look at the subject in a different way than as
simply an object of scientific truth, then we can also consider a different type of truth. On
Foucault's account of truth-event, it cannot be a shared truth, and it exists alongside
demonstrative truth. Nevertheless, that it exists allows us to question the objectivity of
demonstrative truth. I am suggesting that Foucault is correct in pointing out different
types of truth, and that we can recognize it in other people, particularly those deemed
mentally ill. This is not to say that mentally ill patients have experiences of truth as event
such as Foucault describes it, but because the experiences they have cannot be
communicated in their own terms and they have demonstrative truth forced onto them
(via appeals to structures that condition conscious experience), we can still learn

Sujet et le Pouvoir” for instance, Foucault said: “Ce n’est pas le pouvoir, mais le sujet qui
constitute le thème de mes recherches.” See: Dits et écrits, Volume 4, p. 223.
22

See: Deleuze, Negotiations.
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something from them. Even though we cannot experience reality or truth as does
someone whose consciousness may be structured differently (as it seems that certain
mentally ill patients are), that we can recognize it allows us to call the pervasiveness and
power of demonstrative truth into question. That is, we can look at a truth that occurs in
the margins of society, and learn something from its relationship to demonstrative truth.
To do this, we need to better understand the subject at the margins.
One approach to this type of analysis is to re-read the History of Madness in a
way more like the way Lynne Huffer does in her book Mad for Foucault, seeing it as a
history of a sexual subject, and particularly the emergence of the modern western sexual
subject. Huffer is concerned primarily with the particular way in which the queer subject
is on the same level as the mad subject in many ways, as an alienated subject, but there is
something correct and helpful about her approach for my purposes in examining madness
as it related to time-consciousness. Madness is needed to track the emergence of the
subject. In History of Madness, “madness repeatedly punctures – as reason's rupture or
limit – that self-perpetuating history or story [histoire] called reason” (Huffer, 15). She
notes, importantly, that Foucault is not trying to capture the experience the mad have, all
one can do is describe the historical “structure of the experience of madness” through
looking at archives (HM xxxii).
It is impossible to allow madness to speak for itself: “as an object whose truth is
constituted by the deceptive rituals of normalizing science and bourgeois morality,
madness and the psyche have no real content and, therefore, nothing to say” (Huffer, 149).
This corroborates Foucault's assertion that the language of madness is still the language
of reason (HM 233). When the madman does speak in a language that is his own (if this
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is even possible) the mad can only do so from a position of alienation, and even if society
pretends to listen, it cannot really understand (Hallward, 103). Even though
psychoanalysis is a dialogue, and since the time of Pinel psychiatric patients have spoken
to doctors in order to reconstruct their autobiographies, madness does not have its own
language. This is exemplified in Nietzsche's own experience of madness as a failure to
speak. Those deemed normal cannot speak for the mad; the language used to
communicate among normal subjects is the language of reason. A mental patient must
conform to normalcy enough for anything meaningful to come across.23 Huffer suggests
that madness might be best communicated by art, because art provides a form of
expression that is less confined by language. Art also may provide a means for truth as
event to be communicated, though that discussion goes beyond the scope of this project.
To be comprehensible, the mad have to use the language or expression of reason
(the language of the non-mad) to be heard, and so they are never really heard because
they cannot express their experience in their own terms. I am not suggesting that we
literally listen to the mad, and indeed it would be futile to even try, as I explained above,
but that we remain aware of the social and historical contingencies that define madness.
In the modern era, this means we have to acknowledge that the mentally ill are pushed to
the social margins and alienated. Even though it has been acknowledged that the mentally
ill are free subjects, their subjectivity is only of a certain type, that is, of the normal,
rational subject. Huffer corroborates this claim, arguing that in History of Madness,
Foucault is already concerned with subjectivity and truth, because the stakes of madness
are the stakes of rational subjectivity (Huffer, 257-8).
23

I do not mean that they purposefully or consciously conform, just that normalizing
psychiatric treatments essentially are conforming to a norm or range of norms.
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The history of madness is a history of the subject, and in looking at this history,
we see historical contingencies extend also to truth. Demonstrative truth dominates the
modern conception of truth, but other truths are possible. Even in the history of madness,
Foucault points to some type of alternative to the history of the rational subject, and I
suggest that this also points to an alternative truth. Of course, truth is always historical,
but the people who can have truth need not always be the ideal, rational Western subject.
In Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault does identify the 19th century as an era of
subjective transformation (15). Here, Foucault describes an alternative to demonstrative
truth as “transformative” where “transformative truth brings subjects into play.” By
contrast, the Cartesian moment denies the possibility of self-transformation, because it
fixes the subject as a rational “I” who can assert he is not mad. Huffer argues that this is
because Descartes denies eros and the sexual subject, but I want to take this more
generally. The subject is a historical product just like anything else, but in modernity at
least, it is also a site of resistance.
In History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, Foucault writes about “se deprendre de soi-meme,”
or releasing oneself from oneself. That is, he points to a possibility of escaping the grip of
teleological history and the regulatory shackles of bio-power. Because the self is defined
in terms of normalizing practices and power relations, to free oneself would require a
rejection of certain institutions and truths and a refusal to be governed in a certain way.
Although ultimately this is up to the subject, I argue that it becomes possible to think of
such an escape when we look at subjects who are at the margins. The mentally ill are the
focus of my project, and they seem to be the key example of how practices of
normalization lead to their silence. We must learn from their experience in order to give
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subjects alienated for other reasons a voice as well, even if they speak a truth we might
not understand.
The individual is the only thing that can experience this different type of truth.
Even though the truth cannot be known by another, the mad individual reveals to the nonmad that alternate truths are possible. One could ask why we should assume these
alternate truths exist. What Foucault's analysis shows is that demonstrative truth is
contingent upon certain epistemological conditions and relations of power that change
over time. What is true could be otherwise. Even if there is little evidence to support
revelatory truth, we can at least call demonstrative truth into question. I suggest that this
is one way to navigate the overwhelming dominance of demonstrative truth in modernity,
because demonstrative truth as it gets tied in with practices of normalization and
medicalization becomes a threat to individuals. Though the mentally ill are certainly
threatened, and their silence is documented, there is a broader threat of the conservative
power of the status quo. In the next section, I will look at why the subject is important
and why I consider the subject to be under threat.
Time-Consciousness as Normalizing
What Foucault's work most clearly, and I think uncontroversially, reveals is that
those deemed mentally ill in Western society today would have been treated very
differently if they had lived in a different time period. They would have been seen as
madmen, sinners, untreatable, animals, deviants, or some variation or combination of
these things. Today, the commonly held view is to see them as individual subjects who
have something wrong with their brains, and this is a stark contrast to the thinking of the
Classical age of confinement. In the above section, I discussed a way of looking at the

192

subject as an individual to whom a different type of truth can be revealed. In this section,
I am going to make that claim more concrete by showing how the subject is usurped by
modern mechanisms and practices like normalization, and the psychiatric subject offers a
clear example of how this happens.
I am not critiquing psychiatry, and I do not want to deny the reality of mental
illness. I am also not valorizing mental illness or claiming that in order to experience nondemonstrative truth we must be mentally ill. What I am doing is using the experiences of
the mentally ill, particularly those with “abnormal” experiences of time-consciousness, to
offer a critique that points out the risks of increased and pervasive medicalization
indicative of the modern era for the experiencer and what the broader epistemological
and social implications are for this type of normalization. I want to look at the negative
effects of normalization like the marginalization that can occur when a person is labeled
as deviant, or the possibly harmful measures people take to fit into a social standard.
Women (or men) who become anorexic to fit a beauty standard are one such example. I
will also argue that paying attention to the mad, seeing them as something more than just
a medicalized subject, and legitimizing their experience is one way to establish a point of
resistance against the potentially oppressive effects of normalization. The mentally ill are
often oppressed in modern society; for example, therapy is stigmatized or
pharmaceuticals that treat a mental illness may not be covered by insurance. My aim is to
show that these potential effects are not necessary.
In “Friendship as a Way of Life,” Foucault said, “We have to dig deeply to show
how things have been historically contingent, for such and such reason intelligible but not
necessary. We must make the intelligible appear against a background of emptiness and
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deny its necessity. We must think what exists is far from filling all possible spaces” (139140). This is a good starting point for my discussion. Foucault's archaeological work
exposes the historical contingency of mental illness as a human science. This contingency
is further exposed when we look at medicalization in terms of power relations that are
historical, but we also see how pervasive they are and try to get us to believe in their
necessity. In his aside during the Psychiatric Power lectures, Foucault suggests that one
of the ways this has happened is via the domination of demonstrative truth. In the
previous section, I provided more support for that claim. In the modern era, we see that
not only is medicalization a pervasive feature of a disciplinary system, it is also
oppressive in that it alienates and locks the subject into certain regulatory practices that
homogenize.24
Time and time-consciousness are crucial to this criticism. First, time is a tool used
to regulate, and I have argued in previous chapters that is it also a tool used to normalize.
In modernity, where we care about consciousness, we also care about time-consciousness,
because time is seen as a fundamental and universal experience. We see this in Husserl,
indicative of the fact that he continued to write about time-consciousness over the course
of his entire life, and that it continues to be taken on by philosophers, psychiatrists, and
cognitive scientists. The consequence of time-consciousness being taken as fundamental
is that a normal experience of it can be used as a standard by which to evaluate deviation.
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There are numerous arguments that could be given as to why this is a bad thing. Curiously,
the modern era is marked by a declaration of human rights and many Western nations include
statements about individual liberty in their constitutions. Furthermore, the dominating economic
system of free market capitalism also promotes certain images of individuals pulling themselves
up by their bootstraps. Nevertheless, in spite of this common rhetoric, many practices (marketing
comes to mind) also requires that subjects be docile, compliant, predictable, and the same. This
appears like a case of subject-object doubling, yet, the “subject” seems more illusory than
anything else.
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When the phenomenological subject becomes a site of normalization, then it can be used
in a political and economic way. By being fixated on the linearity and regularity of time
and of consciousness, we become easier to regulate and order as subjects, instruments of
capital, military personnel, etc. This can occur in something as simple as enforcing time
tables in military training or schools.
Second, having an abnormal experience of time-consciousness can be enough to
push you into the margins. The purpose of my using Foucault's work is to take a new look
at the human subject, taking a critical look at the things we take to be fundamental to
human functioning, like time-consciousness. I have shown that time-consciousness
becomes a medical issue when it enters psychiatric discourse. Foucault mentions
something similar with regard to the deployment of sexuality in modernity in The History
of Sexuality. There he claims that through pedagogy, medicine, and economics, sex
became a concern of the state. The medical field and medical discourse was employed in
the political sphere, and state management of marriage, births, and life expectancies
developed. It was “a political ordering of life” (HOS 123).25
To return to the role time plays in this, Foucault has given numerous examples of
how disciplinary power takes a role in controlling an individual's time (PP 47). There is a
temporal component to psychiatric treatment. In asylums, which according to Foucault
employ disciplinary power that is militaristic in its employment, treatment is very
regulatory. There is a certain order and strict rules, and this functions according to a time
table (PP 152, 248). Certain types of individual treatments also have a temporal
component. In the doctor-patient relationship, there is a temporal component to the
25

I am taking this out of context here, but the phrase, I think, sums up a broader claim that is
applicable more widely than in the historical point Foucault is making.
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autobiographical recounting type of therapy, wherein a patient must construct a
chronological timeline of their life (PP 158-9). Today in the field of psychiatry, there is a
temporal component to theories of cognitive development via developmental milestones
that are arranged in a temporal division.26 That is, there are rules of chronological
succession for certain developments to occur; normativity takes shape, and the adult
appears as the real and ideal end of development (PP 208).
In Chapter 2, I showed how Husserlian time-consciousness specifically appears in
this medical discourse via an appeal to certain structural features indicative of a normal
consciousness. In Chapter 3, I made a broader claim that all such discourse is dependent
on certain modern conceptions of time and consciousness as linear. I also used Foucault's
archaeological work to show that madness as mental illness is a historical conception that
arose in modernity. In this chapter, I continue the analysis of mental illness within
modernity. Foucault shows that mental illness does not only emerge out of a modern
epistemological framework but it is also an effect of disciplinary power that emerges in
modernity. Mental illness is indicative of the medicalization that emerges in disciplinary
regimes.
We can see how a conception of truth as demonstrative (that originated before
modernity) is utilized in modernity with the emergence of the human sciences that take
man as a measurable object. Demonstrative truth becomes dominant in a regime of
disciplinary power where individuals are instruments of power. I combine these two
claims to argue that if we can fully understand man, then he can be most effectively
harnessed as an instrument of power. It is here, in a regime of disciplinary power, that
26

Developmental psychology and infant and child psychology are huge field within the larger
discipline, but all developmental theories seem to rely on some time table to when certain
cognitive milestones are reached.
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mental illness and time-consciousness come together. Medicalization and normalization
are practices that pathologize deviant experiences, and the experience of time is
employed as a regulatory means of control. Because there exist regulatory practices that
conform to a normal conception of time, this also means that there are abnormal senses of
time. We (society) do not legitimize the deviant cases of time as simply alternative
experiences which would show that the structures of time-consciousness are not universal,
nor do we allow these alternative experiences to operate under a different and individual
conception of truth. Instead, we regulate them and treat them. Mental patients are a
collection of specific deviations from the norm, and each one is taken as a “case” and not
as a subject.27
In spite of these practices, we can still challenge normalization and resist
normalizing practices. Foucault suggests that this occurs at the level of the subject. I will
once more use his work, this time to claim that we should not rule out different
experiences of time-consciousness as simply not true (and fixable) at the risk of silencing
the subject. Foucault is interested in historicizing the subject that can eventually change
and that is politically important (“Sexuality and Solitude,” 177). And this is the point
where his ethics of freedom gets off the ground.
Escaping Normalization via Care of the Self
In “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” Foucault defines
ethics as “the conscious practice of freedom,” and his aim seems to be to suggest a postmoral ethics of freedom.28 For Foucault, ethics is a network of practices, values, and
patterns of conduct, and the ethics he seems to endorse allows for the possibility of
27

McWhorter also makes this point. See: McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the
Politics of Sexual Normalization, p. xviii.
28
See: Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” p. 284.
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ethical self-overcoming and creating a “style” of living, giving ourselves to the process of
becoming new. Another way to see this is as transforming the modes of rationality –
living life as a work of art (Huffer, 270). What enables Foucault to propose an ethics of
this type? With Foucault's work, one must reconcile the methodological question of how
we can even criticize our own era or propose anything new within it.
I think the answer to this problem might be simply that we can know it can be
different because it was different, although we might not ever be able to ground
evaluative assertions that things are better or worse. I am implying that practices of
normalization and medicalization are harmful, but I cannot justify that substantially, other
than to say that people (as subjects) can feel harmed by these practices. We can see that
people feel harmed based on the existence of counter-narratives and on the existence of a
different type of non-demonstrative truth. I do not think it is a radical assertion to say: I
want freedom as a subject not to be treated like an animal, or locked up, based on criteria
I did not make. Biopower is pervasive, but there are other threads of discourse and
practice that run through modernity. We can conceive of ourselves as not fully captured in
a normalizing regime.29 This is indicated by the fact that we can critique power relations,
and that we can resist taking on certain ideas and treatments. One way to do so is via
ethical care of the self.
In her work on Foucault, Ladelle McWhorter has suggested that the elements of
this self-overcoming style include ethics based on care of the self and counter-memory. A
counter-memory is a concept Foucault develops in the 1970s, and it comes out of a
genealogical investigation of the type Foucault performs; like a counter-history, it is an

29

McWhorter makes a similar suggestion in Bodies and Pleasures, p. 195.
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alternate history or a different story of the past that is not included in the dominant story
of history. Knowledge is subjugated by the power of the status quo, so a counter-memory
revives forgotten experiences and memories of marginalized perspectives. The task is not
to escape power, but to mobilize other forms of knowledge in what Foucault calls an
“insurrection of subjugated knowledge.” Where subjugated knowledge are forms of
knowledge that have been disqualified as non-conceptual knowledges, as insufficiently
elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges,
knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity.30
One way to utilize counter-memories and counter-histories is to deploy them in
the service of an ethics, but an ethics based on care of the self. To have an ethics based on
care of the self means to create a way of life based on patterns of personal behavior, value
systems and networks of intimate relationships. Through care of the self, one can find the
potential to live differently, even within a disciplinary regime. Through a countermemory we can expose the contingency of things, the empty background against which
historical forms appear (McWhorter, 190). Hearing the voices of those who have been
suppressed, instead of those whose interpretations have won out, helps us to see the
contingency in our beliefs. McWhorter writes, “Counter-memories collected together,
even from the distant past, can serve to illuminate and reinforce acts of resistance in the
present as people struggle to establish new networks of power to counter whatever
network now oppresses them” (McWhorter, 208). Counter-memories work to keep things
unstable and can provide a reason for disobedience if we are to oppose normalizing
regimes.
30

See: Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, p. 7-

10.
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Look at the case of Herculine Barbin. In Foucault's work Herculine Barbin, which
includes the diaries of Barbin, one sees an example of an individual who, being a
hermaphrodite, is a medical anomaly. Barbin's body was interesting to medical doctors in
the 1860s, not simply because it was usual, but because deviations allowed them to better
document, understand and influence normal development.31 McWhorter claims that with
Barbin's own record of his/her experience, we have a counter-memory to sexual
normalization. With counter-memories, we can “[push] the moment of sexual
normalization's total domination of our lives back just a little bit,” because we reach a
limit to discourse (McWhorter, 208). Although I am not talking about sexual
normalization, there is a parallel account that can be drawn for the normalization that
comes along with the treatment of mental illness. This is why the experiences of the
mentally ill and particularly their experiences of time-consciousness need to be shared.
Even if they cannot be fully expressed to those who do not have the same experience, we
can still be aware that they exist.
We cannot resist or oppose normalization if we cannot see it, and this is why the
mentally ill, the abnormal, and the mad are necessary, not to learn more about the nonmad the way doctors learned from Herculine, but because the way the mentally ill are
treated exposes greater implications about the large-scale social norms that govern us.
Because madness is understood, treated, and defined differently historically, we can see
that there are different ways to categorize the mentally ill. Even within the 20th and 21st
centuries, if you look at different editions of the DSM, you can see the ways mental
illness have come to be defined and redefined. Another way to categorize “deviant”
psychology is inevitable, historically speaking, and it could very well include people who
31

See: Foucault, Herculine Barbine.
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we would not consider mentally ill today. It could be anyone who disagrees with the
government, for example, which the government has the power to “fix.” The way people
are normalized could involve things that we find ethically deplorable.32
Foucault looks at the way we treat the mentally ill in terms of power relations.
When certain disciplinary practices become pervasive, and when behavior is normalized,
it is more difficult for alternative types of experience to be given legitimacy or for any
subject, mad or not mad, to be heard. Even being aware of normalization allows us to
have an access point to expose the power relations at work that normalize us, and maybe
provide an alternate account of truth.
Conclusion: Why Time-Consciousness?
To reiterate, the purpose of this chapter is not to say that the mad are “right” or
that they are not ill. It is to say that we have to be wary of accepting transcendental
conditions that deal specifically with things like ordered human experience. Time is used
to regulate, organize, and control. If it is linked to time-consciousness (which is seen as
fundamental), then we can more easily be controlled as disciplinary subjects. This sounds
like a conspiracy theory and an extreme consequence, but is it any more extreme than
locking up the poor or chaining the mad like animals or defining homosexuality as an
illness? Time is simply a condition of experience that appears as ordering our experience,
and we let it control us. I am using time-consciousness as an example (and there are
others, like sexuality) of a site of normalization. What this discussion of the subject at the
margins of power reveals is that it is possible that other ways to be conscious of time
exist, especially given their dependence upon historical transcendental conditions like
linearity.
32

Of course, this already occurs.

201

In Chapter 3, I established a connection between time-consciousness and studies
of mental illness, particularly with regard to a reliance on transcendental conditions. In
this chapter, I showed that this is indicative of a demonstrative type of truth, because the
transcendental conditions are taken both by Husserl and by the psychiatrist as
demonstrably true, whether it be through a phenomenological reduction or through
medicalization. What would an alternated experience of time-consciousness look like, not
in terms of something to be regulated and normalized, but in terms of truth-event? It
would very likely be a non-measurable, non-physicalist account of time-consciousness,
where consciousness is not reduced to the brain or regulatory practices that force a person
with a different experience of time to accept a linear time. Ultimately, I am arguing that
time-consciousness is another feature of human experience that is dependent upon history
and discourse, and so it could be otherwise.
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Conclusion
In this project, I set out to question the universal and normative claims that are
included in Edmund Husserl's account of the structures of time-consciousness. In order to
do this, I first showed how within Husserl's own account of time-consciousness, there is
an implicit assumption that the structures of time-consciousness must appear in a
psychologically normal consciousness. I based this argument on Husserl's explanation of
intersubjective time constitution. For Husserl, we constitute the spatio-temporal world;
that is, we assume that there is an objective reality outside of ourselves that we share with
other subjects. Husserl excludes who he refers to as “the insane,” from participating in
shared constitution on the grounds of their lack of rationality, claiming they do not
constitute shared social norms, included among these would be a shared, objective time.
To further my argument that Husserlian time-consciousness is implicitly normal, I
showed that his structures of time-consciousness have been employed in psychiatry at
least since Eugene Minkowski's work in the 1920s. Since the 1920s, Husserlian structures
of time-consciousness, particularly his innovation of a 'thick present' where a protentionprimal impression-retention structure conditions our conscious experience, have been
used to study cognition and even the neurological experience of time. I was interested in
the particular instances where either research on time-consciousness was used to study
cases of mental illness or where time disturbances were noted as symptomatic of a mental
illness. One particular mental illness that comes up frequently in this type of research
(back as far as Minkowski) is schizophrenia. One of the common features of
schizophrenia is a disturbed experience of time, and I gave examples as to how
Husserlian time-consciousness played a role in describing these disturbed experiences
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where there is often a gap or a loop in what is supposed to be a continuous flow of
consciousness. I also showed one case, not of schizophrenia but of trauma, where Robert
Stolorow used Husserlian time-consciousness in aiding the therapeutic process of a
patient who was made to consciously reconstruct her experiences in order to recapture
what Husserl would call a sense of ownness to her consciousness, along with its linearity.
Some would argue that employing Husserlian time-consciousness in these cases is
not a justifiable move because of the methodological differences between
phenomenology and psychiatry. Indeed, the first psychiatrists to employ Husserlian ideas
in their work explicitly rejected certain features of phenomenology, like its commitment
to transcendental idealism. Instead, psychiatrists preferred to look at subjectivity as tied
to an anthropological subject in the world, not as constituting subjectivity over and
against the world. Nevertheless, I argued that at least in the case of time-consciousness,
both the phenomenologist and the psychiatrist rely on two transcendental conditions – the
linear flow of consciousness and the linear flow of time – that they take to be objective
and true of all experience. From here, I argued that the reliance on these structures put
phenomenology, psychiatry, and any study of Husserlian time-consciousness together
under a particular historical epistemic framework.
In other words, phenomenology and psychiatry occur in a particular historical
period, what Michel Foucault calls modernity, and an examination of history reveals
certain contingencies about the knowledge and truth these studies discover. In the second
half of this project, I utilized Foucault's work to show that studies of time-consciousness
take place in a particular modern framework that both phenomenology and psychiatry fall
under. One of the main features of this epistemic framework is that in modernity, man
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emerges as both a subject and an object, meaning that man is stuck in a doubling. In
modernity, man emerges as an object of study for the first time, and this is done by
looking at internal structures and functions that relate to the way man operates within a
particular context. Man is also the subject performing these studies, and so his knowledge
conditions what can be known. According to Foucault, and I take this idea up as well, this
means that man is both empirical and transcendental. Foucault argues that although
phenomenology attempts to get out of this doubling, it will always fail to do so. It is
inescapably empirical because it claims to be grounded on experience, but this experience
happens to a transcendental consciousness. Because it does not escape this doubling, it is
subject to criticism from both sides. Nevertheless, there is an upshot to this when working
specifically within a modern context. That is, I argued that because Husserlian timeconsciousness relies on transcendental conditions of linearity (of time and of
consciousness), it is always working in the same framework used by the disciplines
(psychiatry and cognitive science) that take themselves to be empirical, and this
application is justifiable.
Despite the fact that I argued that Husserlian phenomenology of timeconsciousness can be employed in empirical disciplines, I was also interested in exposing
the historical contingencies of the epistemic framework that conditions phenomenology
and the study of time-consciousness. The same modern episteme from which timeconsciousness emerges as an object is also the framework that conditions the study of
mental illness, so I used Foucault's work on the history of madness to reveal the
emergence of mental illness as a rupture from the previous era's understanding of
madness as unreason. The practices that surrounded madness in what Foucault labels the
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Classical era included poverty, immorality, and criminality as forms of madness; it was
only in the late 18th and 19th centuries that madness was construed as a medical issue.
This matches the modern episteme Foucault outlines in The Order of Things, which looks
at the underlying structures and functions of the body (and, I claim, of consciousness) in
order to form knowledge and truth. In the modern era, this medicalization of madness led
to the birth of the mental asylum and eventually to psychiatry as we know it today.
According to Foucault, this modern ordering of knowledge makes psychiatry
something that happens not on the level of society, but on the level of the individual, their
body, and their surroundings. This is a move in the direction of positive medicine, but it is
also indicative of what Foucault calls the domination of demonstrative truth.1 In the
modern era, demonstrative truth dominates knowledge by privileging the empirical
sciences, and what makes the modern era different is its studies of man. This way of
looking at man as a measurable entity and an object of knowledge that can be fit into
statistical, medical norms can be explained in terms of discursive practices and power
relations. In continuing to look at the modern era in his later works, Foucault explains
that an increase in the medicalization of the subject is indicative of disciplinary power,
where individuals are considered in terms of their productive power, their ability to
repopulate, and their usefulness to the governing body. This power works to push people
who do not fit into norms, like the mentally ill, into the margins of society and silences
them as unimportant, not useful, and, as Husserl himself did, unable to constitute a shared
world and shared norms. Although statistical and pathological margins are created in a

1

Of course, demonstrative truth is not a particularly modern phenomenon. It has existed as
dominant at least since the scientific revolution.
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regime of disciplinary power, there are also mechanisms of treatment for the
marginalized to try to bring them back to some norm.
It seems that there is no escaping these processes of marginalization and
normalization. Nevertheless, we can still evaluate practices and discourse that normalize
because the knowledge and truth in which they are rooted are historically contingent.
When reading History of Madness as a 21st century reader, some of the confinement
practices employed in 17th and 18th centuries sound dehumanizing and morally repugnant.
Even though we cannot think outside our own epistemological constraints, we can still
evaluate modern practices keeping in mind the risk that practices we consider harmful or
ethically suspect could become the norm. What this means for an individual in a
disciplinary regime is that if you find yourself at the margins, you may be forced into
practices that negate or devalue your experience. One concrete example of this is the
marginalization of homosexuality in modern society. As I mentioned in the body of my
paper, homosexuality was considered a mental illness by the APA's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders until 1973. Today this seems absurd and even
offensive to those who understand homosexuality as a sexual orientation, but even after
its removal from an institutional document like the DSM, there is still much legal
discrimination and negative stereotyping on the social level. This reveals both the
contingency of diagnoses as well as the social consequences of pervasive medicalization
and normalization.2 In the context of this project, I also claim that marginalization occurs
in cases of people who experience time differently from what is considered
psychologically normal. In the final sections of this project I give a response to these
2

Although I did not discuss this in detail in my dissertation, Foucault talks at length about the
influence of morality in the treatment of mental illness. There seems to be a clear tie-in here.
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practices of normalization based on other Foucaultian tools, like the ethical practice of
care of the self and creating counter-memories. There are still ways for people in the
margins to subvert normalizing practices, and ultimately, I think we have to be willing to
question the power of demonstrative truth as it pertains to mental illness and also to the
experience of time.
Why Time?
Over the course of this project, I have looked at the specific case of Husserlian
time-consciousness, and as my project progressed into social considerations, it may have
seemed peculiar to the reader to continue speaking of time and time-consciousness at all.
It is because it feels peculiar to call it into question that I am questioning it. We have a
tendency in the Western, Judeo-Christian tradition, to think of time, particularly linear
time, as feature of the world. We think that time frames all of our experiences. I am
looking specifically at time-consciousness, because it is taken to be so fundamental it
could be argue that it is an innate feature of human nature. I want to make it clear that I
am not claiming that Husserl's conception of the structures of time-consciousness is
wrong. In fact, I think there is something right about Husserl's conception of timeconsciousness so long as we clarify that it is within a modern context and under particular
epistemic conditions. Husserl is the starting point of my analysis because he gives a
thorough and extensive account of time-consciousness. Because his account has been
taken up in other fields like psychiatry and cognitive science this legitimizes his work in
the service of demonstrative truth. For Husserl, time in its flow and linearity is an
observable, experienced phenomenon, and the work that takes up Husserlian time-
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consciousness also uses these same assumptions of linearity in the service of
demonstrable truth.
Nevertheless, not everyone experiences time the same way or in a linear way, and
the psychiatric research I presented in Chapter 2 shows evidence of this. Where Foucault
becomes important to my project is in exposing the normalizing effect that psychiatry has
on individuals who do experience time differently from the normal account established
with Husserlian structures of time-consciousness. What Foucault's work shows is that
psychiatry is a discipline that is at the service of certain commitments to demonstrative
truth and relationships of power. Power, particularly psychiatric power as it exists in a
biopolitical framework, leads to medicalization and normalization. So my claim is that
you must experience time in a certain way to be normal, and you need to be normal in
order to participate in society.
Why is this important?
The case of abnormal time-consciousness may seem like a very specific situation
in practice. That is, deviant experiences of time-consciousness like the examples I
brought forth are statistically rare, and an abnormal time-consciousness is often only one
symptom among many. Most of the examples I use in this project are cases of
schizophrenia, but I am not suggesting that we should not treat schizophrenia as mental
illness or that normalizing processes are always harmful or dangerous. What I am
offering is not a critique of psychiatry per se; I am claiming that looking at history and
questioning the domination of certain norms exposes contingency and makes us see that
things could be different, even certain temporal conditions we take to be fundamental.
Before modernity, anyone deemed mad by the state could be confined and eliminated
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from society, and madness was not defined other than by the whim of the sovereign state.
Now, madness is defined in terms of demonstrative truth and in the medical field, but that
does not mean these conditions will not be used to perform similar exclusions.
In fact, normalizing practices are in some ways even more insidious when done
under the heading of demonstrative truth. For example, from the 18th to the mid-20th
century, there was a practice of confining young women by putting them into group
homes (called Magdalene asylums) due to so-called “debaucherous” behavior.3 This is an
example of a gendered exclusion based on the imposition of certain imposed and widespread moral norms. As I mentioned above, it has only been in the last 40 years that
homosexuality is not considered a mental illness, but even today, some people still speak
of it as a curable disease in the same way we see mental illness, like depression, as
curable. These examples show that even though we take psychiatry to be an objective
discipline that uses scientific means to diagnose and treat patients until they fall into
some commonly accepted range of normal, we can (and should) still call into question the
ways we measure and evaluate mental illness. I am drawing particular attention to cases
where the grounds for exclusion are generally considered fundamental.
I hesitated to use this quote from Foucault in the body of this project, because it is
a quote from a 1975 interview Foucault himself was opposed to having published.
Nevertheless, it clearly expresses the importance I am trying to convey from the point of
view of Foucault not qua philosopher, but qua someone who is marginalized:
In my personal life, from the moment of my sexual awakening, I felt
excluded, not so much rejected, but belonging to society's shadow. It's all
the more a problem when you discover it for yourself. All of this was very
quickly transformed into a kind of psychiatric threat: if you're not like
3

See: McCarthy, Origins of the Magdalene Laundries: An Analytical History. See also: Smith,
Ireland's Magdalen Laundries and the Nation's Architecture of Containment.
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everyone else, it's because you're abnormal, if you're abnormal, it's
because you're sick.4
The reason why the issue of normalization is important is because it exposes the
contingencies that occur at the level of things we deem fundamental, including the
conscious experience of time, time objects, and time-constituting acts. Questioning the
contingent nature of supposedly objective practices matters because these practices
exclude people. Marginalization and normalization are pervasive and often sinister
practices. We have reached a point in society where mental illness is pervasive and
thought to occur on basic structural levels of bodily experience, but this does not mean
we should ignore and remain uncritical of the practices that result from this type of
knowledge.
Where Do We Go From Here?
This project is by no means complete. I have provide a narrow critique of the
particular issue of Husserlian time-consciousness, its application in practices that study
and treat mental illness, and the social effects of these practices. This could be expanded
in multiple directions, but there are a few implications and other points of critique that I
briefly touched upon over the course of these four chapters, and I would like to bring
attention to them here.

A Critique of Natural Science
In Chapter 4, I relied heavily on one section of Foucault's Psychiatric Power
lecture course, in which he expounded upon two conceptions of truth that exist today in
our society. The first of these is demonstrative truth. What struck me about these pages of
Foucault's lecture is that he points to an issue that is pervasive not just in philosophy, but
In Huffer, Mad for Foucault, p. 36. Citing Foucault, “Entretien avec Roger-Pol Droit.”
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in everyday existence. There is a tendency in our culture to take any information coming
under the heading “science” as brute fact of the highest and irrefutable truth. Furthermore,
we also have a tendency to view the changes in science that have occurred over the
course of history as progress in the service of making human life “easier.” One need only
to open a newspaper (or news website) or watch the evening news to see both of these
claims uncritically advanced.
What a historical analysis (and tangentially an analysis of power relations) does is
allow us to see the contingencies of scientific truth. Even natural scientists themselves
would admit that scientific research and findings are never exact. The scientific method is
largely inductive and reliant upon probability. Even when a neuroscientist claims that a
brain is not functioning “properly,” there are still statistical ranges of normal that
scientists rely upon to reach this claim. Just as Husserl is commonly criticized for being
always in the shadow of Descartes with his reliance on consciousness as something over
and against an outside world, the world of science is in the shadow of Enlightenment
thinking. The clear and distinct ideas that Descartes was seeking may never be found,
particularly in cases where “truths” about man as an object are trying to be found.
Although I argued that it is legitimate to employ the phenomenology of timeconsciousness in the service of psychiatric research because these fall under the same
epistemic conditions, I do think one must do so reflectively. Husserl's goal was for
phenomenology to play a foundational role in the sciences (including psychology), so it
might be possible to offer a broader account of phenomenology in the service of
psychology and psychiatry but it is not clear what that type of psychiatric work would
look like.
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It follows from what I said above that I think it is important to question the
domination of science, particularly in the case of medicine and psychiatry, because
human beings are easily manipulated in the service of power. It may seem like I am going
in the direction of a conspiracy theory or a dystopian novel, particularly at the end of
Chapter 4 of this project. Nevertheless, with the domination of pharmaceuticals
especially in the field of psychiatry, a society where human beings are reduced to heavily
drugged and regulated cogs in a machine does not seem implausible.
Art as Truth-Event
At one point in Chapter 4, I suggested that madness might be best communicated
by art, because art provides a form of expression that is less confined by language and
may provide a means for truth as event to be communicated. In Lynne Huffer's work, she
suggests that if we read the History of Madness not just as an archaeology or history, but
as something more narrative, i.e. the history of the emergence of the western rational
subject, then we see that the “heroes” of Foucault's story are the likes of Nietzsche,
Artaud, Roussel, and Van Gogh. In fact, Huffer claims that, “All of these characters,
along with others—onanists, precieuses, melancholics, hypochondriacs, nymphomaniacs,
ad infinitum—will emerge and disappear over the course of the book as figures of the
othering structure that simultaneously produces and excludes sexual subjects and their
others” (Huffer, 50). Although Huffer's project is very different from mine, this is an
angle that could be explored in relation to truth. These are individuals who may generally
be considered mad, some were diagnosed as such, but it is also the case that they may
speak a different type of truth with the vehicle of art, poetry, etc.
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I argued in Chapter 4 that we should consider the possibility of different forms of
truth other than demonstrative truth, including the type of truth Foucault suggests as
truth-event. This type of truth may not be able to be communicated linguistically or in
perfectly ordered prose or by means of some other vehicle of rationality. Insofar as art is
an expression of something non-linguistic or non-rational, it may be the best means we
have to express different forms of truth. This is not an idea unique to philosophy or
uncommon in philosophy,5 but it is an argument that could come out of my work with
Foucault particularly in the ways art relates to time.
Time-Itself
Finally, although I mention “time itself” at points in this project, I have tried to
separate it from time-consciousness, or the conscious experience of time. I have argued
that we do not always experience time as a steady, streaming, evenly divided flow that
imposes itself on our consciousness. I think this also points to a criticism of the
objectivity of time as it is conceived in science and in the natural attitude. I mentioned at
points in this project that linear temporality is a product of the age of reason, but a
nonlinear conception of time still exists within it, a time which Huffer refers to as the
tragic, lyrical, circling time of unreason (Huffer, 157). Studying madness exposes
alternatives to that which we consider normal. Thus, if time-consciousness is a historical
creation in the same way that mental illness is a historical creation, then it can be
otherwise.

5

I gesture in the direction of a work like Jean-Luc Marion's The Crossing of the Visible, which
looks at art as the expression of givenness.
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